Emotions, protests, and populism: discursive struggle and democratic implications of recent anti-austerity movements by Cossarini, Paolo
UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID 
FACULTAD DE DERECHO 
DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA Y RELACIONES 
INTERNACIONALES 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
 
 
 
Emotions, protests, and populism: discursive struggle and 
democratic implications of recent anti-austerity movements 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD Candidate: Paolo Cossarini 
Supervisor: Prof. Fernando Vallespín Oña 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Madrid, November 2015 
 2 
This PhD thesis has been kindly founded by the FPU Program of the 
Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport 
 
 
THIS DISSERTATION HAS ONLY BEEN PARTIALLY PROOFREAD. 
A MORE COMPLETE PROOFREADING WILL BE DONE AFTER INTEGRATING THE 
CRITIQUES OF THE COMMETEE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
AGRADECIMIENTOS 
 
 
Si los agradecimientos ocupan las primeras páginas de una tesis doctoral es 
porque, de alguna manera, lo último que se escribe resulta ser de lo más 
importante: sin las personas que aquí agradezco no existirían las páginas que 
siguen.  
 
Evidentemente son numerosas las personas a las que debo mi más profundo 
agradecimiento, tanto en el ámbito profesional como en el personal. En primer 
lugar, todo mi agradecimiento para mi director de tesis, Fernando Vallespín, 
quién como pocos sabe combinar rigor teórico y libertad intelectual, agudeza 
en el debate y pasión por la enseñanza. Además, su capacidad para conjugar la 
seriedad de los temas públicos con el ingenio del humor se merece una 
mención especial. Asimismo quiero agradecer al Departamento de Ciencia 
Política y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid en 
su conjunto. Desde que inicié la investigación doctoral he estado rodeado de 
compañeros y compañeras que me han motivado a mejorar mi trabajo, 
ofreciéndome su apoyo y los recursos más adecuados para la realización de 
esta tesis, así como de toda la actividad académica que he desempeñado.  
 
Algunos de los capítulos de esta tesis han sido presentados en los Seminarios 
de Investigadores en Formación del Departamento y se han nutrido de las 
excelentes críticas formuladas por los profesores y compañeros. Doy 
especialmente las gracias a los miembros del área de teoría política y a todos 
aquellos que han comentado en profundidad partes de esta tesis: a Elena 
García Guitián por su acertado análisis pragmático, a Máriam Martínez por su 
esfuerzo en enfocar el debate desde ángulos diferentes, a Ángel Rivero por su 
profunda visión histórica, a Víctor Alonso por su contagiosa pasión por los 
textos clásicos, y a todas las personas que me han ayudado con sus 
comentarios. Dentro y fuera de la Universidad, he podido contar con el apoyo 
crítico y constructivo de, entre otros, Ignacio Criado, Evaristo Prieto, Irene 
 4 
Martin, José Ramón Montero, Carmen Navarro, Ignacio Molina, Alberto Sanz, 
Joaquín Abellán, Susanne Gratius, Sebastián Escámez, Fabiola Mota, Santiago 
Pérez-Nievas, Itziar Ruiz-Giménez. He podido compartir con todos ellos 
muchas horas de clase, debates, comidas y cafés que han sido sin duda 
enriquecedoras.   
 
Esta tesis doctoral nunca se habría iniciado sin la financiación del Programa de 
Formación de Profesorado Universitario del Ministerio de Educación. Gracias 
a ello también pude realizar estancias de investigación en diferentes 
Universidades Europeas, como el Institut d’Études Polítiques y la Écoles des 
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales de París y la Queen Mary University of 
London. Aprovecho para agradecer a los profesores que me apoyaron en estas 
instituciones. A Gil Delannoi, Luc Foisneau, y Pierre Rosanvallon les debo su 
aliento para profundizar en el análisis histórico, a Lasse Thomassen su 
cercanía y su capacidad para el estudio teórico de los fenómenos 
contemporáneos. Fue un privilegio poder contar con estos excelentes 
profesores para mi formación. 
 
Esta tesis, además, es el resultado de una síntesis de los diferentes intereses 
que he ido madurando a lo largo de los años. Si se mezclan enfoques diversos y 
perspectivas heterogéneas, es porque diferentes son los objetivos que me han 
empujado en la investigación. Con todo, uno se queda con un sabor agridulce 
al acabar una investigación doctoral. La sensación de insatisfacción típica de 
estos trabajos – ya que siempre se querrían mejorar – se combina con el alivio 
de verlos terminados. Si he llegado hasta aquí es también gracias al apoyo de 
los compañeros y amigos que me han acompañado en esta aventura. Los 
investigadores en formación del Departamento de Ciencia Política y 
Relaciones Internacionales, que son muchos para citarlos a todos, comparten 
conmigo la pasión por la política y la docencia; gracias a ellos he podido 
cultivar mis intereses científicos, e ir componiendo parte de esta tesis. A todos 
ellos gracias.  
 5 
 
He dejado para el final los miembros de mi familia. Les dedico este trabajo 
precisamente porque, durante estos años, han sido el apoyo emocional más 
cercano y fuerte. Si a veces es difícil entender que esto de hacer una tesis no es 
cosa de dos días, siempre he podido contar con su aliento.  
  
 7 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last decades, social scientists and democratic theorists have paid 
increased attention to the role of emotions in politics. However, while 
sociologists have emphasised primarily the role of emotions in the 
mobilization process, and normative political theorists have discussed mainly 
on the dichotomy between suitable versus harmful emotions for democratic 
purposes, there is still a lacuna in the understanding of the political role of 
emotions. It is this gap that this thesis attempts to fill. 
Focusing on the broad role of emotions apparent in recent anti-austerity 
movements in Europe, this thesis advances a theoretical inquiry, which can 
contribute to the connection between protest analysis, democratic theory, and 
populism.  While in the broad scientific literature recent protest mobilizations 
have generally been associated with contentious processes, the rise of left-
wing populism, practices of deliberative democracy, experiments in horizontal 
decision-making, and so forth, this research highlights the role of affects in 
recent anti-austerity movements, and examines how a discursive focus on 
emotions can enrich the scholarship on democratic theory on offer. The main 
argument proposed here is that, besides their central function in motivating 
people to engage in political action, emotions also play a significant role in the 
framing of democratic order. Specifically, it is contended that they have a 
‘geometrical’ role in shaping the political subject – namely ‘the people’. As well, 
contributing to the latency of political concepts, they have an ‘evocative’ role in 
today’s struggle for democratic legitimacy and popular sovereignty. Finally, 
this investigation assesses the success of some current theories of democracy 
giving an account of the role of emotions in politics, and argues that an 
agonistic approach offers fruitful insights in this debate.  
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Chapter 1. Protests, emotions and democracy: Setting up the problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The people’s wrath  
 
2011 has been defined as the year of global indignation. In the wake of the 
Arab Spring, phenomena such as the Indignados and Occupy Wall Street were 
paradigmatic of a global wave of mobilizations that had deep political 
consequences. Syntagma square in Athens, Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Zuccotti 
Park in New York are some of the places in which the citizens protested and 
destabilised the political agenda. As a result of the global financial crisis, these 
protest movements emerged – first in Europe and the United States, and in a 
second moment in a global scale – as critical manifestations of the political and 
economic state-of-affairs, claiming more citizen participation in the political 
decision process. Despite the differences and peculiarities of each of these 
protests, the shared aim of these phenomena was to be a vector of political 
and social change: they all demanded for more (direct and participatory) 
democracy, lacking of faith in traditional political processes and official actors. 
 
Obviously protests and social movements are not new phenomena, but have 
characterized the major changes in contemporary political systems, and will 
certainly remain protagonists in the future. Nor are the social movements that 
later become institutionalised political parties. However, this recent wave of 
mobilizations has reawakened scientific interest in social movements and 
protest. The emergence of recent anti-austerity and protest movements 
caught the scientific attention in recent years, and a lot of ink has already been 
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spilled on these movements. Since the new wave of protest movements 
attained a global dimension in 2011, academics and activists have focused on 
their demands and their political implications. Social scientists have analysed 
these phenomena, highlighting the broad political implications for 
contemporary democracies (as well as other types of political regimes, 
especially in the case of the Arab Spring), and especially the disaffection 
towards political institutions and the financial system they reflect. Similarly, 
scientists have put a lot of emphasis on the new political parties that have 
emerged from the experience of the 2011 protest movements, and that have 
started competing in local and general elections, especially in Southern 
Europe.  
 
A heterogeneous mix of approaches and perspectives developed in recent 
years attempt to answer a series of questions referred to these contentious 
phenomena. Certain questions have gained much attention in scholarly 
debate: how to address the anti-austerity movements? What about the 
relationship between movements and new media technologies? Should it be 
considered as a global phenomenon, or as plural and differentiated 
experiences? And in a more theoretical vein, what kind of political vision do 
they entail? Is it an ephemeral, isolated occurrence or does it belong to the 
long wave of global – though locally grounded – anti-capitalistic and radical 
democracy protests? What are the relationships between these movements 
and the institutionalized political parties?  
 
Within this context, a concrete sector of social sciences – mainly sociology of 
protest, and protest event analysis – has produced a copious amount of 
literature, particularly focusing on topics such as the organizational resources 
and networks these movements employ to mobilise citizens, the type of 
mobilizations, and the inner structure of movements (e.g. Benski, 2013; 
Jasper, 2011). Moreover, in consonance with the spreading of protest, scholars 
have also pointed out, among other things, the anti-austerity discourses and 
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the struggle against economic inequalities and the growing precariat (Tejerina 
et al. 2013; Standing, 2011), the relationships between movements and 
democratic theory and practices (della Porta, 2009; 2013), the rise of (left-
wing) populism in Europe (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Urbinati, 
2014), and the central critique of representation (Tormey 2012; Prentoulis 
and Thomassen, 2013). It is worth noting, in this sense, the fact that the 
protesters occupying squares and streets in the anti-austerity manifestations 
did not just act against the financial system, nor merely criticize the current 
representative democracy as profoundly corrupt, but also experimented with 
different models of democracy. Indeed, as we will point out in the following 
chapters, great part of the defenders of deliberative democracy found concrete 
examples to ground their theories in the political reality (e.g. della Porta, 
2009).  
 
These are only some of the topics related to the increasing literature that 
focuses on these recent phenomena. However, the focal point of this 
investigation, although strongly related to these kinds of questions, is not 
developed from the same angle. Rather, this research deals with a parallel 
aspect that these movements uncover, which is the role of emotions in politics.  
 
In an analogous way to the growing literature concerning the organizational 
structures of movements, and the ‘traditional’ questions about democratic 
problems – such as deliberation, representation and institutional schemes – 
increasing attention has been lately paid to the emotional dimension these 
movements involve. Emotions and politics, we should acknowledge, are not 
new concerns. Politics is awash with emotions: fear, anger, guilt, pity, envy, 
shame, among other feelings that play a part in the lives of every common 
citizen, in the formation of social movements, in the political parties’ strategy 
and so forth. In this sense, the political reflection about emotions, it must be 
said, is nothing new as we will show in the following chapters, the political 
role of emotions deepens its roots in classical and modern traditions of 
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thought. It is noteworthy that, however, while central to many aspects of 
politics and social processes, emotions have only recently re-entered into 
social science investigations, as if emotions were somehow banned from the 
mainstream political science for decades. Drawing on different critical 
approaches and traditions of thought, the relatively new ‘affective turn’ (e.g. 
Greco and Stenner, 2008; Clough and Halley, 2007; Clough, 2008) has 
developed a vast cross-disciplinary literature on emotions that opens up 
thought-provoking interrogatives about the relationship between affective 
and political dimensions. Research questions have included, among other 
themes, inquiries about the relationship between reason and emotion, the 
place of emotions in the process of political judgment, deliberation, and the 
role of affects in the rise and development of protest and social movements, 
and so forth. Furthermore, while recent studies on emotions disclose and 
sustain their growing centrality in every kind of political process (e.g. Hall, 
2005; Krause, 2008; Morrell, 2010; Kingston, 2011), it is worth noting that the 
attention has recently increased alongside the growth of recent anti-austerity 
mobilizations, as well as the electoral success of right-wing parties across 
Europe. (e.g. Perugorría and Tejerina, 2013; Wodak et. al., 2013). 
 
Drawing special attention to states of feeling that mobilize, or demobilize 
citizenries, many authors have started addressing theoretical and normative 
questions about the role of emotions in protest events and, more broadly, in 
democratic regimes. Within this context, social sciences have mainly focused 
on the role of emotions in the mobilization process and, on the other hand, on 
the dichotomy between suitable versus harmful democratic emotions. In fact, 
on the one hand scholars have made the effort to bring emotional dynamics 
into the explanation of collective action and social movements, considering 
emotions in movements’ emergence, organization, identity, framing, 
repertoires, etc. (Jasper, 2011). On the other hand, political theorists have 
explored the normative question of where one draws the line between good 
and suitable versus bad and harmful emotions for democratic purposes. On a 
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general note, these questions have focused on what kind of emotional 
engagement liberal and democratic regimes need: what affective dispositions 
(if any) does liberal democracy require from citizenry? How to differentiate 
emotions that fit with democracy and those that are not beneficial to liberal 
and democratic values? (e.g. Hall, 2005; Krause, 2008; Morrell, 2010). 
 
“Listen to the people’s wrath”. This was one of the numerous slogan shouted 
by young people in Puerta del Sol in Madrid in the spring of 2011 (Ramonet, 
2011: 4).  How is this slogan to be interpreted? What is the role of wrath – the 
wrath of people – in politics? Referring to the recent wave of anti-austerity 
mobilizations, Zygmunt Bauman observed that the 2011 protest movement 
known as the Indignados was an ‘emotional’ mobilization1, stating that 
emotions are particularly suitable for the destructive task, but they are useless 
for constructive functions. On a similar note, Charles Taylor opens his 
foreword to Rebecca Kingston and Leonard Ferry’s work, Bringing Passion 
Back in: the Emotions in Political Philosophy (2008), with a forthright 
statement: “The idea that democracy is threatened by passion is strange but, 
in a sense, true” (2008, vii). Is the people’s wrath threatening democracy? Is 
wrath the only emotion manifestly expressed by these movements? What 
about other emotions brought to the forefront by the recent wave of anti-
austerity movements, such as indignation, resentment, humiliation, fear, hope, 
joy, and so forth? 
 
The normative question about the fit between certain emotional dispositions 
and democratic principles has certainly a significant theoretical value, and 
recently a growing amount of literature has focused on this subject. Beyond 
the alleged ‘hostile’ value of wrath for democracy, what protest movements 
                                                             
1 Interview by Vicente Verdú, El País, 17 October 2011. In the original Spanish: “si la 
emoción es apta para destruir resulta especialmente inepta para construir nada […] La 
emoción es inestable e inapropiada para configurar nada coherente y duradero […] [El 
movimiento crece y crece pero] lo hace a través de la emoción, le falta pensamiento. Con 
emociones solo, sin pensamiento, no se llega a ninguna parte”. 
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surely do is to allow for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between 
emotions and politics. Within this context, this research starts with the 
assumption that there is a theoretical and political dispute about the function 
of emotions in politics and, more concretely, in democratic practices. Although 
it has been shown that emotions have been cast off by contemporary liberal 
political theory on the grounds that they represent a danger to reasoned 
debate (Hall, 2002; 2005; Mouffe, 2002), still, many contemporary authors 
working within democratic theory recognise that an emotional commitment is 
required for a truly democratic community (e.g. Ferry and Kingston, 2008: 14; 
Kingston, 2011; Krause, 2008, Morrell, 2010).  Furthermore, the development 
of contentious events during the last years as well as the emergence of new 
political subjects across Europe adds significant political problems to the 
relationship between emotions and politics (and the study of it). Hence, if this 
research deals with a general puzzle – what is the role of emotions in 
democratic politics, and how to theoretically and politically deal with it? –, 
some concrete questions derive from our methodological standpoint, which 
consists, as we will develop further on this pages, in linking the normative 
questions about emotions to the theoretical and discursive analysis of the 
recent wave of anti-austerity mobilizations that have characterized the 
European context particularly since 2011.  
 
 
2. Object of study and research questions 
 
Given this context, and with the aim of maximizing clarity and precision in the 
analysis, it is necessary to delve into the object of study. Investigating the role 
of emotions in democratic politics implies specifying the boundaries of the 
study itself.  
 
First of all, it has to be clear that focusing on recent anti-austerity movements 
does not mean that this is a thesis on the Indignados, or similar movements, as 
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such. Rather, it is a thesis that starts with these phenomena originated in the 
2011 in order to enter into the democratic implications they entail. 
Specifically, the object of our research will be a critically engagement with the 
broad literature that has lately focused on the political role of emotions. 
Concretely, assessing the role of emotions in scholarly debates about 
democracy and populism, we aim at vindicating the cogency of some 
theoretical reflections, which can in turn shed light on the same contentious 
phenomena. Hence, we will mainly draw on the considerations that disclose 
the nature of the relationship between emotions and the political realm. 
Particularly, we will put emphasis on a series of political approaches – from 
different scientific fields, such as social movement studies, populism and 
democratic theory – that suggest thought-provoking understanding of this 
relationship and unveil normative and theoretical consequences for the 
political domain.  
 
Secondly, when dealing with such broad and all-encompassing terms and 
perspectives – democracy, democratic theories, populism, emotions, etc. – an 
operation of clear terminological definition seems necessary. However, as we 
will argue, the emotions intervene directly in the framing of political reality 
and in conceptual definition itself. That means that the terminological 
definition is what is often at stake, as result of the interplay between the 
emotional dynamics and the political realm. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy to 
mention here some clarifying – though preliminary – points. As almost all 
political categories, the concepts of democracy and populism are contested, 
and there is an ongoing animated debate around both of them. Democratic 
theory is in this sense the lively manifestation of the struggle over what 
democracy is and should be. Although a minimum agreement seems to be 
reached around the notions of a combination of popular sovereignty and 
majority rule – which involves the existence of free and fair elections, the 
protection of minority rights, equality before the law, and respect for basic 
human rights – different approaches, vision, and ‘models’ of democracy have 
 24 
been suggested in both empirical political science and normative political 
thinking. Analogously, the term populism encompasses many different 
understandings, and despite the scientific attempts to reach a consensual 
definition, political studies have on the contrary opened up the field of usages, 
which range from demagoguery, particular kind of movements or political 
style and discourse (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Müller, 2011). In 
the specific subsequent chapters, which are dedicated to these theoretical 
problems, we will further delve into their conceptual significance.  
 
Thirdly, a consideration about the emotions must appear in this introduction. 
Although emotions as such are not the ‘pure’ object of our research, they 
occupy a central role throughout the argument of this thesis, and they will be 
therefore the specific object of analysis in subsequent chapters. What counts 
for now is to highlight that political science has an uneasy relationship with 
the presence and functions of emotions within political realm – probably due 
to its own historical development as a social science. As we have already 
mentioned and will further explain in the second chapter, in recent years a 
wide range of disciplines took up the task of giving new prominence to the 
role of emotions within social sciences. Neurology, psychology, philosophy, 
sociology, and historical studies, among others, contributed to expand the 
interest for emotional dynamics, also reaching political studies. While 
emotions have been given little place in most social-scientific theories for a 
long time, being considered too personal, or too irrational to be modelled or 
measured properly, recently a variegated chorus of researchers brooked the 
silence (e.g. Damasio 1994; Elster 1999; Forgas, 2000; Goodwin et al., 2001; 
Kingston, 2008; 2011; de Sousa, 1987). This diverse literature has challenged 
the traditional dichotomy between reason and passion, re-locating the 
affective dimension at the core of social and political realm, with special 
emphasis on what concerns political mobilizations: emotions are directly 
related to the spreading of protest movements (Goodwin et al., 2001; Goodwin 
and Jasper, 2003); they have a distinct social character and a specific weight in 
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the formation of collective identities and social bonds (Ahmed, 2004); they 
play a role in the process of making political and moral judgment (Nussbaum, 
1994), and so forth.  
 
A variegated literature has brought emotions back into the discussion. This is 
certainly a merit we must acknowledge. Yet, despite this flurry of unceasing 
research, one may still experience dissatisfaction. Firstly because it seems that 
social movement researchers and democratic theorists hardly bridge their 
heterogeneous analyses (even though this might be a general trend within the 
different paradigms of social sciences). Secondly, because there still seems to 
be unexplored questions in the understanding of the political role of emotions. 
A lacuna this thesis attempts to fill.  
 
In this sense it is necessary to mention some gaps in this literature. First, only 
few authors within this literature explicitly bridge the theoretical and 
epistemological perspectives. Although many scholars put emphasis on the 
epistemological consequences this ‘affective turn’ has brought about, little has 
been done to connect the different views with broader theoretical and 
historical considerations (e.g. Kingston & Ferry, 2008: 108-125, Krause, 2008; 
Solomon, 1990; 1993). As we have argued elsewhere (Cossarini, 2014), a 
longue durée perspective mixing a history of political thought and 
contemporary debates can shed light on the relationship between emotions 
and reason, and therefore provide broader analytical tolls to the 
understanding of contentious phenomena. However, given the limitation of 
space and the scope of this research, the development of this point will be 
limited to the methodological chapter. At this stage, it is worth noting that the 
traditional dichotomy between reason and emotion is still profoundly 
pervasive, and probably represents an intrinsic feature of contemporary 
political studies.   
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The second point that has to be highlighted is that, within political and 
democratic theory, ‘reason’ – and its correlate terms, such as rational, 
reasonable, and the ‘best argument’ in deliberative theory – has traditionally 
been given a privileged, often overvalued, place. This does not mean that the 
objective of our research is to conversely give predominance to the emotional 
dimension. Rather, it means that it has been proven that within democratic 
theory, contemporary scholars have traditionally given great place to reason, 
perpetuating (consciously or not) the dichotomy between reason and 
passions, and excluding (often deliberatively) great part of the emotional 
dimension from the proper political field (e.g. Holmes, 1995; Hall, 2005). 
Within this context, recent contentious phenomena, along with developments 
in theoretical perspectives and new cross-methodologies suggest that it is 
possible to explore the role of emotions from a different angle. In this line, the 
theoretical question that guides us in our research is: what can a focus on 
emotions bring to democratic theory? The wide and elusive nature of this 
question obviously involves other related questions we should and will 
consider in this investigation. These questions include interrogating the 
relationship between rational and emotional factors in the epistemology of 
political research, as well as interrogating the same meaning of sweeping and 
contested terms such as emotions and democracy, among others.  
 
Additionally, it is evident that this research question can give birth to multiple 
studies, depending on the perspective, the methods and the object of 
investigation. Theoretical, historical, or empirical inquiries can enrich the 
understanding of emotions in the political domain, as well as in the process of 
democratic legitimacy. However, our level of analysis, as we will detail further 
on in this introduction, lies at the crossroads between democratic theory, 
populist and protest movement studies. It implies that, in order to effectively 
study and to give form to our investigation, a focus on a case study is 
warranted.  
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Moreover, grounding the theories we will take into account on a case study, or 
more precisely, assuming the case study as our starting point signifies that its 
boundaries must be detailed. In this sense, we will put emphasis on the way in 
which emotions were at play at the discursive level in the recent anti-austerity 
events – with a special focus on the Spanish case. Needless to say that this 
thesis is not interested in giving any historical or sociological explanation, nor 
finding a casual mechanism of these events. They are only partially our objects 
of study, being mostly the concrete reality where to ground and probe political 
theories. As we will show, for the purpose of this research, focusing on some 
concrete events has a double scientific advantage: it can obviously shed light 
on the same contentious phenomena taken into account, and it can 
consequently probe the content and inconsistencies of democratic and 
political theories we draw on, and therefore test their cogency of the existing 
political reality. In this sense, we will delve more into it in the specific chapter 
dedicated to the discourse analysis of the last wave of mobilization and 
protests in Spain, so that little attention will be given to a detailed 
presentation of these phenomena. At this stage it can be said that we will 
mainly focus on the discursive level of these phenomena, putting particular 
emphasis on some key slogan, and mottos, that protesters have been 
employing during their acts.   
 
One last specification about the object has to do with our methodological 
approach, which will be the centre of attention of the next paragraph. It is the 
same nature of the object of the research that needs a combination of 
perspectives, and a cross-methodological analysis. Through the conjunction of 
theoretical and discursive inquiries – this is our belief – the role of emotions in 
democratic politics can be further comprehended.  
 
Given that the conundrum we face is the place and role of emotions within the 
political realm, and given the case study we will take into account, we 
concretely deal with a series of specific questions. 
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- From a theoretical point of view, this research focuses on the possibility 
of combining different fields of research, such as protest analysis and 
populist and democratic theory. Concretely, this investigation asks: 
what can a discursive focus on emotion bring to theories of democracy? 
And conversely, to what extent theories of democracy have to take into 
account the role of emotions? 
 
- Empirically, the question we want to answer is related to the role 
emotions have in the complex process of framing the political realm. 
How do they work in framing the reality? How do they take part in the 
discursive struggle over the meaning of democracy and in the process 
of democratic legitimacy?  
 
It is undoubtedly true that a lot of investigations have been focusing on the 
role of emotions in contentious practices, in protests, in democratic 
deliberation, and political agonism (e.g. Goodwin and Jasper, 2003; Krause, 
2008; Kingston & Ferry, 2008; Mouffe, 2013). One might argue indeed that the 
role of emotions has been analysed within social movements and especially as 
part of the mobilization process, the organizational resources and networks. 
As well, it might be contended that even in the dominant theories of justices 
and deliberative democracy of 20th century, there was an acknowledgement 
of the emotional underpinning, such as the intrinsic desire for justice as its 
own normative basis (e.g. Banerjee and Bercuson, 2015).  
 
However, these scientific traditions have not phrased their research in the 
way we are picturing this thesis, and these questions have not been explored 
in much depth. A lacuna still exists in the combination of these heterogeneous 
studies: the connection between, on the one hand, theories of democracy and 
populism and, on the other hand, the focus of emotions brought back 
particularly by social movements studies has not received much attention 
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amongst scholars. In this sense, this study tries to develop a relatively novel 
research line, combining these research approaches and theories.   
 
 
3. Methods and hypotheses 
 
As we have shown, a heterogeneous corpus of recent literature brought the 
role of emotions back to political debate. Psychological, epistemological, 
historical, normative, and sociological perspectives have been used by 
scholars in order to grasp the political function of emotional dynamics. This 
research cannot properly assess the analysis without recognizing the merits of 
this mix of disciplines. However, the perspective chosen for our inquiry, 
despite being cross-methodological, is clearly defined within the contours of 
certain fields of study. As we have already stated, the focus of this study will be 
scholarly debates on theories of democracy and populism, and particularly 
their emphasis on the affective dimensions of politics. The aim is to vindicate 
the cogency of some theoretical reflections, which can in turn shed light on the 
same contentious phenomena. In this sense, this thesis is mainly a theory-
oriented investigation that starts with and operates via a discursive analysis. 
Methodologically, we face the problem of operating in between different 
approaches and fields of study. It implies that different traditions of thought 
are employed at the epistemological and theoretical level. It will become clear 
therefore that this research is not a purely analytical inquiry that draws on 
only one corpus of theories, trying to highlight its arguments, inconsistencies, 
critical arguments, etc. Rather, drawing on different fields of political studies 
we want to critically engage with a political problem. Grounding the theories 
on concrete reality, the aim is to bridge theory and empirical evidence, 
debates on democracy and debates on social movements. The idea is that 
these perspectives have something to learn from each other, and their linkage 
helps to somehow develop an original research line. In this sense, while we 
will probe the cogency of normative democratic theories, it will in turn supply 
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further theoretical tools for the understanding of the same contentious 
phenomena taken into account.  
 
THEORY  CASE STUDY  THEORY 
 
Figure 1.1 Link between theory and case study. 
 
We will focus in detail about this methodological approach in the core 
epistemological chapter, but it is now important to bear in mind what the 
combination of these two perspectives means. John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and 
Anne Phillips, in their ‘Introduction’ to The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory 
(2006: 5) affirm that political theory is located “somewhere between the 
distanced universals of normative philosophy and the empirical world of 
politics”. If we agree with this statement, we then should acknowledge that the 
connection between normative philosophy and empirical world is made by 
language and discourses. As John Dryzek suggests, “discourse is a shared way 
of apprehending the world”, which “enables those who subscribe to it to 
interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or 
accounts” (Dryzek 1997: 8). In other words, it is in and through discourses 
that political theory develops itself and can comprehend political phenomena, 
elaborate concepts, and perpetuate ideas. At the same time, as the critical 
tradition of discourse analyses has shown (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), ideas 
and concepts are daily involved in discursive struggles for the meaning. In this 
sense, while natural, physical and cultural objects clearly ‘exist’ independently 
of any particular discourse, they are ‘discursively constructed’, which means 
that their significance is constantly transformed through concrete discursive 
articulations.  
 
In this sense, we will specifically underline the role of emotions in their 
discursive translations. We will specifically draw on discourse and frame 
analysis, as well as rely on the theoretical outcomes of social movement 
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studies, two of the recent multidisciplinary research fields that have 
developed fascinating approaches and methods for the analysis of emotions 
and politics. Within these scientific fields, as we will show in the 
epistemological and methodological chapter, emotions are seen to have some 
essential and intrinsic dimensions: cognitive, evaluative, sensitive, and 
motivational. Given these allegations, we argue that a combination of 
discourse analysis and democratic and populist theory represents a fruitful 
way in the comprehension of the role of emotions in politics. As well, we will 
enquiry whether a discursive focus on emotions can enhance democratic 
theory itself. This inter-methodological nature is indeed one of the defining 
elements of this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Link between different theoretical approaches. 
 
Going beyond the pure normative perspective – generally employed by 
scholars operating within the liberal paradigms – this conjunction opens up 
fascinating ways of analysis that can complement both theoretical and 
empirical investigations. In our view, this should increase the interest in this 
research, bringing nonetheless some difficulties. First, broadening our 
descriptive and analytical tools obliges us to fulfil the theoretical standards of 
different methodologies. Secondly, employing different methodologies 
increase the risk to open the field and the object of analysis in an 
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unmanageable way.   
 
Nevertheless, this research will draw particularly on theoretical consideration 
about the nature of populism, its relationship with democracy and discourse 
analysis of recent anti-austerity movements, in order to assess some general, 
testable hypotheses. Moreover, our hypotheses, as we will show, derive from a 
critical review of recent literature on emotions and politics. This 
heterogeneous literature, as we will see in the subsequent chapters, suggests, 
among other things, that (1) emotional factors are essential in both collective 
mobilization, as well as in the creation of social bonds. As well, from a 
theoretical and epistemological point of view, recent scholarship argues that 
(2) modern dichotomies based on division between rational/irrational 
dimensions, although highly pervasive in political studies, have to be revisited.  
 
These premises allow us to formulate some hypothesis about the potentiality 
of a discursive focus on emotions for theories of democracy and populism. 
Specifically, considering the discursive level of analysis, we can articulate 
some considerations about the role of emotions in the process of framing the 
political realm. In this sense, it is contended that:  
 
- Emotions have a ‘geometrical’ role in shaping political subjects. From a 
purely theoretical point of view, one may find demonstration of this 
geometrical role of emotions within the history of political thought, 
being they concrete part of political theories – often opposed to ‘reason' 
– and their intent to create legitimized political order (Holmes, 1995: 
271). This thesis starts with the assumption that emotions have a broad 
historical and theoretical role in the construction of the political order. 
It stresses that they have a role in the current struggle for the meaning 
of political categories and, as a result, protest movements are part of 
this struggle. At the discursive level, our hypothesis is that emotions 
operate in the formation of political identities, creation of basic 
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democratic bounds, and consolidation of democratic beliefs. 
Specifically, we think that emotions function through a discursive 
construction capable of dividing the social into two camps, and giving 
birth to political identities. As shown by the literature on populism, this 
logic often means the division between ‘the people’ and the 
establishment (Laclau, 2005a: 110). 
 
- Furthermore, we contend that emotions have an ‘evocative’ role, 
contributing to the latency and ideality of political concepts. Emotional 
factors take part, through the ideological and symbolical function of the 
concepts they contribute to create, to the constantly transformation of 
political ideas. Discursively, emotions operate in the daily struggle over 
the definition of central political categories, such as the political subject 
– ‘the people’ – and therefore the same idea of ‘democracy’. Such 
concepts are publically contested and continuously redefined – this is 
what contentious phenomena, also emotionally, show and claim.   
 
In this context, it will be stressed that a discursive approach to emotions can 
contribute to the normative debate about the relationship between populism 
and democracy. 
 
- For these reasons, we will argue that a discursive focus on emotions 
enhances democratic theory, insofar as it opens up a space for 
theoretical reflections that goes beyond the purely normative 
dichotomy between good and suitable versus bad and harmful 
emotional dispositions for democratic purposes. In this vein, a 
theoretical and discursive focus on emotions can also contribute to the 
normative debate on the relationship between democracy and 
populism – often formulated in a similar either/or fashion. Focusing on 
emotions adds interesting nuances to the normative debate about the 
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threatening or correcting nature of populism for democracy, since it 
shows the articulated ways in which the struggle for conceptual 
meaning occurs. 
 
In this light, we further highlight the relevance of our case studies – the recent 
wave of anti-austerity movements. They represent one of the most remarkable 
examples of the role of emotions in politics, both at the discursive and 
theoretical level. As well, they are an expression of the broad and foundational 
role of emotions in politics, notably for what concerns the use of emotional 
tools in the creation of political and democratic subjects, as well as for the 
emotional struggle for the meaning of key political categories.  
 
 
4. Aim and structure of the research 
 
As we have already mentioned, particularly engaging with the scholarly 
debates on democracy and populism, our purpose is to delve into theoretical 
reflections that are attentive to emotional dimensions. Specifically, the idea is 
to explore the role of emotions in the process of democratic legitimacy, 
drawing on the case of the recent wave of anti-austerity movements, and their 
rhetoric for popular sovereignty. In so doing, we will also disclose how a 
discursive focus on emotions can enhance democratic theory. 
 
In order to reach this objective, the concrete case study allows us to deepen 
into theoretical considerations. In this sense, we construct an investigation 
placed at the crossroad between different methodologies of political 
investigation. Theoretical and discursive aspects are showed to be intertwined 
and not merely in a parallel way, so that they can be put together with the aim 
of constructing a comprehensive narrative on our object of study, which is – as 
stated above – a relevant theoretical and political problem to delve into. 
Trying to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the topic studied, the aim is, in 
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other words, to better understand the function of emotions in the fluctuating 
and shifting boundaries of democratic legitimacy, as well as to theoretically 
vindicate a particular democratic perspective. In order to do so, we will follow 
a quadruple strategy: 
 
a) We will explore how political and social theory has considered the 
role of emotions and their relationship with the political domain. 
Through an analysis of recent literature, we will put emphasis on the 
heterogeneous fields of contemporary political research on emotions. 
Highlighting the different arguments within the literature, we will put 
special accent on the broad political consequences associated to social 
theorizing. 
 
b) We will further develop the epistemological considerations about the 
nature of political investigations. As well, we will set our theoretical and 
methodological model for the study, which will enable us to link 
together heterogeneous and apparently separated fields of study, such 
as the political analysis of emotions and theories of populism and 
democracy. 
 
c) We will focus on our case study – the case of recent anti-austerity 
mobilizations and particularly the Spanish case –, and through a 
discourse analysis we will identify the role of emotions and affective 
dimensions. 
 
d) We will return to a theory-centred section, delving into recent 
populist and democratic theories. If the aim is to vindicate the cogency 
of some theoretical reflections, nonetheless the normative question will 
be linked to the discursive focus on emotion we will have developed in 
the previous chapters.  
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In accordance with this, we will proceed through different steps. The structure 
of this research is, indeed, deliberately intended at developing in a clear 
manner its main methodological objective, which is the conjunction of both 
normative democratic theory and discourse analysis. Drawing on a 
heterogeneous literature about social movements, populism and the theory of 
democracy, the research aims at showing a theoretical path to the 
comprehension of the political role of emotional dimensions, specifically 
referring to recent contentious mobilizations.  
 
From this perspective, the chapters can be seen as divided in three main 
blocks: literature review, methodology, and development of theoretical and 
discursive analyses. More concretely, the second chapter (Chapter 2) is 
dedicated to a critical examination of the relationship between emotions and 
political research. After dealing with the conceptual analysis of emotions and 
affective dimensions, particular attention will be paid to the relationship 
between emotion and reason in modern and contemporary political 
investigation. Moreover, we will put emphasis on the arguments developed by 
contemporary political research on emotions, especially highlighting the 
different arguments within normative social and political theory. The 
following chapter (Chapter 3) belongs to the second block. This is the core 
methodological and epistemological part of our research. In fact, we firstly 
deal with the epistemological consequences that the literature on emotions 
and politics bring to the forefront. Then we take a stand and advance some 
suggestions for the combination of different methodologies, showing the 
advantages of this move. A conjunction of theoretical and discursive 
perspectives, it is argued, will allow a better comprehension of our puzzle. 
Moreover, drawing on the discursive approach developed by the so-called 
Essex School, we will particularly delve into some consideration of the 
discursive level of our investigation and its link with populism and normative 
thinking. Drawing on this perspective of populism, we will explore the place of 
emotions within it. It is through the populist logic, it is contended, that 
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emotions operate what we have called their geometrical function. Populism, in 
other words, activate a politicization of passions. 
 
The following two chapters combine discourse analysis with theoretical 
reflection about social movements. Chapter four (Chapter 4) is focused on the 
ways in which the social sciences have considered collective action, and its 
particular relationship with the dichotomy between reason/emotion. It is 
firstly devoted to a review of the developing field of protest movement 
studies, and draws deeply on recent scholarship on protest and social 
movements. The attention is on both the explanation of collective action and 
social mobilization, as well as on the ways in which emotions have been 
included in the comprehension of social movements. In the following chapter 
(Chapter 5) we will pay particular attention to the emotional elements we can 
find discursively employed within the contentious phenomena we take into 
account. We will put emphasis on the political consequences of this, showing 
that emotional dynamics properly interplay with the same definition of 
political ideas, such as ‘the people’ and ‘democracy’, which are at the centre of 
the discursive and emotional struggle. Finally, the last two chapters (Chapter 6 
and 7) go back to a theoretical perspective, resuming the normative questions 
about the relationship between democratic politics and the role of emotions. 
Concretely, the sixth chapter is devoted to the uneasy relationship between 
populism and democracy. The literature on democracy and populism is so vast 
that any attempt at completeness would be futile. Nonetheless, dealing with 
recent perspectives that highlight the problematic nature of populism for 
liberal democracy, the chapter considers the deep theoretical and historical 
magnitude of such issue, and intends on making a contribution via a discursive 
approach to emotions. Consequently, the seventh chapter discusses some 
normative political theories that have developed recently with a strong 
interest in the role of emotions in democratic interaction, and argues that an 
agonistic approach can be a fruitful perspective to deal with this debate.  
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5. Advantages and limitations of the research  
 
In introducing the main lines of our research, it is important to make clear that 
we have also found a number of obstacles. We believe that it is essential to 
explicitly refer to them, as well as to refer to the intrinsic limitations of the 
investigation. Openly discussing them is somehow a way to overcome their 
implications.  
 
The first difficulty has been dealing with the wide and sweeping definitions of 
political concepts this research focuses on. Defining concepts is, for evident 
reasons, one of the most contested and challenging tasks social scientists can 
face. Moreover, due to the same nature of the research object – which is, 
somehow, to show the way in which emotions play a role in the re-definition 
of political categories – it becomes clear, then, the vicious circle this research 
has to deal with. Definitions, furthermore, always risk being either too general 
– and then loosing concrete explanatory power – or too concrete and specific – 
and then becoming useless to a broader comprehension of phenomena. The 
same reasoning can be applied to research hypotheses. Nonetheless, the 
challenging nature of this perspective is nothing but an additional motivation 
for theoretical reflection. Moreover, another inconvenience this investigation 
had to face has been the combination of different methodological perspectives. 
This, obviously, can become a solid criticism to the entire investigation, as far 
as it can sum the criticism of the different approaches employed and, more 
importantly, the criticism to any multi-methodological research (to put it 
simply – not a case study, nor a pure investigation in political theory). 
 
Notwithstanding these problems and possible criticisms, we want also to 
defend a certain number of results and advantages this research presents. 
Despite the big scope of the inquiry, what we will try to do in the subsequent 
pages is to develop a methodological path to the study of the role of emotions 
in democratic politics and legitimacy, and to take into account normative 
perspectives that delve into them. Being aware of the immense amount of 
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variables that are involved, we will focus mainly on the theoretical and 
discursive level, through which – we argue – is possible to carry out a fruitful 
inquiry. In other words, the theoretical framework this research is built 
around constitutes, we think, a relevant contribution. The advantage it has is 
precisely that it can help a broad understanding of the role of emotions in the 
political realm, and contribute to vindicate particular democratic and populist 
theories.  
 
Similarly, the combination of multiple methodologies, far from being a 
problem per se, can enrich this broad understanding. Drawing on the literature 
on normative political theory, populism, protest movements, and applying 
different perspectives are indeed strengths of this research. It is clearly 
evident that even this cross-methodological approach struggles to overtake 
the positivism and reductionism political science has had when referring to 
emotions and similar dimensions. Nonetheless, what this thesis aims to do is 
to take a further step in this direction. We aim to bridge theory and empirical 
evidence, debates on democracy and debates on social movements, and going 
beyond this gap – which we see as a considerable obstacle to a comprehensive 
analysis of democracy and the role of emotions. We will try then to contribute 
to the dialogue between normative theories and discourse analysis. Linking 
contemporary political theories to the discursive level of current contentious 
phenomena is, in our opinion, a good way to answer the questions of this 
research and to make a scientific contribution. The formulation of our 
research question in a broad fashion is, therefore, something that helps to go 
beyond simply analysing emotions in social movements. In this sense, this 
research tries to contribute to the exploration of what we can call ‘emotional 
legitimacy’, and not merely new dimensions of social movements, nor the 
causal weight of emotions.  
 
Finally, the theory we develop in this thesis is clearly built on some important 
theoretical precedents in the field as well as on our own previous 
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contributions. Nonetheless, through the discursive understanding of recent 
mobilization for democracy, the study also aims at building original theory. In 
particular, we advance some suggestion for a combination of democratic 
theory and discourse analysis, focusing on the recent wave of anti-austerity 
mobilizations. Reading these phenomena through the lens of the role of 
emotions in politics, they can be seen as an example of the contemporary 
vectors through which the struggle for popular and democratic legitimacy is 
currently led. They clearly have represented an immanent critique of the 
contemporary forms of economic and political power, and a symptom of the 
declining legitimacy of political and economic institutions. Therefore, stressing 
the use of emotional vectors within anti-austerity movements, we will aim at 
highlighting the fundamental role of emotions in politics, particularly when it 
concerns the creation of political subjects – and particularly ‘the people’ – as 
well as the process of political legitimacy and the same definition of 
democracy. 
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Chapter 2. Emotions and political research: is there anything new under 
the sun?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Politics is about feelings”, writes David Redlawsk in the incipit of his 
collective essays (Redlawsk, 2006: 1). To see somebody truly angry about the 
government rescuing of financial institutions, someone fearful that his or her 
party will lose an election or, again, fearful of some alleged external enemy 
who would increase criminality, is to see people fill the political world with 
meaning. In that sense, anger and fear are the lived experience of politics 
(Tiedens and Leach, 2004). Indeed, there seems to be no reason to highlight 
that emotions such as fear, anger, hatred, compassion, empathy, and 
indignation are ubiquitous in individual and social life. Why, then, focusing on 
emotions? In spite of this apparent evidence, the role of emotions has long 
received little attention within social and political sciences. In fact, while 
central to many aspects of politics and social processes, in the second half of 
the XX century few social scientists have explicitly paid attention to these 
emotions and their political role.  
 
Political science, in fact, has often seen passion as the enemy of reason. 
Positive political science, for instance, has largely avoided discussion of 
emotion altogether by focusing instead on the “cold” voter calculus. On the 
other hand, normative political theorists have long considered emotion 
integral to the understanding of politics, but such discussion has often been 
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motivated by the perceived harm of emotions for liberal values and in 
democratic deliberation. However, over the last decades there have been some 
signs of change. Emotions re-entered the study of politics in the 1970s and 
1980s, especially for what concerns the research in the fields of economics 
and sociology of work. Two works are worth noting. Albert O. Hirschman’s 
influential work (1977) pointed out the role played by the ideological pursuit 
of material interests as one of the intellectual impulses that, historically and 
ideologically, gave rise to capitalism and, at the same time, could control and 
limit other more harmful and destructive passions of man (e.g., lust, violence). 
Similarly, Arlie R. Hochschild, from her The Managed Heart (1983), developed 
a sociology of emotions centred on the “feeling rules”, that is the management 
of the emotional dimension by capitalist and consumerist society. 
 
Since then, emotions are popular again, becoming a ‘hot topic’ in the study of 
societies and politics. Indeed, many scholars working in the field of social 
sciences have attempted to reinvigorate the study of emotion, highlighting its 
importance for the understanding of political phenomena or in shedding new 
light on classic questions related to political regimes, political participation, 
activism and mobilization and so forth. Thus, in recent decades several books 
on emotions have been published in the field of social sciences, especially 
influenced by the psychological and sociological perspectives2.  
 
This chapter is concerned with (2) the conceptual inquiry on emotions and 
affective dimensions; (3) the relationship between emotion and reason in 
modern and contemporary political investigation. Particular attention will be 
paid to the reason/emotion dichotomy as well as to the basic elements of 
mainstream current political research, namely objectivity and measurability. 
Additionally, (4) we will emphasise the heterogeneous fields of contemporary 
political research on emotions. Highlighting the different arguments within 
                                                             
2 Notable examples of these streams are the Handbook of Emotion (Lewis et al., 2008) and 
the Handbook of Sociology of Emotions (Stets & Turner, 2006). 
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the literature, we will put special accent on the broad political consequences 
associated to social theorizing. (5) Finally, we will focus on some central 
‘political emotions’. 
 
In this sense, this chapter stresses that emotions have a broad historical and 
theoretical role within political and social sciences. Highlighting this role is a 
fundamental purpose of this thesis, which advocates – as we will develop in 
further chapters – for a link between discursive analysis of protests and an in-
depth analysis of emotions in democratic theorizing. 
 
 
2. Defining emotions 
 
What is an emotion? Since political philosophy, as well as social research, is a 
discipline concerned with the nature of the political realm, the basic question 
about the “definition” should be taken into consideration. The nature of 
emotions is the core subject of a great deal of contemporary literature. A 
general consensus is reached on defining emotions as spontaneous, self-
induced or externally produced self-feelings. Examples include love, loyalty, 
pride, joy, enthusiasm, sympathy, hatred, fear, anger, sadness, shame, and so 
on and so forth. However, as often happens, the definition can differ 
depending on the approach chosen in the analysis and the elements a 
researcher highlights (Turner 2009: 341). As we might expect, emotions have 
been defined in many ways, using many epistemological orientations. 
 
In etymological terms, the word emotion comes from a Latin word movere, 
meaning “to move” or to “stir up.” It is well known that in De Anima (383–323 
BC) Aristotle spoke of emotions as the human source of movement. In this 
perspective, he understood that emotions have a social dimension: they are 
adaptive responses to situations of social life, and a person’s emotional 
experience provides a framework through which the world is regarded. 
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Consistent with his standpoint, Aristotle argued that change occurs in what we 
feel because emotions are the results of a process that enables us to act in the 
social world.  
 
This definition, suggesting that emotions are ways in which individuals react 
to social situation, has influenced many modern and contemporary authors. 
Frijda (1987), for instance, adopts a functionalist approach and defines 
emotions as “tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with 
the environment […] so that emotions might be defined as action readiness” 
(1987: 71).  
 
Even though our objective is not to delve into a psychological inquiry about 
emotions, however, at the outset it is helpful to highlight that the language of 
emotions is complex and apt to be ambiguous. Indeed, everyday discourse 
tends to conflate what is meant by emotions and closely related notions such 
as feelings, moods, sentiments, passion, and affects. Over the last decades, 
many psychological perspectives have developed different framework to 
conceptualize this ‘affective realm’. Ben-Ze’ev (2000: 79–116) tends to define 
it very broadly, formulating a sociology of emotions that includes all related 
emotional phenomena such as sentiments, moods, and feelings, and affects. On 
the contrary, many authors try to differentiate these notions and prefer to 
draw clear-cut distinctions between different emotional phenomena, also 
avoiding considering them as “a set of homogeneous phenomena” (Calhoun 
and Solomon, 1984: 23). While emotions involve actions and movements, and 
include specific behaviours, posture, gesture, and some facial expression, 
feelings in contrast are defined as private, not playing out a public role. People 
react emotionally to social events, and these emotional reactions are tied up 
with an array of feelings, whose essential elements include some inner 
components (Damasio, 1994, 2003). As well, sentiments are usually defined in 
strict connection with emotions. What marks the general distinction is placed 
on the temporal level: sentiments are seen as enduring emotions, which last 
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longer than typical emotions. Thus, sentiments are emotions with long 
duration. Sentiments include romantic and parental love, happiness, 
patriotism, trust, loyalty, and other enduring social orientations. 
 
 
 2.1 Classification of emotions 
 
Following the controversy over the definition, other common disputes have 
characterized those social sciences that explore the ‘affective realm’. Are there 
positive and negative, political and non-political emotions? How does the 
cultural and contextual level influence individual emotions? Dealing with 
these questions, many philosophical, psychological and political traditions 
have developed different perspectives.  
 
Frequently, psychosocial inquiries have followed a classification or a typology 
of emotions. The most common typology operates by dividing emotions into 
positive and negative ones. While recent literature have argued that we should 
move beyond this conceptualization in political analysis (Huddy et al., 2007), it 
has to be noted that this typology can be traced back to classic authors, and 
still characterizes many studies on this matter.  
 
Another frequent aspect that characterizes the study of emotions and its social 
and political dimension is the binomial culture-context versus individual level. 
Should emotions be associated primarily with the individual or, on the 
contrary, with the social and cultural context – or both aspects at once? As 
well, is there any cultural variation of emotions? In this sense, some scholars 
tend to draw a distinction between primary, natural and universal emotions – 
such as happiness, fear, anger or sadness –, and secondary, socially 
constructed emotions (Turner & Stets 2005: 10-13; Goodwin et al., 2001). 
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Similarly, can we talk about political and non-political emotions or, framed 
differently, are there emotions that have a primary and pivotal political 
dimension? Here, it should be noted that a common classification tends to 
identify certain political emotions – such as anger, fear, resentment, 
indignations, loyalty, etc. – as central elements in the articulation of the 
political realm (cf. Arteta 2003: 53-62; Ost, 2004; Mouffe, 2005; 2013; Laclau 
2005), as opposed to other emotions that operate at an inner level3. Given this 
context, while there are contending conceptual frameworks in the analysis of 
emotions, what is important to note is that the breadth of interest in these 
related topics suggests that the scientific study of the “affective realm” is 
extremely complex, and an in-depth analyses of it necessarily requires of an 
interdisciplinary inquiry. However, the aim of our investigation is not to 
explore emotions per se, rather into the political dimension and consequences 
of emotional elements in the contemporary political realm.  
 
For this purpose, we will explicitly focus on those characteristic and elements 
of emotions and “affective realm” that we consider relevant to our political 
analysis. As we will do in further chapters, emphasis should be put on the 
essentially political aspects of emotions: their valence, that is to say, whether 
they are positive or negative emotions; their cognitive components, and their 
motivational force. 
 
 
3. Absence and return? 
 
Since the aim of this research is not to delve into the semantic discussion 
about the nature and definition of emotions – which is capturing the attention 
of other disciplines, from sociology to neurosciences – we cannot get into the 
                                                             
3 As highlighted by Marcos Engelken-Jorge (2011), the ‘Lacanian-left’ goes even further 
and refer to a ‘affective energy’, often speaking of ‘enjoyment’ and not ‘emotions’, and 
thus focuses not on discernible emotional states but on contingent and shifting aspects of 
subjectivity. (e.g. Glynos, 2001; and Stavrakakis, 1999). 
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debate on the semantic differences between similar terms as emotion, passion, 
feelings, affects, etc. in more depth4. What should be noted, as Robert Solomon 
stated (2006: 3), is that “emotions”, in general, is simply a category, while 
particular emotions have the reality of actual experience. Hence, many authors 
have depicted the auto evidence of emotions. In this regard it is useful to 
remember that Descartes said that “everyone has experience of the passions 
within himself, and there is no necessity to borrow one’s observations from 
elsewhere in order to discover their nature”. (1955: 331) Solomon also states 
that philosophers have been concerned about the nature of emotions since the 
pre-Socratics, and although the discipline has grown up largely as the pursuit 
of reason – until becoming the Reason in the post-Enlightenment thought –, 
the emotions have always lurked in the background – often as a threat to 
reason and a danger to philosophy and philosophers (2008: 3). 
 
However, skipping the debate on “definition”5, does not imply skipping a 
deeper discussion about the role and the place of emotion in the social 
sciences. This is particularly important because the place that emotion have 
generally had in social and human disciplines has to do with, on the one hand, 
its own definition and, on the other, the role we think emotion play in society 
and politics. In this regard, contemporary social research mainly view 
emotions in two ways: as an outcome of social and political processes, as well 
as a cause of these phenomena. Jack Barbalet (2002) stresses that the idea that 
emotions are consequences of cultural and cognitive processes is dominant in 
social research, while the idea of emotion as a social cause is quite often 
resisted by political scientist, due to their search for general explanation. 
According to Barbalet, in order to overcome the reductionist vision of 
emotions’ political role, we should first understand the ways in which the 
relationship between emotion and rationality has been regarded.  
                                                             
4 For this, useful readings are, for example, Hall (2002); Kingston (2008: 4). Here, we use 
them interchangeably. 
5 Regarding the numerous theories of emotions, we remind to the Kemper’s (1978) 
general characterization. 
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Therefore, before focusing our attention to the contemporary interdisciplinary 
inquiries that put under scrutiny the political and social role of emotions, we 
should deepen into the reluctance of social research to focus on the political 
role of emotion, and thus pay attention to the modern marginalization of 
passions. The absence – or deliberate marginalization – of emotion from 
modern and contemporary political theories and social inquiries could be 
explained by several reasons: the modern reason/emotion dichotomy (3.1), 
and the contemporary epistemology of social sciences (3.2).    
 
 
3.1. Reason/Emotion dichotomy: modern rationalism 
 
First, the peculiar relationship between modern politics and emotions should 
be mentioned. From modern rational thought we inherited the general idea 
that emotions are a kind of excess, usually perceived as women’s dangerous 
features or human beings’ bodily sensations that distort the rational ability to 
make choices and ethical judgments6. That is the traditional contrast of 
emotions with rationality, which persists in the form of classical dualisms such 
as body versus mind (Massumi, 2002). Indeed, in modern philosophical 
mainstream and in the Western culture in general, there has been a pervasive 
dualistic construction that opposed mind and body and analogous 
dichotomies, such as rational/irrational, thinking/feeling; cognitive/affective; 
objective/subjective; judgment/prejudice; constructive/destructive; 
impartiality/partisanship; universal/particular; public/private; male/female; 
outer/inner, conscious/unconscious; controlled/uncontrolled; 
individual/mass; order/disorder; etc. (Máiz, 2010: 17). Robert Solomon 
                                                             
6 It is interesting in this sense the fact that as far back as the Greeks, emotions have been 
particularly associated with women, who were excluded from citizenship also because of 
the belief that they were incapable of managing their emotions through reason. The 
example of courage in Aristotle is suggestive, as it is understood as principally a male 
virtue.  
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reminds the master-slave metaphor that has been long used to represent the 
relationship between reason and emotion.  (2008:  3). He states two problems 
in this relationship: the first one is the reason-emotion distinction itself – as if 
we were dealing with two different natural kinds, two conflicting and 
antagonistic aspects of the soul. The second problem refers to the inferior role 
of emotion, compared to the one of reason. That is to say, the idea that 
emotion is as such more primitive, less intelligent, more bestial, less 
dependable and more dangerous than reason, and because of that, it needs to 
be controlled by reason. Although from the classics to the present politics has 
been portrayed as an activity encompassing both mind and body, affects and 
emotions have been largely dismissed by the normative paradigm of 
rationality. The opposition between reason and emotion was formulated by 
modern rationalism – and Descartes in primis – as a division between res 
cogitans and res extensa, spirit and matter, mind and body, that is between an 
indivisible and non-measurable thinking part and another mechanical and 
divisible non-thinking body. (Máiz, 2011: 32-33) It is a separation between an 
upper sphere and an inferior one. Based on this dualism, emotion, feeling and 
passion have been excluded from the field of modern politics, considered as 
the empire of reason. Moreover, liberalism, as the dominant modern political 
ideology and economic organization, institutionalized the division of collective 
and individual into public and private selves. Doing so, liberalism relegates 
emotions to the private sphere.  
 
Given this context, we cannot start the effort to think emotions better without 
dealing with the heritage that this idea of emotions has produced and the 
distinction of these from reason. The tradition of reasoning that we have 
inherited, in other words, has been built, at least in part, by putting emotions 
in a specific and contained place. It is worth noting that understanding the 
relationship between emotion and human behaviour has long fascinated those 
who endeavour to contribute to a broader knowledge of human nature. 
Almost all classical and modern political philosophers include in their 
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accounts of human nature and political affairs some vision about the role of 
passion and emotion. Indeed, classical philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, 
Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, and Hume - among others - all had theories of 
emotion, which do not necessarily display a categorically negative vision of 
them. 
 
Although such philosophers have linked the role of emotions directly to 
human action, many contemporary authors affirms that emotions have tended 
to appear on the ‘wrong’ side of these traditional dichotomies previously 
mentioned (Calhoun, 2001: 52). In this context, Cheryl Hall has shown how 
emotions have been cast off by contemporary liberal political theory on the 
grounds that they represent a danger to reasoned debate (Hall, 2002; 2005). 
As we will further develop below in this chapter, Cheryl Hall draws on a 
specific meaning of passion and, specifically, uses this term in order to speak 
of enthusiasm, ardour, and zeal.  Hall states that liberal theorists tend to push 
passion to the margin of their theories of politics7, basically in two ways. 
Either simply ignoring passion in their discussion, or explicitly arguing that 
passion poses a danger to politics and is best eliminated as much as possible 
from the public realm. The first way of marginalizing passions is more 
common in contemporary political theory. The second, on the other hand, is 
the classical argument of liberal thought: passion should be confined to the 
private sphere. Classical liberal argument states that passion should be 
confined to the private sphere of life, because it poses important dangers to 
the political realm. These dangers are, basically: instability, fragmentation, 
injustice, and tyranny. As Nancy Rosenblum has stated, the intrusion of affects, 
emotions or personal factors in the public sphere is conceived as something 
that perturbs the use of public reason, and even potentially authoritarian and 
despotic (1987: 167). 
 
                                                             
7 Cheryl Hall says “positive arguments on behalf of passion are scarce in liberal political 
theory”. (2002: 728) 
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Furthermore, Hall stresses that there are two problems with the conventional 
presumption about passion. The first one is the way it treats passion as if it 
were an alien force that operates independently to the psyche. The second 
problem is that they neglect the interconnectedness of passion and reason 
(2005: 14-15). Hall, indeed, following cognitive and evaluative theorists of 
emotion (e.g. de Sousa, 1987; Nussbaum, 1994; Solomon, 1993) argues that 
the two are deeply tied. 
 
As Chantal Mouffe has put it, passions, somehow, have been derided as 
antipolitical to the modern and contemporary rational project of government 
(Mouffe, 2002). If classical liberals, such as Locke, Mill, Smith and Madison, 
demonstrate an “acute awareness of human irrationality” – or the possibility 
that human beings will often be motivated by “irrational desire” (Holmes, 
1995: 43; 267) – Hall, following Stephan Holmes, argues that the basic 
assumptions of rationalism, with special relation to the place of passion, only 
begin with neo-classical economic theories. Indeed, Holmes contends that 
prior to the 19th century, “most human behaviour was understood to spring 
from unthinking habit or irrational passion. Rational choice of action was 
exceptional” (1995: 24).  
 
Neo-classical economic theories influenced political liberalism in its vision of 
human beings. As Albert O. Hirschman has shown, many classical liberal 
theorists promoted the notion of the “interests” over passions. The aim of 
liberalism was to transform potentially disruptive passions into more 
predictable and manageable private interests. The concept of interest has 
some key functionality features, as Ramón Máiz has shown: “it is discrete, it 
can be operationalized and measured, and abandons excessively abstract and 
inefficient notions related to the metaphysics of morals, moral philosophy, or 
ethical and political principles”. (Máiz, 2011: 35) That conceptual focus on 
interests has contemporary outcomes: it contributed to the shifting of the 
model of human motivation. Following the liberal economists of the 19th 
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century, contemporary liberals ted to operate with a model of men, and 
sometime even women, as motivated primarily by rationally pursued self-
interest, rather than irrational passions. (Hall, 2002: 734).   
 
Similarly, David Ost (2004: 230-233) maintains that the marginalization of 
emotion in the Western tradition is to be traced back to the reason/emotion 
dualism, which also triggered the association of reason with the realm of 
institutionalized exercise of power (Ost 2004: 231). This is related with 
another aspect of the alleged marginalization of emotions: the idea that 
outside of the institutionalized order is the space of emotional behaviour. In 
this regard, during the first half of the 20th century social movements and 
masses were thought of as irrational phenomena triggered by passions (Le 
Bon 1960). 
 
 
 3.2. Objectivity and measurability  
 
The second reason for the absence of the emotions, somehow related to the 
modern shifting in attention from passion to interest, is the fact that the focus 
of the scholarly debates in contemporary political science has been reserved 
for objective and “objectivable” facts. Emotions, in this context, represent the 
other face of the coin of the rationalistic tradition on which current 
investigation is based. It should be noted that the behavioural revolution in 
the social sciences in the 1960s was an attempt to introduce scientific 
methods into the study of society. It primarily was an explicit reaction to 
political philosophy, which was seen to be concerned with normative 
questions, as well as to institutionalism, which has been seen as lacking 
theoretical and methodological rigor. This behavioural and empiricist 
tradition, which played a crucial role in the development of he social sciences, 
has been influenced by logical and scientific positivism. In ontological terms – 
which is related to the consideration of the “nature of being” – positivism is 
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foundationalist: it states that there is a real world independent from the 
observer. In epistemological terms, positivism believes that phenomena can 
be explained by their regular and predictable outcomes, objectively 
understandable. Its focus is upon identifying the causes of social behaviour, 
and the emphasis is upon explanation. Positivism is concerned with 
establishing casual relationships between social phenomena and developing 
explanatory models. (Furlong and Marsh, 2002)    
 
In this context, social sciences show many difficulties in analysing affective 
dimensions. Political science dominant trends, focusing on the study of the 
quantitatively and objectively defined behaviour, tend to avoid such 
dimensions.  Moreover, in order to understand what kind of resistance 
inquiries into emotions meet, it should be underlined the deep resistance that 
lies in the implicit behaviourism absorbed by many social scientists and their 
preference for more “objectivable” facts, as incomes, voting, and so forth. In 
this light, it is worthy to underline the inherently “ephemeral” nature of 
emotions, which are normally conceived as insufficiently tangible and not 
subjectable to quantification. This poses major methodological concerns for 
political and social studies, by no means unimportant: how to approach the 
study of emotions and how to integrate them into political analysis? As well, 
how to take into account the role played by their contextual, cultural and 
discursive dimensions?  
 
Given this context, due to their vague nature of unobservable inner states, 
emotions are hard to define, hard to operationalize, hard to measure and hard 
to isolate from other factors – from reason too, as we will stress. Still, in much 
of the literature, emotions have often been viewed as juxtaposed with 
rationality, the standard baseline of behavioural expectations. Because 
emotions can distort rationality – emotional people can become both passive 
and hyperactive, they say – there is no explanation for emotions and therefore, 
as the logic goes, it is better to stick to the notion of rationality especially when 
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it is linked to behaviour. Therefore, despite the growing public consciousness 
of the importance of emotions in social and political life, within academia the 
study of the relationship between emotion, power and politics has lagged 
behind practice. 
 
The reluctance of the social sciences in the study of emotions certainly is 
something to be explored. Nonetheless, one remark should be made: from the 
origins of modern and contemporary social and political theorizing to the 
early 20th century thought, there was ample space for emotions. As noted by 
Barbalet (2008: 10-13), the explanatory value of emotional categories can be 
located in the major sociologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Alexis de Tocqueville, Gustave Le Bon, Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo 
Pareto, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg Simmel are some of the more notable 
European sociologists who regarded emotional categories as important 
explanatory variables.  
 
For what concerns the 20th century, psychoanalysis had offered the main tool 
kit for researching the role of emotions in politics (Lasswell, 1960). In fact, this 
type of analysis has been successful within different intellectual perspectives 
such as those of Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (1960) and of 
Theodor Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality (1950) – in the wake of 
Gustave Le Bon and Freudian influence – before being eclipsed during the 
following decades. In that context, crowd-based theories dominated protest 
research until the 1960s. The most influential expression of this pathologizing 
perspective, Gustave Le Bon (1960) described crowds as impulsive, irritable, 
suggestible and credulous. Given these traits, crowds are susceptible to the 
emotional appeals of demagogues. Thus, emotions were considered the 
driving force for all political action that occurred outside normal institutions, 
when the normal, reasoning individuals could become angry, violent or 
unthinking under the influence of a crowd. Most social scientists of the early 
and mid-twentieth century, including Weber, Durkheim, and Freud accepted 
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some version of Le Bon’s viewpoint. However, in the second part of the 20th 
century, emotions were erased from social sciences. Whether due to the 
influence of the rational choice paradigm or simply a legacy of the 
enlightenment’s privileging of reason over emotion, the role of emotion in 
politics has been understudied, despite the clear connection between how 
people feel and how they act. Indeed, in the 1970s, many scholars in social 
sciences abandoned the concept of crowd behaviour and investigated 
collective action, developing resource mobilization theories based on rational 
actor assumptions. This new thinking postulates that individuals’ inclination 
to engage in political action as well as to join social movements depends on 
the material and organizational resources available to them. That is to say, 
these scholars affirmed political participation or engagement in social 
movements as rational, and “objectivable” political phenomena. Emotions 
disappeared from their theoretical models. 
 
 
4. Bringing emotions back in contemporary political and social research 
 
After having focused on these general aspects of the relationship between 
emotions and the social sciences, we can ask: has political science neglected or 
marginalized the role of emotions? Even though it is difficult to affirm that 
there has been a deliberately neglect of emotions, on the whole it is true that 
emotions have been somewhat disregarded, in particular in the field of 
political science. 
 
However, the refusal to consider emotions as a casual element, or even as an 
element to be considered at all, found opposition from the late 1970s in both 
European and North American political theory and sociology. Toward the end 
of the twentieth century, a number of social scientists took up the struggle to 
bring emotions into serious consideration within the discipline, reflected by 
renewed attention to the centrality of emotions in political research. A series 
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of publication on the role of emotional dynamics helped to reinvigorate the 
political research in many fields. Theodore Kemper’s A Social Interactional 
Theory of Emotions (1978), Arlie Hochschild’s The Managed Heart (1983), and 
Norman Denzin’s On Understanding Emotion (1984) are considered among the 
publication that renewed the interest in emotion in the last decades. As a 
consequence, the role played by emotions in public life is receiving increased 
attention in the broad fields of social, political and philosophical studies. In 
recent years, there have been advances in a wide range of disciplines, such as 
in neurology (Damasio 1994) and cognitive psychology (Forgas, 2000). There 
has also been an increased interest in emotions by philosophers (Elster 1999; 
de Sousa, 1987), anthropologists (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990) and sociologists 
(Steats, 2006). Furthermore, recent work developing theories of affective 
intelligence (Marcus, et al., 2000) have given new prominence to the role of 
emotions in social sciences disciplines, such as political psychology (Lewis et 
al., 2008), political science (Kingston, 2008; 2011) and international relations 
(Bleiker & Hutchinson, 2008). This heterogeneous literature and fields of 
knowledge have been undermining the traditional dichotomies between 
reason and passion, and mind and body, trying to find a location for emotions 
and affective dimension in social and political investigation.  
 
It is worth noting that the main arguments in the literature are related to the 
field from which the analyses are carried out. From a philosophical 
perspective, there is a general recovery of the theme of emotion through 
reinterpretations of classic works, such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
Spinoza, Hume, Rousseau and Tocqueville, among others. Remo Bodei (1991; 
2010), Martha Nussbaum (1994; 2001, 2013), and Jack Barbalet (2001; 2002) 
are only three examples of this trend. From a sociological and cultural studies 
point of view, contemporary authors point out how emotions have a distinct 
social character and a specific weight in the formation of collective identities 
and social bonds (Ahmed, 2004). Moreover, the literature also highlights the 
influence of emotions in the proper functioning of reason – even in the 
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rational choice focus8 – (Frank, 1988), in the process of making political and 
moral judgment (Marcus et al., 2000; Muldoon, 2008; Nussbaum, 2001). 
Neuroscience and psychology, in particular, have developed substantial 
analyses on the social and political role of emotions. These disciplines have 
shown that not only the absence of emotion engenders irrational decisions – 
contrary to conventional wisdom – but also that it strongly hinders the 
capacity to take any decision at all. Damasio (2003: 149), among others, has 
also shown that human action is triggered by processes of decision-making in 
which both emotion and reason concur. In this context, it has been 
demonstrated that emotion is involved in reasoning. Indeed, it enhances 
rather than undermines reasoning (Evans, 2002). Furthermore, there has 
been a great development in the study of emotions related to the spreading of 
protest movements (Goodwin et al., 2001; Goodwin and Jasper, 2003). 
Emotions – it is argued – motivate individuals and groups to engage in 
political protests. They can be means and ends of movements and they shape, 
often rhetorically, their goals and strategies.  
 
Similarly, there are many sociologists and anthropologists who have argued 
that emotions should not be regarded only as psychological states, but as 
social and cultural practices (Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 1990; Hochschild, 1983: 5; 
Katz, 1999: 2). In addition, there is a feminist tradition that is bringing the 
emotions back to political theory and moral philosophy, underlying in the 
wake of Aristotle the fundamental role played by the emotions in judgment 
and in political action (Koziak, 2000; Nussbaum, 1994). Interestingly enough, 
a great deal of contemporary lliterature has taken up the challenge of this 
perspective and deeply criticised the discriminatory consequences. For 
instance, criticising modern idea of public space as the place for the 
expression of universal and imaprtial reason, Iris Marion Young stresses that 
the excesses of rationalism lead to practical-political consequences: “women 
                                                             
8 Through the 1990s, several scholars, working from different theoretical perspectives, 
advanced critiques of rational-choice models and its restricted definition of rationality as 
calculated maximization of benefits. 
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must be excluded from the public realm of citizenship because they are the 
caretakers of affectivity, desire, and the body” (1990: 108-9). In doing so, this 
feminist perspective deconstructs the Western political thought for ignoring, 
denying, or denigrating several dichotomies used to denigrate women (mind 
versus body, thinking versus feeling, public versus private, and so on) and, 
consequently the role of emotions in social and political life (Calhoun, 2001). 
 
Scholars in disciplines such as psychology, sociology, philosophy and feminist 
theory disagree with each other about how emotions should be valued, but 
they do agree on the need to oppose two stereotypical views of emotions: that 
they are purely private and irrational phenomena. As Craig Calhoun (2001) 
has cautioned, such approach falls into the same trap of dividing and 
dichotomizing of mind-and-body and reason-and-emotion. “Putting the 
emotions in their place” as Calhoun says, is to study emotions in such way as 
to transcend and not reproduce this pervasive dualism. In this light, Robert 
Solomon and Martha Nussbaum stress that emotions are important forms of 
knowledge and evaluative thought (Nussbaum, 1994; Solomon, 1993).   
 
In this context then, even more empiricist political analysis has been 
challenged by this emotional return. Influenced by disciplines such as 
neuroscience, psychology and sociology, political science has started a process 
of revisiting its core principles of epistemology, opening up to broader 
methodologies outside the hegemony of hyperrationalist explicative models. 
In this regard, emotional factors have increasingly been explored and accepted 
within the spectrum of the classic explicative variables – i.e. interest, utility 
maximization, civic culture, political opportunity structure, etc. – under the 
belief that “the political brain is an emotional brain” (Westen, 2007). Indeed, 
the affective dimension – especially common feeling such as fear, anxiety, 
enthusiasm, apathy and hope – can be found in many political phenomena 
such as electoral behaviour, as well as in political communication, corruption, 
and so forth (Barbalet, 2001; Marcus, 2002: 104) 
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Given this context, although most of the scholarship is divided between those 
who push for a general theory of emotion and those who endorse a deeper 
understanding of the role of particular emotions, we will stress especially the 
broad implications of emotions in political theorizing.  
 
 
 4.1 Normative questions  
 
In both conceptualizing the political world and the prompting of normative 
principles – the language of political theory –, emotions have had a special 
place in different traditions of thought. As already mentioned, emotions such 
as fear, anger, wrath, rage, and so forth, have been studied by such classical 
political philosophers as, among others, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Spinoza, 
Hume and so forth. Yet, it seems that the historical importance of passions in 
politics has been recognized above all in the phases of revolts or revolutions – 
their phases of their highest intensity (Marx, 1994)9. The French Revolution, 
for example, has been viewed as one of the biggest expression of people’s ire 
in European history, since it completed a ‘democratization’ of emotions 
(Bodei, 2010: 100; Sloterdijk, 2010), which led commoners and poorest 
people to revolution. Indignation about the French crown’s privileges and 
about aristocratic corruption and injustice is collected by the Jacobins: ire was 
legitimate even in its most violent form of Terror. Beyond the political 
consequences of the French Revolution, political thinkers have generally taken 
into consideration the role of emotions in politics, either to highlight their 
political and social roles or, as within the liberal mainstream, to relegate them 
to the private sphere. Within this context, it is worthy to note that liberalism 
was born out of the fires of civil and religious wars, as well as social and 
economic uncertainty. It should not be forgotten that most of the key concepts 
                                                             
9 Beyond his economistic vision, Marx establishes a direct connection between the 
collective sensibilities and the ‘revolutionary energy’. 
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of Hobbes, Locke, Milton and others were a set of responses to the violent and 
fearful conditions in which they lived. As Judith Shklar underlined, the ‘politics 
of fear’ dramatically informed classical liberal theorizing at the beginning of 
modernity (Shklar and Hoffmann, 1998).  
 
Similarly, in contemporary normative political theory, numerous approaches 
have focused on the new appraisal of the emotional dimension. The same 
dismantling of the reason-emotion divide implies a series of normative 
questions political theorists have been faced with. On a general note, it has 
been asked what kind of emotional engagement liberal and democratic 
regimes need: what affective dispositions (if any) does liberal democracy 
require from citizenry? Liberal democratic theory has focused its attention on 
the repercussion of these ways of conceptualizing the interplay of emotions 
and reason for the understanding and the possibilities for democratic 
engagement.  Most contemporary political theorists agree indeed that 
emotions have a central role in the citizens’ support of liberal values. Rebecca 
Kingston (2008) is clear in pointing out the impact that the new perspectives 
on emotions can have on contemporary liberal democratic theory:  
 
“They can generate a rethinking of our traditional ways of 
distinguishing between private and public; they can lead us to seek 
greater clarity on the ways in which emotion continues to sustain 
current political commitments in liberal and democratic regimes; they 
can contribute to recognizing better outcomes in democratic practice 
including democratic deliberation; and finally, in general, they allow us 
to develop a more realistic set of political expectations”. (2008: 11) 
 
Within this context, liberal theorists have particularly focused on finding 
criteria in order to choose the emotions that can further the cause of 
democracy and those that can detract from it. How to differentiate emotions 
that fit with democracy and those that are not conducive to liberalism and 
democratic values? 
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4.1.1 Commitment to liberal regimes 
 
Belonging to this ‘emotional renaissance’, Cheryl Hall (2002; 2005) rather 
than supporting the conventional liberal vision of emotions, argues that we 
should see passions from a particular perspective: passion as a desire for an 
envisioned good can be a different conceptualization that can lead to a 
different comprehension of the role of the affective dimension in the political 
realm. As we have already mentioned, Hall conducts an overall analysis of the 
marginalization of passion in liberal political theory, stating that it is both 
unjustified and harmful. She advocates for a conception of passion as the 
desire for an envisioned good, political theory – especially liberal theory is 
guilty of its marginalization – can reintroduce the study of passion in its 
perspective. Thus, Hall supports a deeper consideration of passion in politics 
and in political theory. In doing so Hall states that, although liberalism is often 
presented as ideally gender-neutral, bringing passion back into political 
debates would stop the perpetuation of this gendered dichotomy 
reason/passion and the consequent marginalization of women in the political 
realm. Hall’s argument is that a misleading understanding of the role of 
passion in politics – namely attributing instability, injustice and violence to it – 
constitutes a weakness of liberal political theory.  
 
Hall’s argument, as we have already stated, is that the common liberal 
approaches to passion, both the explicit rejection and the tacit exclusion, are 
“inadequate because they stem from impoverished characterizations of 
passion and, as a consequence, lead to impoverished approaches to politics”. 
(2005: 28). However, she points out that, although liberal theorists generally 
exclude or overlook passion, they still rely on passion to make politics work 
(2005: 31). Quoting classical liberal authors, from Locke to the Federalist, and 
contemporary liberal thinkers such as Rawls, Hall argues that passion is 
nonetheless at the heart of the liberal perspective, either as a latent horizon to 
be avoided or as a moral dimension – the ‘sense of justice’ in Rawls – to be 
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considered as the outset of the normative political action. Despite this liberal 
contradiction – denying passion and at the same time relying on it –, Hall 
stresses that the conventional negation of emotional dimension in politics 
made by liberal theory also has practical consequences. Namely, Cheryl Hall 
underlines two prominent consequences, which are the perpetuation of 
gender inequality in politics and the stifling of political innovation (2005. 36).  
 
“Liberal mandate to keep passion out of politics is neither feasible nor 
desirable. It is not feasible because it relies on a dichotomy between 
reason and passion that is unsustainable. […] Moreover, even if 
passion could be excluded from politics, doing so would not be 
desirable: passion is indispensable to a fully democratic polity”. (2005: 
3-4).  
 
Therefore, emotions and passion should then be established as central 
categories, alongside other concerns. This horizon of analysis can give new 
importance to the study of passion in politics, as well as creating a new image 
of politics as a passionate activity. Indeed, Hall points out, there are at least 
three ways in which passion is important to politics. First, emotions are seen 
as a key component of political values and choices. Second, they contribute to 
create the bonds of political community. In this regard, it should be noted that, 
for instance, a sense of shared history, shared goals or values, creates a feeling 
connection that is of great importance for the constitution of political 
communities (in all its variants, nationalism, patriotism, communitarian 
belonging, etc.). Third, emotions can be seen as motivators of political action. 
Since feelings and emotion are concrete basis of knowledge and judgment, 
they lead to action, because they inspire people to pursue the things they 
value in life. Passion, indeed, motivates not only private action but public 
action as well. In summary, passion plays a vital role in the political 
construction of individual and collective identities, operating as both ‘mental 
frames’ and ‘action tendencies’ (Goodwin et al., 2001; Flam and King, 2005), 
and being therefore part of the inescapable agonistic dimension of politics 
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(Mouffe, 2002). Examples of this political and social role of emotion can be 
found in the broad spectrum of feelings and affections. Apathy, hope, disgust, 
trust, shame, indignation, friendship, anger, fear, etc. have all been integrated 
into political analysis.   
 
Cheryl Hall, in this context, is right in her attempt to find a new path for the 
consideration of emotions and passion in political realm. Arguing against the 
common liberal vision of passion, Hall stresses that conceptualizing passion as 
– among other things – inherently irrational, egoistic, extreme and private, 
does not allow liberal theorists to recognize important dimensions of political 
life.  The ‘trouble with passion’, as she states, is the fact that on the one hand 
passion, viewed as the source of mass instinctual intolerance, raises the 
spectre of violent behaviour, and on the other hand passion is seen as the 
motivation of cooperation and justice.  
 
In this context, Hall’s argument is that both classical and contemporary liberal 
approaches to passion are inadequate because they “stem from impoverished 
conceptions of passion and, as a consequence, lead to impoverished 
approaches to politics” (2002: 736) Indeed, Hall states that if passion is 
considered subjective and properly private – consequently partial and selfish 
– on the other hand reason is considered objective and public – thus impartial 
and just. Drawing on heterogeneous sources such as Plato, Rousseau and 
contemporary feminism, Hall tries to overcome the common liberal 
perspective about the role of emotions in politics. Following these different 
traditions, she supports the idea that passion may be deeply thoughtful in 
three dimensions at least. It is essential 1) insofar as emotions tie our sense of 
meaning and value in life; 2) passion is a crucial source of power, insofar as it 
provides the motivation for action. And 3) passion is profoundly concerned 
with justice, insofar as it is the source of our connection to others and our 
imagination of a better world. (2005: 5).  
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Whereas reading Plato draws attention to the point that political ideals involve 
passion, and if reading Rousseau allows Hall to draw attention to the point 
that political community requires passion, contemporary feminists point out 
that political action engages emotional dimensions. Given these statements, 
Hall underlines that passion is particularly important for the political change 
and innovation. If resignation, disaffection or apathy keep people docile and 
obedient, Hall argues, the enthusiasm for an envisioned good – e.g. the desire 
for a better world – represents a motivating power for political action. 
Therefore, since political participation and engagement are central to the idea 
and practice of democracy, the passionate dimensions that boost the civic 
commitment to politics are central to democracy itself (2005: 130). 
 
  4.1.2 Deliberation and justice 
 
A similar position is developed by Sharon Krause (2008) who particularly 
focuses on the nature of practical reason vis-à-vis sentiment. According to her, 
the relationship between practical reasoning and the affective dimension 
raises relevant questions about the nature and source of normativity and the 
motivation of political action. At stake in this debate is above all the promise of 
impartial justice. The disputes operates, according to her, in the following 
terms: the rationalists worry that impartial justice will be impossible if reason 
cannot transcend passions; the sentimentalists worry that it will be 
impractical (because unmotivated) if reason does not engage passions. She 
states that “our theories of moral judgment and democratic deliberation 
havebeen caught on the horns of a dilemma: they have either been 
toorationalistic to motivate action and decision, or they have 
been tooindiscriminately rooted in the passions to carry normative weight” 
(2008: 6). However, according to Krause, neither of these two positions 
succeeds to preserve a proper balance between reason and passion. She 
maintains that the rationalist approach err in rejecting the passion almost 
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entirely, while the opposed perspective seems to give up impartiality in the 
name of affectivity.  
. 
Sharon Krause acknowledges that passion can indeed be dangerous to liberty 
and equality (2008: 200). Harmful emotions such as cruelty and rage can 
indeed be disruptive in politics. However, the way to prevent these dangers is 
not to abandon passions for a form of reason that abstracts from feeling 
altogether. Krause advocates for a new politics of passions, in which affective 
impartiality has a central role in political deliberation. For Krause the point is 
that, given that we cannot fully transcend the influence of sentiment, the 
challenge is to understand how the inevitable, affective dimensions of 
practical deliberation can be reconciled with the demands of impartiality.  
 
“Since judgment and deliberation cannot do without the passions, the 
best hope for impartiality lies not in trying to transcend passion, but in 
reforming the political context that helps shape them” (2008: 110).  
 
The struggle for determining what should shape democratic practice in 
communities that seek equal justice and voice for citizens is at the heart of the 
Krause’s work. Theoretically and methodologically it pushes beyond the neo-
Kantian position on the motivations for practical reasoning. Acknowledging 
the seminal work of Rawls and Habermas – among others – on justice and 
democratic legitimacy does not imply maintaining a rigid rationalistic position 
on sentiments and their contribution to impartiality. Drawing then on the 
politics of judgment of Hume, Krause advocates a value of impartiality and 
equal respect, which can be inclusive of moral sentiment. Following a Humean 
approach is indeed a fruitful theoretical way to permit the acknowledgment of 
the key value of affect in practical reasoning. Challenging the common 
assumption according to which for impartial deliberation feelings must be 
overcome.  Only taking into account this fundamental aspect, argues Krause, 
we can be able to articulate impartial judgment and deliberation. Krause 
argues therefore that contemporary societies need a normative account of 
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affective deliberation that can define the right and wrong feelings in the 
deliberative context and that support the ideal of impartiality. In this sense, 
sentiments play more than simply a motivational role; they have a key 
function in building what we mean by reciprocity. Thus Krause advocates for 
cultivating the capacity for somehow “feel with the others” through 
deliberation. 
 
However, Sharon Krause insists that there is no more need for passion in 
politics. What she does is to illuminate the ways in which sentiments 
(inevitably and necessary) figure in moral judgment, political deliberation, and 
the authority of law, and thus to promote guidelines for accommodating this 
affective dimension in ways that support rather than obstruct the central ideal 
of impartiality (2008: 203). While a truly impartial and affectively engaged 
deliberation requires liberal-democratic politics, this form of politics, itself, 
needs engaged and passionate public discussions. By insisting on the 
“holistic—and therefore more realistic—account of practical reasoning, in 
which a affective and cognitive modes of consciousness are deeply entwined” 
(2008: 201), Krause aims at grounding her view of a kind of politics in which 
passion and justice are strictly linked.  
 
On a similar note, Michael Morrell (2010) attempts to draw a line of 
connection between deliberative theory and the relatively new attention to 
the emotional dimension. Morrell is aware of the shortcomings of 
contemporary deliberative theory and the unhelpful dichotomy between 
reason and passion – and the apparent privileged focus on rational 
argumentation – it is trapped in. As well, he is sensitive to the fact that, as he 
argues, deliberative theory fails to fulfil democracy’s promise of equal 
consideration for all, and thus somehow denies its ideal promise of justice. In 
this context, Morrell develops an argument that resonates with Krause’s link 
between passions and justice, and considers that an inclusionary and equal 
consideration for all is possible if empathy finds a significant place in 
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deliberative theory.  
 
He argues that the cultivation of empathy is a fundamental task for democratic 
purposes. From a ‘moral’ point of view, it is trough an empathic perspective 
that we can develop a better – truly democratic – relationship with other’s 
opinions. “Empathy – argues Morrell – is not a feeling, but rather a process 
through which others’ emotional states or situations affect us” (2010: 41). 
Empathy has a series of beneficial components that foster a democratic 
intersubjective relationship: if it generally leads to tolerance and mutual 
respect (Morrell, 2010: 115), it creates the conditions for a democratic 
openness toward others’ points of view, and thus a democratic inclusion and 
fairness (2010: 125). Empathy, in this sense, can help us become better 
democrats. Moreover, similarly to neo-Aristotelian theorists such as Martha 
Nussbaum, Morrell points out that contemporary societies need to foster the 
civic education in empathy (2010: 187). The purpose is to generate the 
conditions of possibility of an ‘empathetic democracy’, in which people 
attentively listen to each other, acknowledging others’ positions and avoiding 
destructive conflict. A model of democracy in which, although the result is not 
necessary the agreement, citizens can be adversarial and respectful (2010: 
157).  
 
Yet, both Sharon Krause and Michael Morrell struggle to excape from the 
liberal paradigm that tends to divide suitable versus harmful passisons for 
democracy. In fact, it seems that in Morrell’s account empathy is a ‘reasonable’ 
democratic passion in so far as it is conducive to liberal, peaceful, and 
harmonious relationships. It is true that Morrell acknowledges that people will 
not be able to empathize with absolutely everyone, yet empathy could appear 
a ‘depoliticizing’ emotion in his account, especially if we take into account his 
rejection of agonistic democracy (2010: 195). In this context, one might doubt 
that empathy is the proper – and unique – emotional disposition for 
democratic contexts. If a minimum of empathy between citizens can be a 
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necessary condition for an intersubjective dialogue, it does not imply that the 
democratic play involves the exclusion of other affective dispositions – 
especially those emotional responses often considered as harmful, such as 
anger, indination, hate. As we will futher show in the next chapters, these 
emotions also can be seen as constructive – not only ‘desctuctive’ – political 
dimensions. After all, if the point is to prompt justice within democratic 
context, how oppressed and disfavoured groups could empathise with those 
who are considered as the culpable of the oppression? How and to what extent 
should deliberative theory only rely on ‘positive’ emotional dispositions? How 
to ask citizens to empathise with those who are seen as guilty of their political 
and economic fraud? 
 
 
5. Thinking the political through emotions 
 
In the last chapters of this research we will further insist on these normative 
issues, especially putting emphasis on the recent democratic developments 
that have brought fruitful insights about the place and role of emotions in 
democracy. In this sense we will draw particularly on the work of Chantal 
Mouffe and her agonistic approach, in which passions are essentially involved 
in the conception of democracy and the conflictive nature of politics. However, 
before further dealing with this debate, here we will give a brief overview of 
the recent literature that has focused on the affective dimension of politics. In 
particular, beyond the purely normative (liberal) arguments, it is worth noting 
the rich theoretical approaches that have insisted on the fundamental role of 
certain emotions in society.   
 
The idea that there are certain emotions that are essentially political is present 
in the scholarship (e.g. Flam & King, 2005). Among others, loyalty, solidarity, 
anger, fear, resentment and shame – without exhausting the list of “political” 
emotions – are often seen as the key emotions that construct and support 
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social structures, as well as relations of domination. It is well known, for 
instance, that Max Weber associated loyalty with the legitimate systems of 
domination. He thought of loyalty as a key element that links the powerless to 
the powerful: the loyalty to the powerful is at the base of every legitimate form 
of domination and, together with fear, constitutes a field that shapes 
obedience. In this line, Ju rgen Habermas (1987: 320), argued that modern 
political institutions are systems that supply administrative services and 
political decisions for loyalty and taxes. In this sense he attributes great 
significance to loyalty binding role, and affirms that along with gratitude they 
are the two emotions that cement social relations converting them into 
permanent institutions. 
 
Helena Flam (Flam & King, 2005) has lately developed a research agenda for 
the study of emotions, putting special attention on the concrete role emotions 
have in society. Aiming at broadening the perspective that has been developed 
especially on social movements and the work emotions do within them, she 
contributes by identifying a series of theoretical tools for the macro-study of 
emotions and society. While most social movement researchers have so far 
focused on the mobilizing role of emotions or the feelings within members of 
collective mobilizations, the research Flam develops contends that emotions 
do not exclusively belong in the realm of the micro-politics of social 
movements – and thus she does not merely treat emotions in an instrumental 
and functionalist manner. Rather, according to Flam, we should connect the 
micropolitics of social movements to the macro-politics. In this vein, she 
points out that emotions such as loyalty, anger, shame, and fear are inner 
features of both social structures and relations of dominations. Within this 
framework, the role of emotions becomes essentially political. Some, such as 
gratitude and loyalty, are the most important cementing emotions. Anger, in 
contrast, is viewed as a sanctioning and activating emotion, or hate and 
distrust as subversive counter-emotions. 
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It is noteworthy that much of the recent scholarship has been focusing on 
some specific emotions. Fear and anger, for instance, have attracted particular 
attention in recent years, and deserve further consideration. Although during 
the main part of the 20th century – according to the general view of emotions 
in social science – accounts of fear tended to be individualized and 
pathologized, in recent years, fear has not fortuitously attracted much interest 
among social scientists. Although further debate on the psychological debate 
would be of great utility for its clarification10, we want to consider the political 
relevance of fear, that is its inter-subjective value. Social theorists and political 
scientists, as well as sociologists and historians have focused on this emotion, 
trying to shed light on its relationship with politics – apparently obvious and 
without interest – that remains ambiguous and that often has been 
disregarded by political science (Robins, 2004). In Max Weber’s vision, fear is 
another essential emotion for every form of legitimate domination. Weber 
(1970: 79) argued that individual and collective action in a given community is 
“determined by highly robust motives of fear and hope.” According to Kemper 
(1978: 55–6), the causes of fear are to be found whether in the “structural 
conditions of insufficient power […] or […] in the excess of the other’s power”. 
 
In the late 1990s and in the early 2000s the politics of fear has become an 
important topic in political sociology and political science. Frank Furedi’s 
Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation and Barry 
Glassner’s The Culture of Fear: Why American are Afraid of the Wrong Things 
exchanged Ulrich Beck’s “anxiety” for “fear” and reframed the analysis of risk 
                                                             
10 From a psychological standpoint, fear facilitates the development of perceptual and 
cognitive processes necessary to assess danger and protect the self from harm. Fear 
becomes highly adaptive, as motivation for avoidance and escape. It is worthy noting that 
fear, and other terms used more or less interchangeably like horror and terror, in 
psychological terms, are often taken to be a self-evident emotional response to an 
external extreme situation. It is normally forgotten that fear is also a social phenomenon: 
as how people behave in specific circumstances depends upon wider cultural, political 
and social norms, as well as expectations and beliefs. Similarly, rage or anger, are 
considered as both positive and negative emotions or, in Martha Nussbaum’s words, as 
humanizing” and “dehumanizing” tendencies (Nussbaum, 1994: 404). 
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society. Furedi and Glassner’s position has now become common wisdom: we 
live in a culture dominated by fear and this fear has damaging social 
consequences. They both argue that, as this fear is often irrational, 
exaggerated, or misplaced, it is not simply a reasonable response to the 
conditions of risk society, but the result of a debilitating obsession with safety 
or the outcome of a media-produced perception of heightened risk. The idea 
that governments are increasingly manufacturing, drawing upon and 
reproducing fear has become the predominant focus of attention in scholarly 
works. The objective of this politics of fear would be to gain support for 
positions on issues, thereby enforcing the idea that because we are vulnerable 
to threats and cannot risk the consequences of not acting, certain policies and 
government’s actions have no alternatives.  
 
Some go so far as to state that “fear has become the emotion through which 
public life is administered” (Bourke, 2006: 10). Others tend to assume the 
effects of fear results in creating fearful masses (Pain and Smith, 2008). Engin 
Isin (2004), on his count, argues that Anglophone neoliberal state societies are 
now governed through neurosis: “the culture of fear” underplays “the fact that 
people not only conduct their lives with affects and emotions but also in the 
absence of capacities for evaluating full and transparent information” (Isin, 
2004: 220). As Joanna Bourke argues in Fear: A Cultural History (2006), our 
understanding of, response to, and even subjective feeling of fear are 
historically determined. That is, it is fundamentally constituted through a 
dynamic process with the social. While it is obvious that the causes and 
sources of fear have transformed along the historical axis, it is unclear how 
one would measure its intensity or compare different historical moments. 
Although much of the work that follows Furedi and Glassner typically posits a 
shift in the intensification of social fear following the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks, most argue that the origins of this “culture of fear” can be 
traced back to 20th century developments. There is a plethora of examples, 
including increased globalization, the scientific-technological advancements, 
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the loss of traditional sources of authority, and fundamentalist religious 
beliefs. So, fear relates to the world “risk society” (Beck, 1999), in which the 
“unpredictable, uncontrollable and ultimately incommunicable” consequences 
of risks increasingly circulate at a global scale (Beck, 2002: 40). According to 
Beck, it is not that life has become more dangerous. It is that risk has now de-
bounded, in spatial, temporal and social terms, so that “the hidden central 
issue in world risk society is how to feign control over the uncontrollable – in 
politics, law, science, technology, economy and everyday life” (Beck, 2002: 41, 
original emphasis). Furthermore, the interest of social scientists for this theme 
has obviously spread out after a series of contemporary events, most notably 
the terrorist attacks in the beginning of this century and the so-called “war on 
terror”. Since 2001, fear has become primarily focused on issues of 
international reach, like immigration, disease, and terrorism. All this has 
encouraged social scientists and political theorists to dig into the patterns of 
fear, highlighting different perspectives of analysis: the paradoxes of 
contemporary insecurity (Castel, 2003; Furedi, 2005, 2007), the risks of 
industrialized societies (Beck, 1999) or the fluid nature of current fears 
(Bauman, 2006).  
 
Similarly, recent literature has pointed out the relevance of others emotions, 
at the opposite side of the spectrum of emotions, such as rage, anger, outrage, 
wrath, indignation, fury, hatred and so forth. These emotions have been 
increasingly analysed within the field of social sciences. From a psychological 
point of view, anger is conceptualized as an active affective reaction to a 
problematic situation of social hierarchy. In the Western culture, anger is a 
Janus-faced emotion, considered to have both socially constructive and 
disruptive effects. On one hand it is considered as a noble passion of rebellion 
against injustice or changing the state of affairs; on the other hand it is viewed 
– and feared – as a losing of judicious thinking. While in the Christian tradition 
anger represents a capital vice, liberalism has often silenced this kind of 
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emotion because reason is defined as technical rationality (Weber, 1958; 
Bodei, 2010).  
 
Simon Thompson notes that there are two distinct and closely related ideas in 
the study of anger in politics. The first is the notion that anger often leads to 
mobilization; that is, that anger as an emotion is capable of motivating people 
into political action and participation. Secondly, we have the idea that the 
reason people mobilize is too often overcome some form of perceived and real 
injustice. In this sense, it has been emphasized in recent literature that the 
capacity to respond with anger is crucial to a sense of justice (Nussbaum, 
1994: 403; Solomon and Murphy, 1990: 242).  
 
Anger is usually an immediate, spontaneous response to the perception of 
unjustified harm or pain to the self or to the social contours. Thus, anger is 
manifested in support of position or status in a social hierarchy, and can be 
considered a positive emotion insofar as it can have a functional value. That is 
to say, anger mobilizes our energy and resources in service of goal attainment. 
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) affirms that, “[l]ike other emotions, anger is functional when 
it is in the right proportion, for example, when it is expressed in a socially 
constructive way without becoming highly aroused” (2000: 386). Although in 
an era of increased personal and collective sense of insecurity – job insecurity, 
insecurity, civil, economic, etc. – it is difficult to turn the anger towards clear 
goals, to transform it into a constructive political power, anger is viewed as 
motivating people to engage in political action, fuelling collective struggle for 
justice and recognition. Thus, if anger is something people feel when they 
experience injustice, then understanding anger may offer some insight into the 
nature of injustice itself. If anger motivates political action, then its study may 
well offer new insights into the character of struggles for power. 
 
Theodore Kemper (1978; 1990) argues that we experience anger as a ‘real 
emotion’ when we are confronted with power that seriously limits our 
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autonomy and we attribute the blame for the loss of autonomy to the power-
holder. In a similar context, Martha Nussbaum asks, “What moral sentiments 
will be particularly important in such a political-liberal society, based on ideas 
of capability and functioning? […] I have frequently suggested that anger and 
indignation will be such core sentiments because they react to harm or 
damage” (Nussbaum, 2004: 345).   
 
In this context, although the collective expression of anger has historically 
been discouraged – due to its close association with irrationality, aggression 
or violent excess –, recent studies on social movements have demonstrated 
that anger motivates and fuels activity and collective struggles for justice 
(Goodwin et al., 2001; Jasper, 1997). As Gamson (1992: 31–2) pointed out long 
ago, injustice and inequalities may cause demobilizing affects on citizens, such 
as cynicism and resignation. Similarly, social and political injustice may also 
cause, moral outrage, anger – as well as hope – that are crucial for 
mobilization. The political value of anger, in this line, has been seen to lie in its 
capacity to communicate that an injustice has been committed, and through 
this anger to question the legitimacy of power (Lyman, 2004: 133).  
 
In a thought-provoking exploration Peter Sloterdijk (2010) investigates the 
role of rage as one of the driving forces of human history. In Rage and Time he 
reflects on the sociopolitical ordering, coding, and accumulation of rage, from 
the Greek mythology to the contemporary world. In his global vision of this 
emotion, the German philosopher attempts to rehabilitate rage as a political 
category. From his standpoint, the theory and history of rage is primarily a 
theory of the politico-religious mediations of the processes of overcoming 
offended pride and of aspiring for revenge. In his analysis, Sloterdijk points 
out that, when supported through justified indignation, rage can be an 
emancipatory fore. In that light, making a contribution to our understanding of 
the constitutive role of affects in world politics, Sloterdijk provides an 
historical contextualization of the most recent violent eruptions of anger. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
Here we have dealt with some of the contemporary debates on emotions and 
politics. We have firstly shown the wide spectrum these debates cover and, 
secondly, their respective arguments. As well, we have contended that it is 
necessary to take into consideration the wide range of social sciences that 
make a contribution in the understanding of the role of emotion in politics, 
and critically engage with the reason versus emotion dichotomy. For the 
research aim of this investigation, widening the spectrum of the various social 
sciences is an essential task. In order to deal with the emotion-politics nexus it 
is essential – as we will argue further on this thesis – to broaden the 
perspective of analysis. Recent studies in political psychology, neurology, 
philosophy, as well as social studies can contribute to a better understanding 
of the nature of emotions and their relationship with the political realm. 
Although defining emotion – and showing the contemporary debates over the 
definition – is not the aim of this study, it is nonetheless a first step we have to 
take. This is the way to show how and to what extent emotions have entered 
the political debate in recent decades.  
 
Moreover, drawing on a wide range of approaches and field of studies, we also 
aimed at showing the broad historical and theoretical implication that a focus 
on emotions involves. Political thinking about the affective dimension is, at 
once, rooted in ‘classical’ philosophical disputes – the concern with emotions 
for social life is as old as philosophy itself –, and opens up relatively new and 
thought-provoking research paths.   
 
In the next chapter, after dealing with the epistemological implication related 
to the political research on emotions, we will set our theoretical and 
methodological proposal, which will combine discourse analysis and 
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normative thinking about the emotions in populist and democratic theory. As 
we have already mentioned in the first chapter, this combination of 
perspectives – we argue – will enable us to better grasp the broad role of 
emotions in politics, as well as providing fruitful tools to understand the 
phenomena we will take as our case study.  Indeed, the critique that recent 
anti-austerity mobilizations moved towards the concrete functioning of 
contemporary democracies was also made through emotional elements. In 
order to better comprehend this critique, and its theoretical implication, it will 
be useful to take into consideration what we have outlined in this chapter and 
will do in the next one, that is, these heterogeneous ways in which emotions 
were considered within the broad field of social and political studies. 
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Chapter 3. Building our model for emotions, protests and populism. 
Theoretical and methodological framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we have focused on the broad research areas that 
brought emotions back into political studies. While we have contended that it 
is necessary to take into account of the broad range of social sciences in the 
understanding of the political role of emotions, here we want to delve into our 
theoretical framework that will enable us to conduct our research. We will 
thus set our methodological proposal, which will enable us to link together 
heterogeneous and apparently separated fields of study, such as the political 
analysis of emotions and theories of populism and democracy. They have, we 
will argue, some interesting points of convergence. 
 
As we have already suggested, this study is primarily based on two 
methodological perspectives, which makes this thesis a theory-oriented 
investigation that operates via a discursive analysis. The combination of these 
different theoretical perspectives, which is needed – as we will argue – to 
overcome the lacuna in the understanding the political role of emotional 
dynamics, turned out to be one of the most salient features of this research. In 
this sense, instead of debating whether discourse analysis is a more effective 
tool than a pure theory-oriented perspective for our purpose, this thesis 
combines both techniques. As such, while it is contended that it is time to 
break free of the idea that it is necessary to delve into only one specific 
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methodology in the study of politics, the aim is to link discourse analysis with a 
broader vision of emotions and their role in shaping social reality.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. We will firstly focus on the 
epistemological implications related to the political study on emotions (2), 
showing the strict connection between the cognitive consequences they bring 
to the forefront and the process of framing the reality. We will then turn to the 
methodological proposal of this research (3), explaining the different methods 
that are combined in the research. We will especially highlight the discursive 
level of our investigation and its link with populism and normative thinking. 
Moreover (4) we will briefly take into account the essential reflection about 
populism and particularly the discursive approach developed by the so-called 
Essex School, and finally (5), we will delve into our own approach and insist 
on the theoretical nature of the research.  
 
 
2. Emotions and epistemological implications 
 
The recent literature we have outlined in the previous chapter brought 
emotions back into the discussion. From the heterogeneity of works on 
emotions at least two main theoretical consequences can be derived. The first 
one, by some means related to the explicatory goal of political analysis, is that 
social sciences should consider emotions as part of political reasoning. The 
second one, more focused on the normative level of political reflections, 
suggests that emotions play a crucial role in the cognitive and normative 
construction of politics.   
 
Nonetheless, some criticism of this diverse literature should be addressed. 
Firstly, there is still a lack of interdisciplinarity in the study of the political role 
of emotions. Even though psychology and neurology have broadly influenced 
political research, most of these works are still resisting about incorporating 
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broad and cross-disciplinary methods of analysis; rather there is a preference 
to focus on specific field of knowledge. Secondly, little attention has been paid 
to the theoretical and historical implications. Although philosophy and 
political theory are two essential domains of the re-entering of emotions in the 
political research, few authors are filling the deficient attention to the 
connection between the history of political thought and the current 
articulation of political affairs. Specifically, there is a lack of analysis of the role 
of emotions in the process of conceptualization of political categories. While 
political philosophers and historians have highlighted how the foundations of 
our thinking are related to emotions, few contemporary analyses are devoted 
to the political role of emotions in the construction of modern political ideas 
and their current version (e.g. Kingston, 2011; Krause, 2008; Nussbaum, 2013; 
Solomon, 1993). Thirdly, there is a broad epistemological issue that the study 
of emotion forces us to deal with, which recent literature – as we have 
mentioned  – point out: the nature of our knowledge. How to deal with 
emotions and their political role? Although many authors have carried out 
analyses of concrete emotions – especially in the fields of psychology, 
sociology and protest movement analysis –, emphasis on the epistemological 
consequences for political research have been underestimated by political 
scientists and theorists  (Kingston, 2011:99-106; Neuman et al., 2007). 
 
 
2.1 Emotions, cognition, and the framing of reality  
 
The relationship between the political realm and the emotional dimensions 
forces us to delve into the epistemological construction of political research. 
The theoretical engagement with emotions in the last decades contributed to 
some innovative epistemological trends. Neuroscience, poststructuralist 
feminist theory, psychoanalytical theory and critical analysis innovations 
have, among other perspectives, challenged the conventional oppositions 
between emotion and reason, and the complex relationship between power, 
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knowledge and emotion. As well, they have questioned the misunderstood 
place of emotion within political theorizing – that is, the affective dimension of 
the normative (Koziak, 2000). Given these heterogeneous perspectives, we 
need to take into account the epistemology of contemporary social and 
political research.   
 
In his overview of contemporary literature on emotion, Máiz (2011) 
mentioned the most relevant arguments advanced by this heterogeneous 
literature. Briefly, we can state that: 
 
1. The mind/body and reason/emotion dichotomies are to be revisited.  
Emotion and reason are both anchored to the body. 
2. Reason and emotion are symbiotic in the evaluative mental processes 
and in the determination of what is crucial and vital for individuals and the 
collectivity.   
3. In that context, emotions have a cognitive dimension. That is, 
emotion contributes to knowledge and judgment: “there is no cognition 
without feeling” (Melucci, 1995: 45). 
4. Emotions, and their cognitive dimension, are in part socially 
constructed. Emotions are at least in part determined by cultural and socio-
structural factors, by processes of socialization.   
5. Moreover, emotions are influenced by and have an influence on 
judgments, especially with regards to values and beliefs. In this vein, emotions 
have advanced our understanding of cognitive processes and the mechanisms 
that influence political judgement, and decision-making.  
 
In all this, emotions are seen to have some essential and intrinsic dimensions: 
cognitive; evaluative; sensitive; motivational (Ben- Ze’ev, 2000). Recent 
scholarship suggests that emotions may help citizens use political heuristics 
more efficiently. According to the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus et al., 
2000), emotions complement reason by signalling to the brain when to rely on 
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heuristic processes and when to expend greater cognitive effort. Emotions, in 
other words, play an important role in the elaboration of information about 
specific circumstances – our knowledge of the world – as well as in the 
creating a personal and collective disposition to act with respect to this 
information. Emotions, then, are at work in both our action in the political 
realm, as well as in our comprehension of it. One might ask, thus, how to 
understand and to deal with something that contributes to our knowledge. In 
this context, the return of emotions in political investigation opens up new 
perspectives on the epistemological front. Objectivity and measurability – the 
core epistemological traits of current political science’s mainstream – seem to 
be at the centre of theoretical and methodological disputes. An alternative 
ontological perspective might be introduced in the analysis of the political role 
of emotion. Since recent literature on emotions questions modern dichotomies 
and the rigid separation between the object of analysis and the subject of 
knowledge – that is the independence of the phenomena studied from its 
examiner –, one should deal with the ways in which emotional factors frame 
the way one comes to develop an understanding. 
 
However, although emotions bring to the forefront these broad 
methodological issues, it is impossible to delve into them here in details. What 
seems clear is that in recent decades a series of research methods for the 
analysis of emotions and politics has been developed. Both qualitative and 
quantitative are currently available: while quantitative analysis is generally 
oriented to survey data, qualitative investigations rely on a variegated 
spectrum of methods, such as in-depth interviews, discourse and frame 
analysis, and participant observation (Polletta and Amenta 2001: 313). What 
this heterogeneous methods grasp is that emotional dynamics have a strong 
role in the process of framing the social reality. Emotions are viewed as 
producers of individual and collective identities and social meanings, through 
the role they play in the interpretation of the social and political reality. 
Within the notion of frame, it is argued, cognition is an important factor in 
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knowledge and, at the same time, in the construction of the social realm 
(Lakoff, 2008). Moreover, recent literature has shown the strong link between 
cognition and emotions: they have a cognitive role that operates in the process 
of framing, that is the interpretation and construction of reality. 
 
In this vein, this study takes these developments into account and advances its 
own methodological path in order to approach the object of the study.  
 
 
3. Emotions and discourse theory: some general ideas 
 
These facets of the current research on the political role of emotions allow us 
to advance a theoretical proposal, which logically involves deep 
methodological assertions, as we sill argue below.    
 
Overall, we advocate for a comprehensive and interpretive perspective, within 
a general anti-foundationalist framework, contrary to the rigid positivism of 
certain political analysis. According to this interpretive position, we reject the 
unconditional notion that the political world is fully independent of our 
knowledge of it. Rather, we contend that the world is, at least in part, socially 
and discursively constructed. That means that social phenomena are strictly 
dependent of our interpretation of them. In this sense, while the world clearly 
“exists” independently of any particular interpretation of it, the social realm is 
“discursively constructed”, that is, its meaning and significance depend on 
particular discursive articulations. Discourses about the political realm, 
therefore, have both representational and ontological functions: discourse can 
be defined as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world, as 
well as a way of socially constructing its meaning. In this vein, following a 
nominalist vision – i.e. the experience of the world is not given to us directly 
but mediated by language –, we can suggest that it is our interpretation and 
understanding of political phenomena, that really matters.  
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Within this context, we will draw on some well-known assumptions recently 
developed by discourse theory, and particularly the Essex School. The 
discursive approach articulated by this intellectual tradition will allow us to 
properly deal with the theoretical problem that emotions, and their discursive 
translation within contentious practices, pose to the democratic realm. Here, 
we will focus on some main methodological vectors that assess core politics 
issues, such as the poststructuralist and discursive view of the political, the 
analytical tools for discourse analysis, the relationship between emotions and 
discourse and the key role played by the concept of populism.  
 
 
3.1 Discourse theory and politics as struggle for the meaning 
 
In recent decades a variety of paradigms has been developed under the 
unifying umbrella of discourse analysis (see Howarth, 2000). Here we will 
briefly present the theory of the so-called Essex School, in order to sketch our 
own research method.  
 
Being one of the most influential approaches to discourse analysis, the 
perspective initially developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) 
is known to be the ‘purest’ poststructuralist theory, among different 
perspectives of discourse analysis – discursive psychology, critical discourse 
analysis, and so forth –, and the wide arrays of theoretical and analytical 
approaches that have recently highlighted the importance of ‘discourse’ within 
political research (Torfing, 1999; Glynos et. al., 2009). Their starting point is 
that reality can be grasped and understood within discourses, so that it is 
discourse itself that is taken as the object of analysis. Epistemologically based 
on the poststructuralist idea that discourse constructs meaning in the social 
world, the purpose of political and discursive research is not to get ‘behind’ 
discourse. On the contrary, the analyst has to work identifying the social 
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consequences of different discursive representations of reality. Furthermore, 
due to the fundamental instability of language, the meanings of social domain 
cannot be fixed, and they are constantly being transformed through contact 
with other discourse practices. In this context, the term ‘discourse’ is not 
identical to language or text; rather it refers to a network of meaning 
articulating by both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. Discourse refers to 
all “systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and 
objects” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 3-4), which are constituted as an 
attempt to dominate the field of discursivity. Thus, discourse and language are 
not transparent and neutral, rather they inform the social construction of 
reality and are socio-politically ‘situated’.  
 
Consequently, the Essex discourse theory refers to the scientific practice of 
grasping, mapping, and accounting for the discursive articulations that 
attempt to fix the meaning within the political realm. In this process, it 
combines two interrelated tasks: on the one hand a process of capturing the 
processes through which social meaning is articulated; on the other hand the 
mapping of antagonistic feature of different discourses in their articulation 
around specific nodal points (e.g. ‘the people’). While the overall aim is to 
carrying out critical analysis of power relations, as well to articulate a 
normative perspective for social change, discourse theory shows that the 
meaning of social phenomena and entities are constantly involved in 
discursive struggles. Discursive struggle is, indeed, a keyword of the theory: 
discourses, it is argued, are engaged in a constant struggle over the creation of 
the meaning of the same social domain. What this struggle is aiming at is a – at 
least provisional – dominance of one particular meaning over others. This is 
what has been called hegemony.  
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 3.1.1 Construction of the world and objectivity  
 
Epistemologically, discourse theory is grounded in social constructivism: 
knowledge is linked to social processes and to historical and cultural contexts. 
Within this perspective, both the real world and the knowledge of it are to be 
grasped in discursive practices – all material and non-material elements of the 
political realm being viewed as properly discursive. Discourse itself is what 
constitutes the meaning of our world. Since discursive practices shape our 
understanding of the world – its very meaning – the same boundaries of 
objectivity are to be found within the different discourse practices. Their fluid 
and context-based features makes that objectivity something that can be 
contested, especially in the political realm. The allegedly objective 
understanding of the world is the sedimented vision, a result of political and 
discursive struggles. For this perspective, discourses are contingent visions of 
the social and political realm.  
 
In this vein, Laclau and Mouffe try to go beyond the objectivism and 
essentialism of orthodox Marxism. For them, society is not constituted by 
objective laws, nor by fixed class divisions. Rather, the social realm is to be 
understood as our own attempt at give a meaning of existing phenomena 
through discursive processes. Thus, these attempts are what constitute the 
process that leads to objectivity. Objectivity, in this perspective, is produces 
through confrontation of alternative discursive interpretation of the world, 
until one vision is hegemonically naturalised. The naturalisation of a particular 
meaning is what the hegemonic discourse is aiming at, as well as the 
stabilisation of power relations. The production of meaning, in other words, 
natralise power relations and place them beyond question. 
 
 3.1.2 Analytical tools  
 
Studying the political realm as constructed by discourses has different 
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methodological consequences. Epistemologically, the Essex School opens up a 
scientific space for political research beyond casual laws. Indeed, adopting a 
problem-driven approach to political analysis via the study of particular 
problems in specific historical contexts, discourse theory operates through a 
logic of critical explanation (Glyson and Howarth, 2007), that aims at 
evaluating and criticising discourse struggles. What is important to delve into 
here is that, firstly, discourse analysis problematizes its own object of study. 
That means that this approach is not a purely theory-driven approach that 
aims at vindicating a particular theory, but it starts from the definitions and 
construction of political problems. It is indeed a problem-drive approach, 
which does not take for granted the existence and nature of social structures 
and rules, but locates the problems in historical and ideational factors. Given 
these ontological premises, the formal approach to discourse is in this sense 
what permits its flexible utilization in the analysis of concrete cases, allowing a 
rigorous theoretical and comparative usage. The central concepts introduced 
by Laclau and Mouffe in the study of discursive practices are, among others, 
articulation, elements, moments, nodal points and empty signifiers. 
 
Articulation is invoked by Laclau and Mouffe primarily to understand concrete 
social practices in which social actors ‘articulate’ discursive elements along 
the axes of what they call equivalence or difference. Moments, for their part, 
are the different positions that appear articulated within a discourse (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 105). In this sense, articulation refers to the signifying 
mechanism through which elements are continually transformed to moments 
of distinct discourses fixing – at least temporarily – their meaning, through the 
structuring function of the nodal point, which later Laclau conflates into the 
notion of ‘empty signifier’. Within this formal configuration, the articulation of 
a political discourse takes place around empty signifiers: emptiness is, from 
this perspective, not only an essential formal quality of discourses as such, but 
a condition for discursive struggles. Since discourses tend to fill such 
emptiness, they are in an ‘articulatory’ struggle for the ‘matter’ of these empty 
 87 
signifiers.  
 
How does this struggle occur? Laclau and Mouffe argue that in the discursive 
struggle over the significance of the political realm, weight has to be given to 
two different logics: the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. They 
are two distinct logics through which the representation of social space is 
formed. The logic of equivalence is an operation of simplification of the 
political domain, while the logic of difference is a mechanism of expansion of 
the complexity of the world. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 130). These logics 
capture the two basic possibilities in the process of framing the reality and 
construction of political identities.  
 
In this sense, identities, both individual and collective – being an example of 
empty signifiers – are the results of discursive struggles. It is important to note 
that all the approaches to discourse analysis are critical of the classical 
Western understanding of the individual as an autonomous subject. According 
to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the subject – both individual and collective – is 
not determined by economic and material factors, but it acquires its identity 
by being represented discursively. The idea of the true, whole self is a fiction, a 
myth (Laclau, 1977: 2). Like the social, the individual is partly structured by 
discourses, but the structuring is never total. The subject has different 
identities according to those discourses of which it forms part, and is always 
relationally organized. In this sense, the subject is fragmented. In particular, 
identity is discursively constituted through chains of equivalence where signs 
are sorted and linked together in chains in opposition to other chains, which 
thus define how the subject is, and how it is not. Therefore, a given identity is 
contingent – that is, possible but not necessary. 
 
One might argue that Laclau and Mouffe do not add much empirical evidence 
to their discourse theory. But that does not imply that their theory, concepts 
and methods cannot be used in detailed empirical analyses. It is important to 
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note that recently there has been a significant increase in the concrete 
applications of this framework, often perceived as over-theoretical (e.g. 
Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000; Howarth and Torfing 2005). Indeed, 
through the usage of building methodological units, scholars have collected 
and analysed a variegated amount of ‘data’, such as “speeches, reports, 
manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organisations 
and institutions” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 4). 
 
 
 3.2 Discourse and the affective dimension 
 
Within the process of framing, discourses are the vectors through which 
political is structured. The different analytical tools developed and employed 
by the Essex School – such as articulations, elements, moments, nodal points 
and empty signifiers – are the theoretical mechanisms through which political 
analysis can grasp this discursive construction of reality. However, one might 
ask what is this construction composed of? Concepts, ideas, ideologies, beliefs, 
and affects are all significant elements that take part in this process. Recently, 
as we have already mentioned, great attention has been given to the affective, 
emotional side of this process. What about emotion within the discourse 
theory? How are emotion and affectivity articulated with a discursive logic? 
And how is this articulation linked to democracy? 
 
Some criticisms have been raised towards the effective possibility for the 
Essex School and the formal theory it has suggested to grasp the importance of 
affect (e.g. Beasley-Murray, 2010). Although Laclau has admitted himself that 
the topic of emotions have not previously been incorporated into discourse 
theory, or at most in a “sketchy and inchoate way” (Laclau 2003: 278), he has 
also highlighted that it should be seen not as a threat that contradict discourse 
theory, but as an internal challenge for additional theoretical refinement and 
analytical improvement. In this sense, it is noteworthy the fact that discourse 
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theory has suggested a series of useful methodological instruments to capture 
the emotional aspect of identity formation. If the general idea is to register the 
‘linguistic’ and ‘constructivist’ turn in the social sciences, the attempt is to take 
into account the ways in which discursive articulations depends on processes 
of affective investment. Recent developments within the domain of discourse 
theory have been engaging seriously with this problematic (e.g. Stavrakakis 
2005; 2014a), thus taking on board the so-called ‘affective turn’.  
 
Putting emphasis on the emotional dynamics that are related particularly to 
populism has enabled Laclau to start addressing a series of significant 
shortcomings in his earlier account of the phenomenon. Interestingly enough, 
the dimension of affective investment becomes a central value of Laclau’s late 
analysis of populism. Through the notion of radical investment he adds a 
peculiar perspective to his own discursive theory of populism. He indeed 
argues that “an entity becomes the object of an investment – as in being in 
love, or in hatred – the investment belongs necessarily to the order of affect” 
(Laclau 2005a: 110). In this vein, since such investment is necessary in order 
to effect the symbolic unification of a group in a formation such as ‘the people’ 
(Laclau 2005a: 110), then affect becomes a nuclear element of a discursive 
analysis of populism11.  
 
It has been empirically demonstrated, for instance, that the differentiation 
between a technocratic and a populist government lies in the ‘emotional’ 
perceptions they provoke amongs citizens: the former is often seen as neutral, 
passive, distant, and essentially ‘dry’ in its institutional nature, while the latter 
is viewed as warm, passionate, affective and close in its discursive articulation. 
It is in this vein that the role of particular emotions has been studied within 
populist phenomena. Nicolas Demertzis has focused, for instance, on the role 
of resentment in populism, arguing that it is defined as political phenomenon 
                                                             
11 Laclau suggests that the figure of the leader emerges as one possible, even though 
partial, object of radical investment (Laclau 2005a: 192). 
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precisely because it is ‘charged with resentment’ (Demertzis, 2006: 112; 
Demertzis, 2013). Mouffe’s case is, for its part, even more revealing insofar she 
has been underlying the important role of emotion and the dimension of 
affectivity throughout all her research. She has particularly insisted on the 
removal – if not the repression – of affectivity and the passions in 
contemporary liberal democratic theory (Mouffe, 2000: 30), and defended 
from an agonistic position the role of affects and the passions in politics. For 
Mouffe thinking of politics somehow entails thinking of passion. This is so, in 
her view, not only because politics arise out of passions, but also because 
politics – that is partisan politics in the Schmittian perspective she works from 
– at the same time moderates, mobilizes, intensifies friend/enemy 
distinctions. Moreover, in both On the Political (2005) and Agonistics (2013), 
the focus on the role of emotions sustains this argument, with and additional 
engagement with the analysis of identification processes. Passions define and 
substantially enlighten democratic practice, because they represent the type 
of (necessary) bonds that have to develop among democratic citizenries; that 
is, passions are all those affective identifications – practices and discourses – 
that constitute collectivities and unite citizenries. Seen as collective and 
politically necessary, passions ground democratic practice.  
 
 
4. People and populism between theory and discourse 
 
Given this context, here we delve into the study of populism, which is a central 
aspect of discourse theory, and directly related to the affective dimension of 
politics. It is important to note that, being one of the most commented concept 
in recent political studies, populism has been conceptualized through different 
approaches: populism as a particular form of political organization (e.g. 
Germani, 1978; Taggart, 1995), populism as a political style (Canovan, 1999; 
Mazzoleni et.al., 2003; Taguieff, 1995), populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ 
(e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008b; Mudde, 2004; 2007; Stanley, 2008) or 
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‘discourse’ (Laclau, 2005). All different understandings of the term populism 
tend to be broad and vague, even in the academic debates. However, almost all 
these authors have focused on searching for minimal definition of populism. 
Locating such a common core is, certainly, the holy grail of all theories of 
populism. The question is where exactly is this to be located: In ideological 
content, the organizational features of populist movements, or in political 
rhetoric and practices? In this attempt, it has been argued that populism is as a 
thin-centred ideology that has three core concepts – the people, the elite, the 
general will – and two direct opposites – elitism and pluralism, and can be 
attached to other ‘thicker’ ideologies (e.g. liberalism, socialism, nationalism, 
etc.). In this sense populist politics considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the people’ and 
‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of 
the volonté générale of the people (Mudde, 2004: 543; 2007: 23; Mudde and 
Rovira, 2012: 8). According to Cas Mudde, populism is first and foremost a 
moral form of politics, as the distinction between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ is 
mainly based on moral principles – such as the pure politicians versus the 
corrupts politics, a particular kind of Manichean discourse that identifies Good 
with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite.  
 
Regardless of the approach one chooses, what becomes clear is that populism 
focuses on the ‘who’ of politics. In so doing, it contends that ‘the people’ is the 
true subject of democratic politics. According to Ben Stanley (2008), four 
interrelated ideas represent the core values of populism, and represent the 
lowest common denominator that all populist phenomena share: 
 
1. The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: ‘the people’ and 
‘the elite’. 
2. The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite. 
3. The idea of popular sovereignty. 
4. The positive valorisation of ‘the people’ and denigration of ‘the elite’. 
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1. Populism is articulated in a particular vision of the political in which 
the division between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ plays a fundamental part in its 
rhetoric. In this sense, the complexity of society is undervalued. Moreover, the 
same concept of ‘the people’ is somehow ‘decontested’ and its conceptual 
ambiguity contributes the ontological perception of the society as essentially 
divided between the people’s will and, on the opposite front, the elite.  
 
2. Dealing with the division between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, Stanley 
highlights the fact that the essential nature of the relationship between these 
two entities is their antagonistic and adversarial relationship, regardless of the 
concrete structure and configuration of the elite itself. Recognizing the 
Schmittean legacy, it seems that populists subscribe their doctrine according 
to which political actions and motives can be reduced to the relationship 
between friend and enemy.  
 
3. Margaret Canovan remarks that popular sovereignty is the 
‘foundation myth’ of modern representative politics. The concept of ‘we, the 
People’ is somehow the source of political authority. Drawing on this Stanley 
argues that the popular versus elite antagonism plays an ideational rather than 
structural role in populism, and contributes to the simplification of the 
complex task of ‘constructing’ the people. Although there is no substantial 
content within the notion of the people – a part of its being constituted 
through the antagonic logic –, what remains a key factor is the idea of its 
essential role in democratic politics.  
 
4. Furthermore, populism has an evaluative task in attributing different 
political and moral values to both ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Similar to what 
Cas Mudde has argued, in this vision populism charges with positive moral 
significance the idea of ‘the people’, while it discredits those who belong to 
‘the elite’. Hence, the same idea of popular sovereignty is articulated as the 
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ultimate and truly essential normative principle for democratic government. 
In a ‘decontested’ manner, populism treats the general will of the people as if 
it could be somehow privileged over the elite, including over the 
representative role it often assumes. 
 
In a similar vein, discourse theory has developed a powerful approach to 
populism, which shares some elements and critical allegations with this vision 
of populism as a thin-centred ideology. Through the utilization of these 
analytical tools and formal criteria, discursive theory has focused particularly 
on the analysis of some kinds of discourses, movements, and political 
identities – those articulated around the nodal point of ‘the people’.  Populism 
has been in this sense the main object of study and the terrain of application of 
discourse theory since the beginnings of this intellectual tradition (Laclau, 
1977), further enhanced in his more recent work (Laclau, 2005a; 2005b) and 
still remains a key research horizon for those who operate within this 
theoretical framework (e.g. Panizza 2005; Stavrakakis, 2004; 2014b; Arditi, 
2007).  
 
Within the numerous definition of populism, discourse theory develops a 
particular approach in which the fundamental idea of populism is its logic, 
rather than its organizational or structural social features. Populism has been 
elaborated as a specific object of study, and the discursive framework has 
advanced a series of formal operational criteria, as we have seen, which have 
helped the understanding of differentiated political phenomena. The 
formalism suggested by the discourse research is indeed articulated around 
two theoretical assumptions: on the one hand, the nodal point – or empty 
signifier – ‘the people’ and, on the other hand, the antagonistic logic that 
divides the society into two main blocs along ‘equivalential’ lines, the 
establishment versus the underdog, ‘the people’. In a nutshell, populism is 
characterised by a political logic that considers society essentially divided into 
two opposed groups, ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. This division of society into 
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two antagonic camps is the result of a process: firstly, different social and 
political demands are linked together; this leads to the formation of a 
collective identity and the creation of a common enemy – the establishment –; 
and a consequent affective investment in the leader or political party that 
claims to represent ‘the people’.   
 
With the aim of going beyond the limitations of other existing approaches, this 
formalism permits the framing of a concept of ‘populism’ that is at once 
rigorous and flexible and thus apt to be used for both theoretical and empirical 
analysis. Concretely, this formalism helps to overcome an important problem: 
the geographical and political ‘ubiquity’ of populism. As Laclau has noted 
(Laclau 2005b: 44), populism can emerge from different points of the socio-
economic structure, as well as be associated with radically different 
phenomena within the political spectrum, such as left-wing and right-wing 
movements and political parties (Laclau 2005b: 45). 
 
“[W]e could say that a movement is not populist because in its politics or 
ideology it presents actual contents identifiable as populistic, but because 
it shows a particular logic of articulation of those contents – whatever 
those contents are”. (Laclau 2005b: 33). 
 
It becomes clear that what Laclau is proposing is a rigorously formal approach. 
Thus, Laclau’s viewpoint moves beyond the assessment of empirical contents 
– ideological, organizational, etc. – and focuses on form.  
 
“the concept of populism that I am proposing is a strictly formal one, for all 
its defining features are exclusively related to a specific mode of 
articulation – the prevalence of the equivalential over the differential logic 
– independently of the actual contents that are articulated. […] Most of the 
attempts at defining populism have tried to locate what is specific to it in a 
particular ontic content and, as a result, they have ended in a self-defeating 
exercise whose two predictable alternative results have been either to 
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choose an empirical content which is immediately overflowed by an 
avalanche of exceptions, or to appeal to an ‘intuition’ which cannot be 
translated into any conceptual content”. (Laclau, 2005b: 44) 
 
The lastest works of Laclau, in this sense, further highlight the formal 
character of the populist logics, to the point that the core reference to the 
signifier ‘the people’ is replaced by the production of empty signifiers in 
general. In other words, populism as a mode of discursive articulation is no 
longer essentially linked to the location of ‘the people’, rather the populist 
dimensions can belong to all political articulations opposing dominant 
hegemonic blocs. What remains a key feature is the antagonistic 
dichotomisation of social space. However, it becomes evident that this view 
also involves some risks, as remarked by Yannis Stavrakakis (2004). If the 
empty signifier ‘the people’ somehow loses the core value it had in the 
previous analysis of Laclau, thus populism seems to become identical with 
politics tout court. Here, however, in his attempt to advance a strictly formal 
approach to populism, Laclau puts in danger the same usefulness of the 
concept for political analysis. Therefore, if any signifier can potentially become 
the nodal point of a populist discourse, “the risk here is to lose the conceptual 
particularity of populism as a tool for concrete political analysis” (Stavrakakis, 
2004: 263). 
 
All in all, beyond the reference to the structural location of ‘the people’ and its 
role within the analysis of populism, what becomes clear is that the Essex 
School’s discourse analysis develops a fruitful approach to the study of the 
process of framing reality. We will further expand on these reflections in the 
subsequent chapters dedicated to the normative debates about the role of 
emotions in the democratic terrain. Here, we will develop our theoretical and 
methodological viewpoint, in the light of what we have argued up to now. 
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5. Emotions, discourse and populism: sketching our research 
 
We have briefly outlined discourse theory as developed by the Essex School, 
which seems to be a good starting point to deal with the theoretical problem 
that emotions, and their discursive translation within contentious practices, 
pose to the democratic realm. It is through language that we give names to 
things and we comprehend phenomena. Conceptualizing political ideas and 
social phenomena, also, is what political theory has been doing throughout 
history.  
 
Following a broad interpretive position (e.g. Bourdieu, 1991; Taylor, 1985) 
rather than explaining actions in light of casual laws or mechanisms available 
to the observer, we will give importance to the structuring role of language 
and linguistic practices. Believing that truth lies also in the eyes of the 
observer, the patterns of interest are not firmly rooted in nature, but they are 
the products of our making: ideologies, concepts, and discursive practices are 
the loci where we can find the social and political outcomes of emotions. As 
psychological and neurological analysis suggests, the internal psychological 
conflict – emotions, feelings, etc. – affects political reality through the force of 
belief systems. Both realms of experience – the psychological internal and the 
political external – infuse each other; each depends on the other. Where then 
to find the belief systems? Politically, they lie in language and discourses. This 
leads us to take into account the discursive level in which emotional factors 
are politically involved. That is, again, the meanings and interpretations of 
political concepts/categories: discursive struggles about the ways of fixing the 
meaning of signifiers like ‘the people’ and ‘democracy’, for instance, are central 
to explaining the political semantics of our contemporary political world, as 
well as the political role of emotions. 
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In this context, we believe that the contribution of discourse analysis – which 
has historically been linked, together with conceptual inquiries, to the 
conceptualization of power (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Foucault, 1972; 
Koselleck and Presner, 2002) – can fit a theoretical investigation, helping to 
disclose the current discourse struggles over political concepts and ideas, as 
well as the emotional weight of this process. Hence, since the general aim is to 
explore the political role of emotions, it is on language and discourses that one 
should focus. Therefore, sketching a theoretical proposal on the political role 
played by emotions means combining a focus on the discursive struggle over 
the conceptual meaning with normative analysis about the role of emotions in 
politics, as has been outlined in the previous chapter. Drawing on 
contemporary social movement studies, populism and democratic theory, the 
aim is to show how a theoretical focus on emotions can enhance both the 
comprehension of contentious phenomena, and the concrete function 
emotions have in the process of framing political ideas.  
 
More specifically, our view is that, as demonstrated by the broad field of 
studies taken into consideration in the previous chapter, emotions are not 
something that only occasionally explodes onto the political scene; rather they 
are central to politics itself. Emotions are key factors for power, both in its 
pursuit, its legitimation and its exercise. In this context, guided by these 
general assumptions, the arguments in the next chapters will bring together a 
focus on emotions – and some insights from the case study – with theories of 
democracy and populism. As we have already mentioned, we will focus on 
what we call the ‘geometrical’ and ‘evocative’ roles of emotions, in both 
framing political subjects and political concepts. In this context, discourse 
analysis has contributed to showing that concepts are not eternally fixed in 
their meaning, but are dependent to logically and culturally elaborated 
frameworks of interpretations. We contend that emotions operate at the 
discursive level in the formation of political identities, the creation of basic 
democratic bounds, and consolidation of democratic beliefs. Moreover, the 
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logic of this operation resonates well with the populist logic proposed by 
Ernesto Laclau (2005), and the discursive division of the political community 
into two antagonistic camps, “the people” and the hegemonic elite (Laclau, 
2005a: 110). Similarly, we will argue that emotions have a role in the framing 
of some central political concepts, such as ‘democracy’ and ‘the people’. 
Contributing to the latency and ideality of these terms, emotions take part in 
the constantly transformation of political ideas, in their being contested and 
ambiguous. If these political concepts are contested this is because, as Jason 
Frank has observed, “they are not….yet” (Frank, 2010: 5), they are, in other 
words, empty signifiers. Emotions let us see this vacuum and, at once, are 
somehow the concrete ways of filling them. It is through emotional factors that 
citizens give sense to the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of democracy.  
 
As we have already mentioned, we argue that a combination of discourse 
analysis and democratic and populist theory represents a fruitful way in the 
comprehension of the role of emotions in politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Link between different theoretical approaches. 
 
 
Given this context, in this research we will combine two theoretical 
standpoints. On the one hand, through the case study – as we will outline 
below – the idea is to somehow ‘register’ the function of emotions and their 
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discursive vectors in the essential contestability of political concepts and 
ideas. On the other hand, and in the light of what this ‘mapping’ of emotions 
and discourse suggests, we will focus on the normative thinking on the role 
and place to be given to emotions. Going beyond the pure normative 
perspective – generally employed by scholars operating within the liberal 
paradigms – this conjunction opens up fascinating ways of analysis that can 
complement both theoretical and empirical investigations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Different conceptualization of the role of emotions, corresponding to 
the different field of analysis. 
 
 
5.1 Emotions and anti-austerity mobilizations: filling the empty 
signifiers? 
 
Given this context, while we take into account the global context of these 
protests, we will pay particular attention to the discursive level of anti-
austerity mobilizations that have characterized the Spanish political 
environment in recent years, particularly between 2011 and 2014. By focusing 
on the discourse level, the aim is to ‘register’ the role of emotions in the 
essential contestability of political concepts – especially those related to the 
idea and practice of democracy – and thus to suggest concrete ground for the 
theoretical reflection we will develop on populism and democratic theory.  
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Although it has been remarked that the heterogeneous phenomena labelled as 
‘anti-austerity’ – such as the 15-M movement, the Indignados, the mareas, and 
marchas – lacked a coherent and homogeneous ideological cohesion 
(Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2013), they still bring to the forefront significant 
political elements, such as their critiques and questioning character of the 
current state of affairs and, as we will show, the articulation of emotional 
dynamics in both their critique and proposition of an alternative political 
discourse. To uncover these emotional vectors, we have focused especially on 
a range of discourses that characterized the protests and mobilizations taken 
into consideration, and were concretely expressed in manifestos, slogans, and 
the various activities of street occupation and protest. Moreover, we consider 
some key discursive aspects that are particularly representative of the 
protests and that were present all over the different phases of the movements.  
 
However, although this research has been informed by previous work in 
protest event analysis, as well as by existing heterogeneous methods, this 
study does not exclusively aim at an in-depth analysis of these phenomena. 
Since the aim is not a study of the discursive level as such, but to delve into the 
connection between the discourse analysis with theoretical consideration 
about the role of emotions in democracy, we will not explore these 
phenomena nor will we give a complete and comprehensive picture of them. 
Therefore, aiming to advance in a theory-driven approach, we see the 
relevance of this case study to be twofold, according to the assumptions we 
will underscore. (1) In regard to the discursive horizon, it represents a 
remarkable example of the employment of emotional semantic in politics; (2) 
Hence, it is an expression of the foundational role of emotions for what 
concerns the redefinition and contention of central political categories, such as 
‘the people’, and ‘democracy’.  
 
From an analytical point of view, one might doubt that the anti-austerity 
mobilizations that originated in the aftermath of the financial crisis are a form 
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of populism. One has to be aware, in first instance, that under the label of ‘anti-
austerity’ fits different kind of events and movements, and anti-austerity 
protests are clearly different from the institutionalized political parties that 
have originated from these phenomena. Even more importantly, one has to 
carefully consider that many authors have highlighted, in the wake of Laclau, 
that to ask oneself if a movement is or is not populist is to start with the wrong 
question. The right question to ask would be, instead, to what extent is a 
movement – or a political party – populist? (Laclau 2005b: 45). From this 
point of view, it could seem that populism is inherently implicit within politics, 
and therefore becomes identical with it. The presence of the empty signifier 
‘the people’ would lose the centrality it had in determining the essence of 
populism, while the unique defining feature would be the antagonistic logic of 
politics. Despite this theoretical statement, we draw on Stavrakakis (2004) 
and argue to the contrary that the reference to ‘the people’ remains crucial as 
a defining condition for populism, and given its presence within anti-austerity 
mobilizations, we can affirm that we are dealing with a specific form of 
populism. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that both categories of ‘the 
people’ and ‘the elite’ are empty signifiers, and that the concrete meaning of 
these political subjects is articulated through discursive tools.  
 
All in all, the common rhetoric of recent anti-austerity protest movements is 
based on anti-elitism, anti-establishment discourse, and the centrality of the 
people against those who are perceived as corrupting the original meaning of 
democracy: the power of the people. Consequently, the claim for “the people” 
is related to another conceptual and discursive struggle: the very definition of 
democracy. Its meaning and its legitimacy are undeniably at stake. These 
contentious practices represent an immanent critique of the contemporary 
forms of economic and political power, and a symptom of the declining 
legitimacy of political and economic institutions. Therefore, stressing its 
significant relevance in the current situation as well as its use of emotional 
vectors, we will aim to highlight the fundamental role of emotions in politics, 
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particularly when it concerns the creation of the political subject – such as ‘the 
people’ – as well as the definition of legitimacy and democracy. If, on the other 
hand, the ideal of democracy is obviously complex and contested, as are its 
justifications and practical implications, then highlighting the transformation 
of concepts through emotional dynamics in current political phenomena can 
help to give a practical horizon to research in political theory.  
 
Understood as a perceptible example of the role of emotions in politics, anti-
austerity mobilization can be seen as an example of the contemporary vectors 
through which the struggle for popular and democratic legitimacy is currently 
led. They somehow represent an attempt to fill the empty signifiers of popular 
sovereignty and democracy. Ideas and concepts are thus involved daily in 
discursive struggles for the meaning, and showing its relevance and 
implications would shed light on broader political consequences, as well as 
would contribute to the normative debate about the relationship between 
populism and democracy itself. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has focused on the wide epistemological implications of the social 
and political study of emotions. Dealing with the emotional dimension of a 
political phenomenon involves taking into account – at least to start with – the 
broad scientific fields it is linked to.  As we have showed, during past decades, 
the social sciences have developed numerous paradigms of interpretation for 
the role of emotions in politics, and have put special emphasis on the role of 
emotions in the process of framing the reality. Indeed, what the review of the 
heterogeneous fields and methods on the study of emotions has revealed is 
that affective dynamics are considered as producers of individual and 
collective identities and social meanings. In this context, emotions are seen to 
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have some essential and intrinsic dimensions: cognitive, evaluative, sensitive, 
and motivational.  
 
We have then turned to the methodological proposal of this study, and 
explained the different methods that are combined in it. We have argued that 
discourse analysis and theoretical inquiry about the link between populism 
and democracy will be at the centre of the research. In this sense, we have 
briefly taken into account the approach to populism developed by the so-
called Essex School, and drawing on it, we have outlined our own approach. 
We are aware that a combination of discursive analysis and normative 
thinking can both have advantages and entail some perils. If on the one hand it 
risks a lack of analytical rigour, on the other hand, we aim at enhancing what 
we consider an excessive methodological rigidity in the study of politics. As we 
have seen, heterogeneous perspectives have been overlapping in the 
theorising the role of emotions in politics. Drawing on the methodological 
assumption we have stressed, this study advances some propositions for a 
theoretical and cross-disciplinary inquiry, in which emotions are viewed not 
simply as another set of variables but as crucial components of concrete 
struggles for the meaning of political categories.  
 
The relevance of a theoretical investigation on emotions, as we will show 
throughout the following parts of the dissertation, lies firstly in the 
understanding of their broad role in the political conceptualization and 
framing. As well, beyond their historical and theoretical relevance, focusing on 
emotion will allow to highlight the current discursive struggles for the 
meaning of reality. Studying emotions in political disciplines, we will 
demonstrate, equips social scientists and theorists with useful theoretical 
tools to grasp the profound problems of the legitimization of politics (Lakoff, 
2008: 8). In the next chapter we will start focusing on the case study, dealing 
firstly with the literature on protest movements, and linking it to the 
discursive level of recent anti-austerity mobilizations.  
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Chapter 4. Social and protest movements in times of austerity (I): 
between strategies, identity, and emotions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, dealing with the wide epistemological implications of 
social and political research on emotions, we have outlined our 
methodological framework. Here, we will move on considering the ways in 
which social sciences have considered collective action, and its particular 
relationship to the dichotomy between reason/emotion. In accordance with 
our aim and the methodological guidelines – and before focusing on the 
emotional rhetoric and its conceptual implications in the recent anti-austerity 
protest movements – we will pay our attention to the explanation of collective 
behaviour and social mobilization, and especially to the relationship between 
protest movements analysis and emotion. 
 
We will then offer a brief picture of the contending frameworks of analysis for 
the comprehension and explanation of collective mobilization. Mapping the 
various ways of scientific approaches to social and protest movements is a 
useful operation in order to outline the complex scenery of studies that have 
been developed in an attempt to grasp the political nature of social 
movements. After considering the different theoretical paradigms, we will 
then delve into the case of recent anti-austerity movements, putting particular 
emphasis on some discursive elements. Needless to say, we will not give an 
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exhaustive picture of the phenomenon12. It is not our purpose, nor does it add 
to our study, which rather attempts to link these discursive-emotional 
analyses with a broader theoretical reflection. 
 
 
2. Explaining collective action 
 
Social and political sciences have made collective mobilization into a specific 
scientific field that has assumed important epistemological status within the 
discipline in last decades (Ruggiero & Montagna, 2008). The field of social 
movement studies is extremely broad, and this thesis cannot possibly do 
justice to every significant trend, neither is it its purpose. However, it is 
important to note that scholars working on social and protest movements 
have focused particularly on answering a series of interrelated questions, such 
as, among others: What is a social or protest movement? How does a 
movement rise up and grow? What are the standards of organization and 
strategies of contention? How can social science explain these phenomena? 
What role do social and protest movements play within the political and 
democratic domain? In this context, the core of the growing literature in 
recent years has focused on the organizational, ideational, and cultural 
complexity of social and protest movements, especially highlighting the 
structures, ideas, repertoires, aims and goals movements represent. 
 
At the outset, addressing the issue of collective action means admitting two 
basic problematic concerns. First, the concepts of protest and social 
movements are somewhat ambiguous. It is not axiomatic to define what a 
social movement is, differentiating it from other political actors such as 
                                                             
12 There is a wide literature on the mobilizations known as 15-M or the Indignados. Both 
scholars and activists have developed a conspicuous amount of analyses. See, for 
instance, Artal (2011), Dhaliwal (2012), Entine and Moissand (2011), Errejón (2011; 
2013), Errejón and Mouffe (2015), Monedero (2012), Romanos (2013), Subirats (2011), 
Taibo (2011; 2012), Velasco (2011).  
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political parties or interest groups (Diani, 1992). The difficulties derive from 
the diversity of objectives of such movements, as well as the same difficulty in 
establishing the boundaries between them and other forms of political action 
(Pérez Ledesma, 1994: 158). The same reasoning can be made for the concept 
of “protest”, which is clearly only one of the different possibilities for political 
action that social movements have. Even though protests can be defined as 
“sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and 
discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power 
relations” (Taylor and van Dyke 2004: 268), their contours as object of inquiry 
are not simple to define and can cause analytical problems.  
 
Thus, the second problematic element becomes evident: the plurality and the 
heterogeneity of social and protest movements, which means that under the 
category of social movements we can find the most disparate phenomena. 
Additionally, there is disagreement regarding the inclusion or not of certain 
collective protest actions. When authors speak of social movements they are 
referring, for example, to the labour movement, to pacifist, ecologist, the 
antinuclear movements, feminist movements, and so forth. According to this 
view, other phenomena such as human rights movement, the movement for 
sexual liberation, the movement for the defence of minorities, and the 
mobilizations for the rights of homosexuals can be considered other 
contemporary examples of social movements (Laraña and Gusfield, 1994). The 
reflections about the conceptual meaning of social movements would certainly 
deserve to be explored, but it exceeds the scope and aims of this chapter. What 
is clear is that the idea of social movements is related to a broad, plural and 
heterogeneous concept of collective action.  
 
In this chapter we explore the theoretical frameworks on social and protest 
movements that have been developed in recent decades. We will stress two 
aspects related to the study of social movements and protest. First (paragraph 
2), we highlight the importance that their study has assumed for political 
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science and social studies as a whole. In this sense we will emphasise the 
different scientific approaches that have been developed in the past decades. 
We will also show the relevance and purpose of different research 
perspectives, their arguments and their respective critiques. Also, we will 
stress the place and role that emotions (and the reason-emotion divide) have 
been given within the different explanatory paradigms of collective action. 
Moreover, we will highlight the theoretical and practical challenges that social 
movements – particularly those that have arisen after the last global crisis – 
pose to the political system (paragraph 3). In this sense, the social 
mobilization that originated in the aftermath of the financial crisis is an 
important example of deeply political questions that collective action brings to 
the forefront. The focus of the analysis will be the critique that these 
phenomena pose to the conventional liberal democratic model and its close 
ties to the financial world, as well as the variegated proposal of alternative 
models of democracy related to the last wave of mobilization. The goal is 
twofold: to provide an overview of the state of affairs, mentioning the features 
of different scientific paradigms – thus, settling the basis of our own theory –, 
and to show the proper theoretical challenges that social movements unveil 
within contemporary politics.  
 
As with any map of a field, ours is not exhaustive and necessarily excludes 
some nuances. Nonetheless, outlining the research on social movement 
studies and its links with democratic theory is an essential step towards 
achieving the objective of our study.   
 
 
3. Paradigms of social movement analysis 
 
It is now important to briefly lay the different paradigms and the plurality of 
approaches that have shaped the theoretical development in he broad field of 
social and protest movement studies. Approaching the study of social and 
protest movements, we should start by mentioning the two general visions 
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that have dominated the study of mobilization in the recent scholarship – the 
traditions that founded the myth of social movement studies according to 
Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Laurence Cox (2013). In the first half of the 
twentieth century, and even in the immediate post-World War II years, social 
movements, it is told, were generally associated with irrational action. From 
this perspective, collective action was interpreted as an emotional response to 
a given social situation, and it was located outside political institutions, and 
standard political strategies – this being the favourite object of research in the 
behaviourist social sciences. In this context, theories based on the masses – 
known as crowd theories – were the dominant trend in social research on 
mobilization until the 1960s. The author who produced the most influential 
formulation, Gustave Le Bon described the crowds as impulsive, irritable, and 
suggestible. Given these characteristics, the masses are susceptible to the 
emotional appeals of demagogues. In this light, emotions were considered the 
engine of all political action that occurred outside conventional institutions, 
and most social scientists of the early and mid-twentieth century, among 
other, Weber, Durkheim and Freud, adopted some version of the vision of Le 
Bon. Conversely – perhaps as a complement to this vision of masses – in the 
second half of the twentieth century the rational choice paradigm spread out 
its influence over the different scientific approaches, including the study of 
social movements. Mancur Olson, in his The Logic of Collective Action (1971), 
by applying the principles of microeconomics to collective action, described 
the social actors as rational. According to him, individuals act and engage in 
politics, participating in trade unions and social movements, only if they 
obtain a personal advantage that would not be possible otherwise. In the 
absence of personal “incentives”, Olson argues, rational individuals would not 
get involved, nor take part actively in collective actions. It is true that Olson 
acknowledges the existence of moral and emotional factors in collective 
agency, but he only does so in order to exclude them from his model based on 
the fact that it is not possible to obtain empirical evidence of the motivation 
behind the actions of a person. 
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Within this broad context, it is possible to place the main theories about social 
movements. Besides the approach that emerged under the influence of 
microeconomics, and the paradigm of rational choice, there are two major 
visions through which the research on collective action is divided. The first 
one is known as the “American” paradigm that insists on the role of 
movements as strategic actors, emphasizing the resources for mobilization 
and the interactions with the institutions. The second one, the “European” 
tradition, which focuses mainly on the process of historical development of 
post-industrial society, aims to show the identitarian and cultural factors 
within collective actions. Both perspectives developed prolific research 
paradigms that inspired many others, offering answers to the increased 
activity of social movement in the second half of the 20th century. Given this 
sociocultural context, the European tradition emphasized the structural 
aspects of social classes – influenced by a heterodox version of Marxism –, 
while the American approach mainly focused on how social movements raise, 
mobilize and organize themselves following the theory of collective behaviour 
(Laraña and Gusfield, 1994). 
 
Despite the various criticisms of simplification this general vision receives 
(Flesher Fominaya & Cox, 2013)13, two things are worth noting. The first one 
is that, beyond the stereotypical classification of paradigms, today the 
approaches span the entire scientific spectrum and are mixed in cross-
disciplinary perspectives: organisational and political structures, identity, 
grievances, frames analysis, and emotions are some of the many elements 
related to social movements. The second important aspect that deserves to be 
underlined is that the development of the main contemporary paradigms on 
                                                             
13 Flesher Fominaya and Cox state that near-identical account of how the discipline came 
into being. A tale, they say, that stress “the bad old days of collective behaviour theory, 
followed by the rise of resource mobilization theory, the addition of political opportunity 
structure, the encounter with (‘European’) ‘new social movement’ theory and the arrival 
of framing theory” (Flesher Fominaya and Cox, 2013: 7).  
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collective action have been closely linked to the concrete evolution of 
movements themselves 14 . The mobilizations of 1968, the new social 
movements in the 1980s, as well as the more recent Global Justice Movement 
and anti-austerity protests have all been accompanied by theoretical 
reflection.  
 
 
3.1 Movements as strategic agents  
 
For over thirty years, particularly in the American context, the dominant 
paradigm in the study of social movements was the resource mobilization 
theory (Tilly, 1978), which later developed into the political processes theory 
(McAdam et. al., 2001; Tarrow, 1998). This approach was characterized by a 
pragmatic view of social phenomena, in contrast to conceptualizations of 
social movements as irrational occurrences. In early contributions in this vein, 
American sociologists in the 1970s defined social movements as rational and 
organized actors. Collective actions derive, according to this perspective, from 
a calculation of the costs and benefits, and constitute an extension of the 
conventional forms of politics. On the basis of the theory of resource 
mobilization there are two clear principles, linked to the broader rationalist 
perspective of the social sciences: 1) the idea that the activities that the social 
movements perform are not spontaneous nor disorganized; and 2) the idea 
that those individuals involved in social mobilizations are not unreasonable 
people (Ferree, 1994: 151).  
 
                                                             
14 Interestingly enough, Flesher Fominaya and Cox (2013) have, indeed, noted that the 
foundations of European social and political theory are closely linked to social 
movements: Saint-Simon, Marx, De Tocqueville, Weber and Durkheim were all politically 
engaged with or against movements – as utopian socialist, movement theorist, the 
American Revolution, etc., and engaged with theorising popular collective agency. More 
recent social theorists such as Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault, Raymond Williams, 
Claus Offe, Pierre Bourdieu, Ulrich Beck, and Manuel Castells were similarly shaped by, 
and shaped, the political movements they observed or took part in. 
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The Resource Mobilisation approach stressed the importance of social 
movements’ formal institutions (social movement organisations), micro-
structural processes, material resources and tactics as preconditions to the 
emergence and development of a movement. Hence, it is clear from the outset 
that the analysis is focused primarily on the organization of the collective 
action. Roughly speaking, the resource mobilization theory argues that social 
movements are the result of perfectly rational collective behaviour, with very 
precise and defined objectives. The actors engage in social movements 
following their interests, helped by organizational structure of movements, 
which enables the mobilization of collective resources on which action is 
founded. Furthermore, at the core of this theory lies the argument that social 
movements act through strategies of mobilization and resource acquisition 
(mainly human and organizational), which are deliberately selected to reach 
their goals. Thus, it is possible to recognize a logical-instrumental vision of 
social movements, and the theory of resource mobilization suggests the 
existence of well-defined causal chains. A series of variables were favoured in 
the explanations of social movements: external circumstances and factors, 
such as alliances with political elites, the ability for obtaining financial and 
material resource (McCarthy and Zald, 1977); as well as structural variables, 
such as the decrease in state repression (Tilly, 1978), or the crisis of the state 
(Skocpol, 1979). 
 
Moreover, from the ‘80s this approach was extended by another similar 
paradigm, the Political Opportunity Structure. Both perspectives have been 
focusing on determining what features of the political system enable or hinder 
the development of social movements, stressing particularly the importance of 
organisations and political structure. Collective action arises, according to the 
latter approach, thanks to specific “political opportunities” which can leverage 
social groups to start a movement in a given socio-political context. This 
theory states that the emergence of a social movement is linked to the changes 
and the transformations in the political structure that put the regime in a 
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situation of vulnerability. Structures or political opportunities are manifold 
and can range from higher or lower likelihood of participation, the tendency of 
state coercion, institutional forms, etc. In this context, scholars working in 
these paradigms stressed that social movements were not a marginal 
phenomenon in society. Indeed, they showed that social movements were 
more likely to emerge under conditions of structural stability, social 
connectedness and favourable mobilisation of resources. Importantly, 
protesters were redeemed by their image of alienated deviants. Quite on the 
contrary, they came to be characterised as rational actors, intent upon 
weighting costs and benefits of participation.  
 
In spite of these important theoretical and social merits, these approaches 
were subject to criticisms from a number of different standpoints. Neither 
approaches attributed much interest to the causes that led to the appearance 
of movements, nor to their ideological features. In this sense, the main 
criticisms that have been formulated precisely insist on their exclusive 
attention to the organization, as well as on their relative neglect of other 
factors such as individual and collective identity. In particular, the economic 
language used to describe social movements typical of the resource 
mobilisation approach and the almost exclusive focus upon structural and 
organisational elements left many students of social movements dissatisfied 
(McAdam et al., 2001). Indeed, critics pointed out various shortcomings: the 
fact that these approaches were based on the theory of rational choice, 
overstating the rationality of collective action (Jasper, 1997: 33-37); the 
vagueness of concepts such as resource and opportunities; the absence of 
cultural dynamics, due to their structural biases; and the absence of emotional 
dynamics in the study of social movements (Goodwin, et. al., 2001). 
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3.2 Movements between identity, emotions, and framing 
 
During the 1980s, new social and protest movements challenged collective 
action theorists. The environmental movement, the antinuclear movement, 
mobilizations in defence of the rights of homosexuals, alongside the 
development of already known phenomena such as gender equality and 
religious and cultural movements, represented a turning point for social 
scientists. The heterogeneous growth of social movements contributed to a 
revision of the conceptual and methodological tools being employed.   
 
It is usually told that in Europe, the weight of the Marxist tradition did not 
favour the development of approaches based on the ratio cost/benefit as it 
happened in the American context. While Americans focused on analysing the 
instrumentality of social action, Europeans turned their attention towards the 
processes of identity formation and intersubjective communication 
(Foweraker, 1995). According to this, it has been highlighted that the new 
movements differed from previous expressions of dissent because they were 
not only concerned with claims of economic redistribution (Offe, 1985). 
Rather, the authentic – although implicit – horizon of the political struggles 
was the overall system of meaning, which sets dominant rules in a given 
society (Touraine, 1981: 29). The analysis of the new social movements was 
thus accompanied by renewed attention to concepts such as identity (Melucci, 
1982; 1995), morality and ideology. Indeed, European studies have placed 
greater emphasis on cultural aspects and collective identity, developing what 
is known as the new social movements paradigm (NSM) (Touraine, 1981; 
Laraña & Gusfield 1994; Offe, 1992). Alberto Melucci, in this sense, 
characterizes these new social movements as diverting the central interest 
from traditional class-struggle approach towards the cultural and symbolic 
terrain. In particular, the notion of identity had a prominent theoretical role in 
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the analysis of the new social movements (Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1981; cf. 
McAdam et al., 2001). The formation of a collective identity was seen as 
essential to the assignation of common meanings to events. Melucci (1996) 
defined collective identity as “an interactive and shared definition produced 
by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with 
the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in 
which the action takes place” (Melucci, 1996: 44).  
 
Unlike what theorists of collective action had been highlighting in previous 
paradigms, the vision of the NSM tends to take on some distinctive features. In 
the first instance, it has been shown that there is no obvious nor structural 
relationship between the roles of participants in social movements, being 
these characterized by a variegated number of ideas and values. Secondly, it 
has been pointed out that claims usually have a very strong cultural and 
symbolic character, and demands are often related to the issues of identity. 
Furthermore, there is a dynamic relationship between the individual and the 
collective dimensions the paradigm of NSM draws attention on. It is 
noteworthy that this approach stresses that the nature of new social 
movements’ claims are not quantitative – as it could be the redistribution of 
wealth, in the traditional class struggle vision –, rather they are qualitative 
demands, such as calling for the recognition of different cultural, sexual, and 
religious identities, and so forth. In the last decades, different trends of 
analysis emerged with the aim of integrating this main interpretive model, 
favouring the emergence of new methodological and analytical perspectives, 
such as, among others, the frame analysis, and the focus on emotions. 
 
The frame analysis (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995) can be seen as part of the 
“cultural turn” that characterized the sociology of collective action from the 
1980s. This view claims the centrality of cultural and symbolic dimensions in 
social movements, including ideal factors, symbolic resources and ideological 
schemes. It belongs to the constructivist approach within social sciences, 
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which considers the collective action as producer of political identities and 
social meanings, through its symbolic interpretation of the political reality. In 
this sense, this perspective puts special emphasis on the cultural and political 
process of construction of meaning. When applied to the study of social 
movements, the framing approach is aimed at examining the “struggle over 
the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings” 
(Benford & Snow, 2000: 613), by placing social movements as active agents in 
the formation of these ideas and meanings.  
 
This approach focuses on how participants in social movements actively and 
interactively construct shared frames that filter and organise information 
about the social realm. Thus, this perspective combines structural, 
psychological and cultural elements that lead to mobilisation (Snow, 2004). 
Culture and ideology therefore may shape the kinds of frames movement 
activists adopt (Benford & Snow, 2000). Frames, thus, refers to a sum of social 
and political beliefs that operate creating the common horizon for the 
interpretation of reality and the creation of a collective identity and action. In 
a sense, framing flows into ideology (Jasper, 1997: 157). Social movements 
articulate frames as much as they may make use of them as resources in 
mobilization, in that activists make sense of their own protests through 
already existing narrative frames (Eyerman 2002). 
 
All this operates through a “symbolic packaging”, converting the frames into 
the relatively coherent narrative of movement. According to Gamson (1992), 
within the framing process there are three basic components: The logic of 
identity, which creates the division of social identities – us versus them – and 
therefore gives birth to the collective action; the sentiment of injustice, which 
is the basic operation through which individuals and collectives problematize 
a social issue; the logic of motivation: the idea that the situation of injustice 
can be transformed through a collective action.   
 
 117 
The cultural turn in social movement studies is also linked to a renewed 
interest in the emotional processes implied in collective and political actions 
(e.g. Goodwin et al. 2001; Jasper, 2011). While before the 1970s, individuals 
involved in an insurgent crowd were seen as prey of instinctual and 
destructive emotions, new and different approaches to the collective action 
recognized that societies are composed of conflicting values and alternative 
structures of feeling. The rationalistic vision of previous approaches, in other 
words, was transformed into a more genuine interest for emotional dynamics. 
The aim of this variegated corpus of literature has been of, on the one hand, to 
confer the scientific legitimacy on research dedicated to emotions and, on the 
other hand, to contribute to a new perception of emotions within social 
movements. Indeed, recent advancement in social and political scholarship 
has opened new pathways for the comprehension of the role of emotions, 
connecting the micropolitics of social movements to the macro-politics. 
 
One can talk about emotions operating in protest at multiple levels. Within the 
broad field of studies on emotions and collective action, two trends have been 
developed. The first one is mainly the effort to bring emotional dynamics into 
the explanation of all aspects of collective action and social movements. In this 
view, emotions are considered to affect movement emergence, maintenance, 
recruitment processes, the internal dynamics of a movement, its decline, and 
so forth. Briefly, emotion is what puts the ‘move’ in movement. Linked to the 
‘relational’ view of social movements, this approach advocates the 
acknowledgment of the role of emotions as an essential part of collective 
action. Much scholarship links cognitive framing, narration and discourse to 
the practice of mobilization through emotion. So far, the “rediscovery” of 
emotions has followed different theoretical and interdisciplinary paths, and 
has often been incorporated into heterogeneous approaches (Goodwin et.al., 
2001; Hoggett, 2009).  
 
The second approach attempts to incorporate emotions into existing 
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categories of social movement theory, including organization, identity, 
framing, repertoires, etc. Essentially, it is stated that emotions contribute to 
give a meaning to the personal, individual and collective actions. Indeed, 
different authors focusing on this horizon of analysis support the idea that 
emotions – rather than being viewed as opposed to reason – are a way of 
thinking and evaluating, as well as an indispensable source at the origin of all 
kinds of collective action (e.g. Gamson, 1992; Nussbaum, 2001).  
 
Similar to the process of framing reality, emotions have a constructivist 
potential that, according to different authors (e.g. Gamson, 1992; Melucci, 
1996), contributes to the shaping of reality through a series of dynamics. Here, 
we will focus on three central ideas linked with this: identity, injustice, and 
action. These factors, as we will see, can also be useful to enhance the 
theoretical debate about the relationship between social movements and 
democracy.  
 
3.2.1 Identity 
 
Emotions contribute to identity formation, which is an essential component of 
collective action. As with many other political phenomena, protest and social 
movements involve the formation of individual and collective identities. In this 
vein, building or reproducing identities is one of the processes through which 
individuals give meaning to their experiences and the political realm. From 
inside, social movements see the interconnection between individual-based 
experience and collective experience. Collective identities are based on, among 
other things, shared values, attitudes, worldviews, rituals, and shared 
performances in collective protests and actions. These factors set a process of 
trusting connections among individuals, which is an important element in 
mobilizations.  
 
Within this context, identity can be both a precondition for, and a result of 
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collective action. In both cases, collective action needs the presence of a “we”, 
which supplies the sense of cohesion and solidarity, as well as the 
identification of the “others”, which is the collective the movement or 
collective action moves against (Melucci, 1996). A minimal level of moral 
empathy, among other emotions bonds, is therefore a necessary step in the 
demarcation of “we” and “them”. 
 
3.2.2 Injustice 
 
Mobilizations often occur when a sense of injustice is felt by protesters and, 
more broadly, by a sector of a given population. A sense of injustice cannot 
emerge without a new diagnosis of the situation and a conviction that existing 
conditions are unjust (Gamson, 1992: 7, 31–2). In this sense, the reason people 
mobilize is to overcome some form of injustice – whether only perceived or 
effectively real. Events of social injustice can therefore cause indignation, 
moral shocks, and diffuse anger, and thus move citizens to action.  
 
“Different emotions can be stimulated by perceived inequities – 
cynicism, bemused irony, resignation. But injustice focuses on the 
righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul. 
Injustice… is a hot cognition, not merely an abstract intellectual 
judgment about what is equitable. The heat of moral judgement is 
intimately related to beliefs about what [concrete] acts or conditions 
have caused people to suffer undeserved hardship or loss”. (Gamson, 
1992: 31–2) 
 
That means that emotions such as indignation and anger must be seen beyond 
their being one of the many preconditions of protest. They have to be linked to 
the broad conception of justice. In this sense, it has been emphasized that the 
capacity to respond with anger is crucial to a sense of justice (Nussbaum, 
1994: 403; Solomon, 1990: 242). This recent scholarship has also underlined 
that social movements can channel collective emotions at particular targets.  
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3.2.3 Action 
 
Emotional responses to a situation perceived as unjust can lead individuals 
and groups to mobilizations. This response involves the move to protest: from 
framed emotions to action. In this sense, emotions are an essential factor of 
what keeps a movement moving; as well the lack of emotional dynamics being 
able t explain the movements’ decline.  
 
Taking all this into account, we can outline some thesis regarding the social 
and political role of emotions.  
 
1. Politically speaking, emotions and feelings rules contribute to 
individual and collective action, and contribute to the understanding of certain 
aspects of political participation (Hall, 2002: 739-41; Turner & Stets 2005: 
290). 
2. Emotions clearly take part in the formation of the social bonds and 
promote social cohesion (Markell, 2000).  
3. As we have seen in the first chapter, contemporary authors working 
in the neo-Aristotelian tradition consider emotions as a fundamental part in 
the democratic education for virtuous citizens. 
 
Although all movements are clearly emotional and strategic at the same time, 
emotions can play a central role in mobilization and social change. Seen as the 
feeling side of values, emotions can perform an important link between 
political and moral principles and actions. In this vein, contending the status 
quo, social movements often re-interpret specific aspects of political reality 
through both an emotional and cognitive-normative re-framing of the reality. 
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4. The case of anti-austerity mobilizations 
 
Since 2011 the anti-austerity mobilizations sprawled around the world. In the 
European context, especially the peripheral countries have witnessed the 
emergence of a series of protests and collective mobilizations that has shaken 
the political debate and agenda, giving birth to new political parties. The most 
famous movements include the Spanish 15-M or Indignados movement, and 
the Greek Aganaktismenoi. Together with other European mobilizations in 
countries such as Portugal, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and the experience 
of the Occupy movements in the United States, these movements challenged the 
neoliberal ideology and the concrete policies the various governments have 
been implementing in the name of austerity. Although each of these 
movements is clearly shaped by the local political context – which includes the 
cultural and organizational traditions –, they shared numerous elements. They 
were all massive protests that, particularly through the employment of new 
social media technologies, involved citizens from differentiated social and 
political origins, and that created at least partially autonomous spaces for 
demonstration and political engagement. Beyond structural and 
organizational features, they also shared the common perception15 of political 
and economic injustice, which soon provoked indignation and anger. 
 
As a physical proclamation of discontent towards the political regimes and the 
financial system, these variegated anti-austerity movements represent an 
attempt to reconfigure the relationship between the political and the 
economic worlds, through manifestation of moral outrage, public occupation 
                                                             
15 An interesting analysis somehow related to the theme of ‘perception’ is also developed 
by Felix Ovejero (2013), who delves into the relationship between the 15M movements 
(or the Indignados) and the theory of democracy. Specifically focusing on topics such as 
ignorance and participation, Ovejero argues for a republican and deliberative form of 
democracy.  
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and street assembly and speech. Many of these demonstrations, in fact, 
borrowed from Stephan Hessel’s manuscript ‘Indignez-vous!’(2010), which 
calls for an end to apathy and a show of indignation and outrage. If their 
primary economic goals include a fight against the financial system, guilty of 
creating huge wealth inequalities, the political ambition was also to 
democratize power in more participatory ways, which could empower the 
masses bearing the brunt of economic strains. In this vein, these movements’ 
aim is to shake people out of their routine trust and loyalty towards the 
authorities, and they represent a sign of popular discontent and disaffection 
towards political representatives and the financial system (Tormey, 2012).  
 
While some scholar prefer to choose the term ‘occupy social movements’ 
(Tejerina et al., 2013) – or ‘networks of outrage and hope’ (Castells, 2012) – 
over the more widespread ‘indignant mobilizations’, what is clear is that these 
phenomena put the emphasis on a greater concern: the political relevance of 
affective bonds. Although Benjamín Tejerina argues that indignation was not 
the “sole, and perhaps not even the most decisive emotion at play in this cycle 
of contention” (2013: 378), indignation, and similar emotional perceptions 
such as outrage and anger were nonetheless the emotions that ignited these 
mobilizations, and characterized their political nature. As we have already 
stated, a ‘strategic’ vision was clearly present within these movements – i.e. 
their objective was to modify a situation perceived as unjust16. Nonetheless we 
will argue that the emotional dynamics and their discursive translations 
played a key role: not only was the identity formations of protesters at play, 
but it was directly involved in the questioning of current democratic practices 
that the protests performed. In this vein, we will link this horizon with the 
theoretical reflection on democracy and populism.  
 
                                                             
16 For more details on the ‘strategic’ dimension of recent anti-austerity movements in 
Spain see, for Instance, Fuster Morell (2012), Velasco (2011). 
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In this paragraph we analyse some discursive elements of the Indignados 
movements, particularly highlighting the cognitive and emotional dimensions. 
The idea is to show how they were at the centre of the construction of the 
movement identity, as well as how they were part and parcel of the framing 
process of the political reality, through what William Gamson (1992) have 
called the injustice frame. Sense of injustice, identity formation and action are, 
we will argue, the vectors through which affective dynamics play a political 
role. We will therefore focus on the myriads of emotions that were at play 
within this anti-austerity movement, both the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ affects 
that took place in the public space and which were discursively articulated. On 
the one hand, the ways in which affective ties were at play in the identity 
formation of protesters will be emphasized. On the other hand, it will become 
clear – as we will further develop in the next chapter – that emotions are 
linked to the struggle over the meaning of political categories.   
 
 
4.1 Myriads of emotions 
 
In the Indignados, but also in other anti-austerity mobilizations and occupy 
movements, we have witnessed the emergence, presence and usage of a 
variegated number of emotional factors (within rhetoric, discourse, 
dynamics), obviously related to the economic and political crisis these social 
movements are embedded. Wrath, indignation, fear, anger, anxiety, 
humiliation, pain, and so forth are all distinctive emotions of these 
phenomena. In the specific Spanish case, ¡Democracia Real Ya! (DRY) – one of 
the many platforms that have played a key role in organizing of the protests of 
15th of May 2011 and the following events – called for an end of citizenry 
apathy, and a facing up to the unjust situation. It called the people to properly 
feel this unjust context, and to act consequently. In this sense, with slogans 
such as ‘Toma la calle’, DRY strategically ‘mobilized’ the emotion of 
indignation to encourage participation in collective action. From an explicative 
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point of view one might argue that these articulated ‘constellations of 
emotions’ were among the principal factors driving people to mobilize and 
participate in anti-austerity protests. Passion and emotions, as much as 
ideology and interests, impulse people to mobilize and join collective actions 
(Goodwin et al., 2001). 
 
 4.1.1 Framing Injustice 
 
Clearly, a first step towards mobilization is the perception of an unjust 
situation. The injustice frame formulated by Gamson (1992: 112-115) provides 
a useful analytical tool to interpret the motivational reason to join collective 
action, which at once legitimates disobedience. The unjust situation, in this 
sense, responds to deep political and economic consequences citizens have 
suffered as result of the austerity measures implemented by governments. The 
list of grievances denounced by these anti-austerity mobilizations is long, and 
mobilizations have blamed both political and economic sectors as responsible 
for this.   
 
Examples of the ways in which the protesters expressed their perception to 
this unjust situation can be found on both sides, the financial and political ones, 
seen as strictly linked together.  
 
 “We don’t understand why we need to pay the bills of a crisis whose 
authors continue to enjoy record benefits. We are fed up with 
injustices” (15M manifesto ‘How to Cook a Non-violent Revolution’)17  
 
Similarly, protesters expressed a sense of political uselessness – hence 
injustice – claiming a voice18: 
 
                                                             
17  Available at: http://takethesquare.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Roll-
Up_eng_v2_reviewed.pdf. Also cited by Perugorría and Tejerina (2013).  
18 See also Pérez and Barnett (2011) 
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 “We can vote, but we don’t have a voice, and we are frustrated by the 
politicians’ lack of will to develop mechanisms of direct participation 
in decision-making processes. Mechanisms that would put an end to 
corruption and to the lack of transparency in politics and public 
institutions, and that would place the citizen before the markets and 
other private interests”. (15-M manifesto ‘How to Cook a Non-violent 
Revolution’) 
 
Injustice Slogans 
 - “¡No somos mercancía en manos de políticos y banqueros!”(“We are 
not goods to be sold by politicians and bankers”) 
- “No hay pan para tanto chorizos” (“The budget is not big enough 
for so much corruption”) 
- “A los bancos se les rescató. A nosotros se nos liquidó” (The banks 
got bailed out. We got wiped out”)  
- “Esta deuda no es nuestra” (“This is not our debt”) 
-“Del absolutismo al bipartidismo” (“From absolutism to the two-
party system”) 
 
Table 4.1 Key slogans during the Indignados mobilizations in Spain, own 
elaboration 
 
 4.1.2 Framing identity 
 
Despite outrage and indignation being considered essential emotions during 
these protests, other affective states such as humiliation and hope were clearly 
involved and played a key role in generating and sustaining collective actions. 
As it has been argued (Perugorría & Tejerina, 2013), participants were also 
experiencing joy and empowerment from their being involved in public 
‘encounters’ with other peers during the protests – the narrative of being 
together (Perrugoría and Tejerina, 2013: 437). As Donatella della Porta (2014: 
55) points out by quoting Postill (2012), both cognitive and emotional 
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mechanism are embedded into networks of relations. A strong sense of 
connection between protesters was created and various sets of affects were at 
play: joy, pride, humour, and irony also expressed the prefigurative relations 
taking place during mobilizations. By creating shared social bonds, these 
affective emotions can engender trust and solidarity, and thus form a basis for 
collective identity and more persistent engagement with the movement. 
 
In this sense, building an identity is an essential moment for individuals and 
for the collective, and this process not only involves cognitive agreements but 
also demands affective or emotional investments. In an intersubjective 
interplay of attachments, recognition, feelings, and meanings creation, 
collective identities are formed and shared. In the case of the Indignados 
movements, having ‘problems’ instead of ideologies or a specific political 
membership is a clear feature of inclusiveness, which marked the transversal 
character of the 15M since its inception. Quoting the manifesto of DRY, helps 
us comprehend this issue: 
 
“Some of us consider ourselves progressive, others conservative. 
Some of us are believers, some not. Some of us have clearly defined 
ideologies, others are apolitical, but we are all concerned and angry 
about the political, economic, and social outlook, which we see 
around us: corruption among politicians, businessmen, and bankers 
leaving us helpless, without a voice”. (Real Democracy Now Manifest, 
Italics emphasis added)19  
 
In this context, it seems plausible to argue that the Indignados’ political subject 
is made up of ordinary, outraged and angry people. Their being angry is 
indeed what unifies heterogeneous individuals, giving them a political nature. 
 
 
                                                             
19 Available at: http://www.democraciarealya.es/manifiesto-comun/manifesto-english/ 
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Identity Slogans 
 - “Indignados y organizados” (Indignant and Organised”) 
- “No somos antisistemas, el sistema es antinosotros” (“We are not 
against the systems, the system is against us”) 
 
Table 4.2 Key slogans during the Indignados mobilizations in Spain. Own 
elaboration 
 
 
 4.1.3 Framing action 
 
As we have already mentioned, emotions are among the mechanisms that 
drive people to participate in collective action. Especially the affective 
responses to a situation perceived as unjust can lead individuals and groups to 
mobilizations. Similarly to ideology and interests, the affective investment of 
individuals and move people to engage politically. Moreover, in the specific 
case of the Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations, the fact that both ‘negative’ 
and ‘positive’ emotions contributed to the concrete mobilizations of masses of 
citizens is noteworthy. 
 
In this vein, the sense of empowerment, and joy among protesters allowed the 
15-M movement to somehow create the spaces for ‘Real Democracy’ – 
engaging in a horizontal, inclusive, and participatory ways of deciding about 
‘common matters’ – in opposition to the ‘institutionalized politics’ of political 
parties. Similarly, other affective dimensions contributed to trigger political 
horizons and actions. If, on the one hand indignation about political corruption 
and banks bail out encouraged people to abstain from voting, the emergence 
of another ‘emotional’ signifiers such as ‘dignity’ in subsequent years – on 
March 22, 2014 a March of Dignity was celebrated in Madrid, gathering people 
from all over Spain – created the political space for autonomous multitude 
(Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2014: 221). 
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Action Slogans 
 - “Es hora de que nos unamos. Es hora de que nos escuchen. 
¡Tomemos las calles del mundo!” (“It is time for us to unite. It's time 
they listen to us. Let’s take the streets of the world!”) 
- “De la indignación a la acción. Toma la calle” (“From indignation to 
action. Take the street”) 
-“El pueblo unido funciona sin partidos” (“The people united, can 
function without political parties”) 
- “No les votes” (“Don’t vote for them”),  
- “Democracia significa democracia directa” (“Democracy means 
direct democracy”). 
 
Table 4.3 Key slogans during the Indignados mobilizations in Spain. Own 
elaboration 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have focused on the study of protest and social movements 
giving special attention to the multiple scientific explanations social research 
has offered. We have highlighted that protest and social movements have been 
integrated into a variety of theories of collective action. Resource mobilization 
and political opportunity structures have been the main methodological 
approaches scholars have used to deal with social movements for decades. 
Within this perspective, scholars have particularly tried to answer a series of 
questions regarding the emergence, success, organization and structure, as 
well as decline of social mobilizations. Similarly we have stressed the scientific 
approaches oriented to the analysis of the symbolic processes of collective 
action as both an inner character and a political consequence of protest and 
social movements. Here, themes such as identity and emotions resonate with 
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the process of framing, that is the social construction of the political realm 
through the cognitive dynamics, which these mobilizations foster. Scientific 
explanations of mobilizations converge therefore with a broad interpretation 
of collective action as factor of political change.  We thus have argued that 
emotions, as much as other cultural and ideological meanings, are necessary to 
understand the current wave of mobilizations, in their identity and action. In 
this sense, the case of anti-austerity mobilizations is an example of the way in 
which the emotional rhetoric plays a central role in the concrete activity of 
collective action. Drawing on the injustice frame put foreword by Gamson 
(1992), we have highlighted three different – albeit linked – horizons of 
interplay between emotions and political implication: they have a constructive 
role in the perception of the unjust situation, in framing the collective identity, 
and in encouraging action. 
 
As a result, while it becomes clear that movements are at once strategic and 
emotional – concretely policy-oriented as well as factors re-framing political 
reality –, we have stressed that they often open up theoretical questions about 
the nature of politics and democracy. In the next chapter we will focus on this 
aspect. 
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Chapter 5. Social and protest movements in times of austerity (II): meta-
questions about democracy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we have focused on the wide range of approaches to 
collective action, with particular emphasis on the role of emotions in the 
understanding of current anti-austerity mobilizations. As much as other 
factors, emotions are a key element to take into account, not only in the causal 
explanation of collective action, but also in the comprehension of the nature of 
political change involved in mobilizations.  
 
Here we want to suggest a way of interpreting the function of emotions 
beyond the sociological study of collective. We will therefore pay special 
attention to the ways in which discursive and rhetorical translations of 
emotional dynamics properly interplay with the same definition of political 
ideas, such as ‘the people’ and ‘democracy’. Drawing on the example of recent 
anti-austerity mobilization, the aim is also to address the critical power of 
collective mobilizations, and to show how notions such as representation, 
participation, and political subjectivity have been articulated during the 
protests.  
  
 132 
 
 
2. Movements beyond explanation: “meta-question” about democracy 
  
If the focus of attention moves from the explanation and ‘sociological’ analysis 
of mobilization to the matter of it, one might ask what protest and social 
movements have to do with democracy, its principles as well as its moral and 
political values. Taking into account what we have said up to now, the idea 
that social movements have a prominent role in the concrete ways in which 
politics ‘is done’ should be clear enough. But what about democracy as such?  
 
Mentioning the research field dedicated to the democratization process helps 
us to correctly address this question. Even though social movements and the 
process of democratization have been two different objects for long time 
considered separately within scientific investigations, recently they have been 
more and more addressed in a systematic and comprehensive way. 
Traditionally, in fact, research on democratization has mainly focused on 
socioeconomic variables and elite behaviour, considering social movements 
merely as the result of institutional opportunities for protest and the freedom 
of expression. However, it has also been argued that popular mobilization is 
important for regime change (della Porta 2009), and that there are potential 
insights in a link between movement and democratization studies. Charles 
Tilly, for instance, has focused on the relationship between democratization 
and social movements, revealing a significant correspondence (Tilly, 2004). In 
his work, he has singled out the ways in which social movements have played 
a role within regime change and the process of democratization – broadly 
defined as the “populist” and the “elitist” ways to democracy (Tilly, 1995: 1). 
While the first way emphasizes the participation from below, the public spaces 
of deliberation and the different expression of interests and needs of the 
demos participating in the movements themselves, the “elitist” approach is a 
top-down process controlled by political and institutional leaders. Within this 
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context, he has concretely stated that, “democratization as such further 
encourages people to form social movements”, as well as that “under some 
conditions and in a more limited way, social movements themselves promote 
democratization” (Tilly, 2004: 131). In this vein, it has been argued that the 
emergence of the Global Justice Movement encouraged political scientists to 
pay more attention to issues of democracy. 
 
What these reflections show is that there is an essential concern about the role 
played by social and protest movements, both in the regime setting and 
institutional change. Is the contentious, and ‘questioning’ role of social 
movements a necessary element to democracy? Do social movements lead to a 
‘democratization of democracy’? These questions show that social and protest 
movements open up an interesting line of theoretical and empirical research 
within studies on democracy.  
 
Moreover, as we have outlined in the previous paragraph, mobilization is also 
characterized by emotional dynamics and a symbolic codification of realty. 
Emotions and the framing process, in this sense, not only influence various 
phases of a movement, explaining their emergence and decline, they also show 
the core of the political struggle, opening up theoretical questions about the 
organisational structure of government, as well as about its very nature. These 
factors and perspectives, in other words, show that beyond the mobilization 
per se – what research on social movements has mainly been focuses on – 
there are meta-questions about the political realm and, as the recent wave of 
protest movements has shown, about democracy.  
 
Within this context, emotions and the framing process represent in our view a 
link between ‘strategic’ and ‘cultural’ analyses of social and protest 
movements, which leads us to the broader reflection upon political agency in 
contemporary society, characterized by a range of theoretical perspectives 
such as, among others, Marxism, radical and direct democracy, psychoanalytic 
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traditions, feminism, and anarchism. We obviously cannot deal with all these 
traditions of thought here. What we will show is some recent reflections about 
the relationship between the mobilizations of 2011 (and subsequent years) 
and democratic theory. It will be clear in this way that, beyond the sociological 
and politological explanations of social and protest movements, there are 
inherently theoretical questions raised by recent mobilizations.  
 
Before expanding on this, it must be emphasized that there is no consensus 
over the definition of democracy, its very nature is often contested, and there 
is an ongoing scholarly – as well as non-academic – debate on the subject (e.g. 
Dahl, 2006; Mouffe, 2000). The issue, as we will show in these pages, goes 
beyond the academic interest, and has been reinvigorated by the late wave of 
protest and social movements. Although a minimum set of fundamental liberal 
principles – which ultimately protect individual freedom – is almost 
universally accepted as necessary to a democratic regime, many burning 
questions are still open. What is this essential set of democratic factors made 
up of? How does one conceive the relationship between freedom and equality? 
How must the relationship between democratic principles and economic 
variables be articulated? 
 
Dealing with these and other questions, democratic theory and political 
science have long been facing the dilemma of defining what regimes can be 
defined as democratic. In this vein, it is clear that the struggle lies at the level 
of definition: the reflections have been articulated in different manners 
depending on what is conceived as necessary to democracy. While ‘thin’ 
definitions have underlined elements such as the majority rule, the existence 
of free and fair elections, and the protection of minority rights, empirical 
studies of democracy have been underlined a series of basic elements. Dahl 
(1971; 1988) stresses, for instance, eight necessary variables for a democratic 
society: the presence of regular and free elections; universal suffrage; 
universal eligibility for public office; freedom to form and join political parties 
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and other organisations; freedom of expression; the presence of diverse 
sources of information; as well as the role of votes and preferences in 
formulating the concrete policies of a government. Within this context, it 
might seem that democracy is a dichotomous concept – a state is either 
democratic or not. 
 
On the other hand, beyond a minimal and empirical definition of democracy, 
there is an articulated debate that, besides interpreting freedom and as an 
essential component of democracy, delves into other horizons such as, among 
other themes, political pluralism and participation, civic culture, civil liberties, 
and the same forms of decision-making. It is within this horizon of ‘defining’ a 
democracy that recent mobilizations should be interpreted. 
 
In this vein, we will show that this critical and probing feature resonates with 
the emotional and affective dimension we have highlighted in previous 
chapters. Here, we will place emphasis on the fact that anti-austerity 
mobilization are related to the search and construction of the political subject, 
‘the people’; similarly, they refer to a particular way of legitimizing politics in 
the global era, and consequently, the same definition of democracy. In this 
light, the last wave of protests and movements is a concrete example of the 
role of emotions in democracies and, at the same time, the manifestation of a 
deeper democratic challenge tout court. 
 
 
 2.1 What type of democracy?  
 
The recent wave of anti-austerity movements that spread throughout Europe 
and elsewhere since 2011 has been undoubtedly inspired by the Arab Spring, 
and the strategy of occupations of public spaces implemented by this and 
other cycles of contention (Tarrow, 1998). Though, while the protest in Middle 
Eastern countries was aimed at changing the nature of political regimes, the 
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indignados in Spain and other countries occupied squares and streets in order 
to protest against austerity measures. The financial and economic crisis that 
started in 2008 provided the context for the emergence of anti-austerity and 
Occupy movements in Europe and beyond. Related to this, the primary goals 
of these variegated movements were to call for an end to the growing 
inequality and unemployment, thus challenging neoliberal practices that 
imposed public budget cuts, and the privatization of resources and services. 
While each movement is shaped by the local context, traditions, and political 
settings, they all aimed at transforming the economic system. However, the 
recent wave of protests that has shaken the world was characterized by 
movements of ‘indignant’ citizens whose common prerogative – beyond 
decent jobs and an end to economic austerity – was claiming for ‘real 
democracy’. In this vein, while the concrete economic-based claims were 
related to economic justice and anti-austerity discourses, a more broad 
demand for a different – truly ‘real’ – democracy was a founding feature of all 
social upheavals of recent years.  
 
Issue of protest No. of protests in the world 2006-
2013 
‘Real Democracy’ 218 
Corruption 149 
Justice 56 
Transparency and Accountability 42 
Citizen Surveillance 27 
Anti-war 20 
Sovereignty 11 
Total 376 
 
Table 5.1 Source: Ortiz, Burke, Berrada, Cortés (2013). World Protest Report 
2006-2013 
 137 
 
This table shows the number of protests in the world between the years 2006-
2013, listed by their issue or theme. It is interesting to see that mobilizations 
claiming a “real democracy” were the most numerous followed by 
demonstrations protesting against corruption.  
 
In this sense, two consequences are to be drawn. The first on is that, the 
demand for ‘real’ democracy reveals a strong critique of, at once, the form and 
the functioning of contemporary democratic politics. Particularly across 
Europe and the United States, the claim for a different politics became a 
common frame among protesters and analysts. What was contested about the 
contemporary functioning of democracy is the pervasive corruption of elites 
and, more broadly, the lack of representation of the popular will. Firstly, 
protestors criticised the traditional political parties, seen as a corrupted 
political class that contributed to the corruption of democracy itself. 
Furthermore, the current crisis of democracy is strictly associated to the 
financial crisis, and neoliberal ideology. Along with indignation against the 
economic and political state of affairs, protesters clamoured for a “real 
democracy” which is often viewed as opposed to a market based economy and 
more generally capitalism. Indeed, existing democracies are criticized for 
having allowed the abduction of democratic principles, by financial powers 
and international organizations. Although the activists’ discourse on 
democracy is complex and articulate in different manners, it is based on the 
main criticisms of the ever-decreasing quality of liberal democracies, and the 
primacy of neoliberal practices. Neoliberalism is thus denounced as the 
political doctrine that is affecting the very essence of democracy, disfiguring 
its principles and concretely limiting political action. Anti-austerity protests, in 
this sense, criticised the current form of representative politics, which is 
increasingly seen as complicit in emptying democracy of content while 
perpetuating gross inequalities (Hardt and Negri, 2011). Within this context, 
since protest movements directly challenge this paradigm, asking to re-
 138 
configure democracy as an instrument of the people – ‘the 99-percent’ in the 
Occupy movement’s words – as opposed to the global capitalist elite, ‘the 1-
percent’, they revealed that the very meaning of democracy is contested. 
These movements, in other words, have replaced the ‘meta-question’ about 
democracy at the centre of their action (Offe, 1985) 
 
The second consequence is that this critique to the contemporary forms of 
doing politics - labelled as corrupted and submitted to financial imperatives – 
is strictly linked to the alternatives these movements propose to 
representative and parliamentary democracy. As Donatella della Porta (2013: 
57) rightly reminds quoting Kitschelt (1993:15): “The stakes and the struggle 
of the left and libertarian social movements thus invoke an ancient element of 
democratic theory that calls for an organization of collective decision making 
referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, 
grassroots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in 
contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or 
representative democracy”. 
 
Giving a meaning to 
the ‘Political’ 
Slogans 
Meanings of 
democracy  
- They call it democracy, but it is not’, (‘Lo llaman 
democracia y no lo es’);  
- ‘Error 404: Democracy not found’;  
- ‘The Government likes it when we are silent because 
it seems like we do not exist’ (‘Les gusta cuando 
callamos porque estamos como ausentes’) 
 - ‘You vote once every four years and they call it 
democracy’ (‘Votas una vez cada cuatro años y lo 
llaman democracia’);  
- ‘Democracy means direct democracy’ (‘Democracia 
significa democracia directa’). 
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Table 5.2 Key slogans during the Indignados mobilizations in Spain. Own 
elaboration 
 
Within the variegated phenomena of anti-austerity movements, the same 
concept of “democracy” was at the core of the political struggle: ideas of 
horizontal, participative, deliberative, and common democracy were, among 
other definitions, the models that these movements wanted to concretely test, 
in opposition to the representative-parliamentary democracy. According to 
this, in the political vision of social movements, there is the idea that a 
different democratic asset would be closer to the expression of people’s will, 
than liberal democracy.  
 
2.1.1 Participation and deliberation 
 
According to Donatella della Porta (2009; 2013: 60-84; 2015), recent anti-
austerity movements developed a special focus on direct democracy and in 
modes of public deliberation. Comparing the occupy phenomena with other 
social forums such as the Global Justice Movement (GJM) of previous years, 
she states that there is a common interest for a more participatory – direct – 
form of decision-making within these phenomena. Outlining both similarities 
and differences between GJM and anti-austerity movements, she points out 
that the anti-austerity activists’ discourse on democracy takes up some 
criticism about the decreasing quality of liberal democracies already present 
in the GJM, as well as some proposals inspired by participatory and 
deliberative democratic theory. While participation from below has always 
been a common feature of protest and social movements – somehow their 
very nature –, the recent wave of anti-austerity protests also resonate with the 
conceptions and practices of deliberative democracy, creating egalitarian and 
inclusive public spheres.  
 
Assessing the phenomenon of the acampadas in the recent anti-austerity and 
occupy movements from cross-time perspective, Donatella Della Porta (2013) 
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carries out an interesting investigation on the diffusion of ideas across time 
and spaces. Particularly, she delves into the conceptions of democracy within 
these social movements, and states that there are some sharing traits in their 
decision making processes, beyond the critique to the representative system. 
Della Porta finds that the collective action in many European cities – and 
beyond – followed some rules that are at the core of the theoretical reflection 
on deliberation (e.g. Dryzek, 2000), such as:   
 
- The idea of equality: deliberation takes place among free and equal 
citizens. Deliberation is conceived as based on these assumptions, as it 
gives the moral legitimacy to the activity of giving reasons and 
argument for conflicting situation. (Gutmann and Thompson, 1999: 
267).  
 
- The principle of inclusiveness: citizens have to be included in the 
process of decision-making and must be given the chance to express 
their views. According to many supporters of deliberation, there is the 
possibility – and the duty – to build spaces of deliberation beyond the 
institutional level. Ju rgen Habermas (1996), argue for a first “informal” 
deliberation taking place outside institutions that can affect the 
conventional forms of politics. Similarly, John Dryzek (2000) argues 
that social movements and their deliberative openness can represent a 
critical eye upon public institutions. 
 
- The central value of public good. As Jon Elster has argued, a deliberative 
setting facilitates the perception of politics as the search for a common 
good (Elster 1999). In this vein, Cohen has argued that this model of 
democracy, alternative conceptions of public good is at the core of the 
political debate, so that it depends on citizens’ identities and interests 
the way in which it is built. 
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- The transformation of preferences in interaction. One of the strengths 
of deliberative democracy is its defence of the transformation of 
citizen’s preferences through the deliberation itself (Dryzek 2000: 79). 
The process is indeed characterized as a way through which initial 
preferences are transformed in order to take into account the points of 
view of the others. (e.g. Habermas, 1996).  
 
- Rational argumentation: the force of the better argument. The process 
of transformation of citizens’ preferences is enabled by what has been 
called the force of the better argument. Stressing reason and 
argumentation, supporters of deliberative democracy argue for a 
“dispassionate, reasoned, logical” type of communication (Dryzek 2000: 
64). Although criticism have been moved to the overemphasized 
rational dimension of communication within deliberation, it has been 
argued that a setting of intersubjective communication – thanks to the 
attitude to reciprocal listening between participants – would permit the 
confrontation on the basis of rational argumentation. 
 
- Consensus: the aim of deliberation is to reach common decisions 
approvable by all participants. Democracy is not viewed as the mere 
aggregation of preferences, but as the process through which 
heterogeneous political visions can reach consensual decision – thus 
not respecting a pure majoritarian rule. Since deliberative democracy is 
conceived as a way to address controversies through dialogue, a 
conflictual situation should be addressed until a consensual and 
universally acceptable decision can be taken (Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996). 
 
In this vein, della Porta (2013) argues that during the protest of 2011 and the 
following years, in many European squares anti-austerity movements carried 
out successful experiments of participatory deliberative democracy. 
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 2.1.2 Representation between vertical and horizontal politics 
 
Given that social and protest movements are often characterized by a strong 
participatory nature, the question of representation – and the impasse vertical 
versus horizontal politics – has frequently represented a dilemma for both 
scholars and activists.  How to reconcile grassroots democracy with the 
(inevitable) leadership function? 
 
It is clearly obvious that the question of representation has been at the centre 
of democratic theory – one might say – since its origins. Representation has 
often been labelled as the core idea of modern democracy (Viera & Runciman, 
2008: 60), and theoretical and empirical disputes have long occupied scholarly 
debate (e.g. Pitkin, 1972; Manin, 1997; García Guitián, 2007; Saward, 2010). 
However, what we want to delve into here is the recent debate related to the 
last wave of mobilizations. We have seen that the conception of democracy 
social movements entail – especially the GJM and anti-austerity mobilizations 
– affirms that the people themselves should directly intervene in the political 
decision-making process. Accordingly, these phenomena involve a direct 
theoretical consequence for the representative mechanism. It is indeed patent 
that, for instance, the Indignados’ slogan “¡No Nos Representan!” pointed to a 
broad criticism towards, first of all, the current elected politicians, and beyond 
that, the same nature of representation (e.g. Tormey 2012; Prentoulis and 
Thomassen, 2013). Thus, contemporary representative democracy and its 
political elite are – as we have already mentioned – associated with the 
erosion of democracy and the same capacity of politics to influence the social 
realm. In this vein, recent social movements have manifestly supported, as we 
have previously observed, alternative forms of democratic decision-making, 
such as deliberative and participatory models. More concretely, citizens have 
fostered the idea of restoring the importance of participation through direct 
mechanisms such as referendums and direct involvements in the biggest 
 143 
economic and social choices.  
 
On the other hand, the claim “They do not represent us” suggests the (partial) 
refuse of hierarchical and representative mechanisms. It has indeed been 
affirmed that the essentially horizontal character of the recent protest 
movements, from the Indignados to Occupy Wall Street (Feixa, 2013; Hardt and 
Negri, 2012). Supporting this horizontalism – which is indeed clearly part of 
these movements – scholars from different theoretical and ideological 
positions have recently insisted on the possibility of going beyond verticality 
and representation (e.g. Sitrin and Azzellini, 2014; Graeber, 2014; Hardt and 
Negri, 2012). Since delegation has become an instrument of oligarchic and 
technocratic power – representative democracy, they say, necessarily creates 
a specialized body of representatives disconnected from citizens –, these 
authors have endorsed the idea and the practice of autonomous democracy: a 
concrete form of democracy based on the people’s effective sovereignty, 
egalitarianism and the direct participation of citizens, beyond the limits of 
electoral and representative politics.  
 
Notwithstanding, this perspective focusing on the autonomous and horizontal 
character of social movements and their radical democratic ideas has been 
criticized for being an ineffective political project. Among the same post-
Marxist left, other positions have been developed, supporting the necessity of 
verticality – and thus representation – for an operative alternative to the crisis 
of liberal democracy. As Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen (2013) have 
stated, there are interesting links between the discourse of these movements 
and the academic debate, which principally gather around the work of Ernesto 
Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Slavov Žižek. 
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Representation? Slogans 
 
Vertical VS horizontal 
 
-They don’t represent us!’ (‘¡No nos representan!’ in 
the original Spanish),  
-‘Don’t vote for them’ (‘No les votes’),  
-‘My dreams do not fit in the ballot box’ (‘Mis sueños 
no caben en tus urnas’),  
 
Table 5.3 Key slogans during the Indignados mobilizations in Spain. Own 
elaboration 
 
 2.1.3 The place of politics and the democratic subjectivity 
 
Criticizing or refusing the idea and practice of representation, recent protest 
and social movements have also suggested another way of doing politics and 
engaging with the public sphere. The same ideas of horizontalism and 
participation in decision-making, gave democracy a new locale. Indeed, it has 
been argued that the cycle of anti-austerity protests throughout Europe and 
beyond helped visibilize horizontal and deliberative practices – often confined 
to micro and local spheres of activism (Romanos, 2011).  
 
Certainly, the occupation of public spaces, such as squares and streets, has 
represented a salient feature of the last anti-austerity movements. Democracy, 
it is argued, has to re-gain its grassroots nature, through concrete practice in 
the public sphere. The consensus model of direct democracy employed within 
General Assemblies and working groups, thus, is the concrete way of 
practicing horizontal politics. Working groups and General Assemblies are 
undoubtedly paradigmatic of the wave of recent anti-austerity mobilizations, 
and particularly the Occupy experience. David Graeber, both inquiring on and 
advocating for the political visions these movements entail, has insisted that 
“it’s not a question of building an entirely new society whole cloth. It’s a 
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question of building on what we are already doing, expanding the zones of 
freedom, until freedom becomes the ultimate organizing principle” (2014: 
295). Graeber has in this sense argued that, since contemporary concrete form 
of parliamentary democracy is a co-opted democracy – kidnapped by financial 
capitalism –, Occupy Wall Street and similar experiences are a radical, popular 
struggle to change the state of affairs and re-establish the very nature of 
democracy, which has its profound roots into anarchism.  
 
“A democratic government derives its just power from the people, but 
corporations do not seek consent to extract wealth from the people and 
the Earth; and that no true democracy is attainable when the process is 
determined by economic power. We come to you at a time when 
corporations, which place profit over people, self-interest over justice, 
and oppression over equality, run our governments.” (Declaration of the 
Occupation of New York City, 2011)20 
 
Moreover, the democratic milieu of the recent cycle of protest, as witnessed by 
the discourse of the new political parties that have been born as result of these 
mobilizations, marked the return to ‘inequality’ and ‘injustice’ as master 
frames (Perugorría & Tejerina, 2013: 426). The slogans and mottos used 
during the protests unambiguously targeted to capitalist greed, 
precariousness, political corruption, and those such as bankers and politicians 
who were judged guilty of making the ‘common people’ suffer. In this vein, 
while it is clearly obvious that the economic crisis has favoured the return of 
‘materialistic’ issues at the centre of the political struggle, inequality and 
injustice are also to be found within political themes – as we are arguing in 
these pages. The issue of identity – and concretely the identity of the 
democratic subject – is quite salient within these movements, as attested to by 
the same critique of representation and the practice of horizontal politics.  
 
                                                             
20 Available at: http://occupywallstreet.net/learn 
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Although these movements do not struggle in defence or for the recognition of 
a particular kind of identity – as struggles for ethnical or sexual identities do –, 
the same nature of the protest is marked by a double process. On the one 
hand, the protesters were forging their own individual, and simultaneously 
collective identity. In this context, as it has been argued: 
 
“Protesters were demanding recognition not ‘just’ as citizens, but also as 
human beings with the right to lead lives worth living. Some occupy 
movements have explicitly referred to the values of inclusion, toleration, 
sharing, and caring, and have even envisioned an alternative kind of 
society, more concerned with the realization of humanistic and 
community values than the endless and mindless pursuit of individual 
profits” (Tejerína et al., 2013: 385) 
 
On the other hand, these protest movements were related to the shaping of 
the democratic subject: “the people”. Horizontal politics, the critique of 
representation, and experiments in the direct participation of citizens in 
decision-making were all expression of a challenge to representative politics, 
blamed for emptying democracy of its very content: the will of the people.  
 
“We are assembling in public, we are coming together as bodies in 
alliance, in the street and in the square. We are standing here together 
making democracy, enacting the phrase ‘We the people’” (Butler, 2012: 
192). 
 
Constructing ‘the people’ as the very political subject in opposition to the 
elitist politicians, businessmen and bankers – singled out as enemies who hold 
power unjustly – the struggle of protest movements was profoundly 
characterized by a deeply political and symbolic value. In this vein, the process 
of framing and definition of political realm come back within these theoretical 
questions about the very nature of the political subject and types of 
democratic government. 
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2.2 Post-democracy versus populism? 
 
These reflections on the place of politics and the democratic subjectivity bring 
us back to the question of popular sovereignty. As has become clear, recent 
anti-austerity movements seem to resonate with a series of radical democratic 
and participatory political projects. They directly challenge the democratic 
elitism according to which, “democracy does not mean and cannot mean that 
the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms ‘people’ and ‘rule’. 
Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or 
refusing the men who are to rule them” (Schumpeter, 2003: 284-5). As we 
have seen, the anti-austerity mobilizations and the new political subjects 
emerging from the crisis can be interpreted as struggles between different 
conceptions of democracy, and particularly between what Robert Dahl has 
called ‘polyarchy’, as opposed to the Madisonian and ‘populist democracy’ 
(Dahl, 2006). 
 
In the same line, recent protest movements and the new political parties that 
have followed are often viewed as linked to the critique of the technocratic 
turn and the global return of populism in contemporary politics. 
Contemporary elitism and technocratic politics have been framed in different 
ways, and particularly as a post-political or post-democratic form of 
government. It mainly labels the series of current tendencies that characterise 
the loss of some central democratic practices in the name of expertise and 
technical knowledge, as a basis for political government (Crouch 2004: 6). 
This means that, while all the institutions and formal democratic bodies 
remain in place, the centres of political decision have gradually moved 
somewhere else (e.g. Rancière, 1999; Crouch, 2004; Mouffe, 2005). Although 
the parliaments and other representative organizations still function, there 
are myriads of formal and informal non-accountable institutions – the IMF, the 
rating agencies, multinational corporations, as well as some of the EU 
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institutions – that effectively control the decision-making process. Moreover, 
media and ‘experts’ have acquired a powerful role within this context: “while 
elections certainly exist and can change governments, public electoral debate 
is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals 
expert in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues 
selected by those teams” (Crouch 2004: 4).  
 
“Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimation 
of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the 
appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby 
reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of 
social energies and interests” (Rancière, 1999: 102). 
 
Since post-democracy seems to make ‘the people’ disappear (Rancière 2006: 
80), one might gain the impression that there is a natural confrontation 
between this post-democratic evolution of elitism and populism. Within this 
context, recent developments resonate with a populist position, which mainly 
consist in the counter-position of two blocs and their correspective interests 
(Laclau, 2005). On the one hand the collective identified as ‘the people’, on the 
other hand those who belong to the hegemonic elites. The target then is the 
post-democratic trajectory of contemporary ruling institutions, which seem to 
bid popular sovereignty farewell (Beck, 2011; Habermas, 2011). Beyond the 
theoretical question whether the exercise of popular sovereignty might be 
concretely possible on a regular basis – which is obviously linked to the 
question of representation and direct government –, what seems clear is that, 
by making use of the notion of ‘the people’, populist movements and parties 
claim to represent the very essence of the popular sovereignty, which is seen 
as having been corrupted by elites.  
 
Recent protest movements like the Indignados and Occupy Wall Street claim 
for ‘the people’ to be the real political subject. They construct ‘the people’ as 
the political subject in opposition to elitist politicians, businessmen and 
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bankers, highlighted as enemies that hold power unjustly. In this sense, these 
movements claim to express the true will of ‘the people’, as defined by its 
virtuosity and sovereignty. As we have already highlighted, populism tends to 
simplify of the problematic value that the term ‘people’ has always taken in 
the political discourse. 
 
Populist articulation Slogan 
Opposing social blocs: 
we VS them 
-‘The people should not fear the rulers, they should 
fear the people’ (‘El pueblo no debe temer a los 
gobernantes, estos deben temer al pueblo’)  
-‘The people united, can function without political 
parties’ (‘El pueblo unido funciona sin partidos’)  
-‘When are you going to do something for the people?’ 
(‘¿Cuándo vais a hacer algo para el pueblo?’) 
-‘We are not goods for sale by politicians and bankers’ 
(‘¡No somos mercancía en manos de políticos y 
banqueros!’) 
 -Markets rule, governments are subjected to them, 
and people react’ (‘Los mercados gobiernan, los 
gobiernos se someten, el pueblo reacciona’ in original 
Spanish) 
- ‘If the underdogs move, the elite falls apart’ (‘Si los 
de abajo nos movemos, los de arriba se caen’) 
- ‘There is no right and left-wing politics, there is 
only tyranny and freedom’ (‘No hay derecha ni 
izquierda, solo hay tiranía o libertad’) 
- ‘We are not lefties, nor rightist. We are the 
underdogs and want do away with the elite’ (‘No 
somos ni de la izquierda ni de la derecha. Somos los 
de abajo y vamos a por los de arriba’) 
 
Table 5.4 Key slogans during the Indignados mobilizations in Spain. Own 
elaboration 
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Popular sovereignty is then at the centre of the debate. Populism – regardless 
of the definition we give it – is the most evident indicator of this. Within its 
core visions, the idea of popular sovereignty is someway ‘decontested’, and the 
normative principle according to which the general will of the people should 
be privileged over the preferences of the elite is one of the key features of the 
populist understanding of democracy. Margaret Canovan, for her part, 
interprets contemporary populism drawing on Oakeshott’s distinction 
between the ‘politics of faith’ and the ‘politics of scepticism’ (Canovan, 1999). 
This distinction helps seeing the constitutive – perhaps alternative – visions of 
democracy.  Indeed she suggests that democracy has two faces, the 
‘redemptive’ and the ‘pragmatic’ one, which are opposed but also 
interdependent. On the one hand, the pragmatic face interprets democracy as 
“a way of coping peacefully with conflicting interests and views”, and stresses 
the need for mediating institutions in the government of complex and plural 
societies, as a compulsory condition for the effectiveness and efficiency of 
democracy. On the other hand, the redemptive face looks at democracy as “the 
promise of a better world through action by the sovereign people” (Canovan, 
1999: 11). Direct popular sovereignty – the ‘people in action’ – appears to 
Canovan as one of the main features of the political vision professed by 
populism.  
 
Beyond these theoretical and historical assumptions, it is important to note 
that the same term ‘populism’ is the object of contemporary struggles. From a 
critical standpoint, intellectual supporters of a radicalization of democracy 
have contended that the same concept of ‘populism’ has become a name 
through which political and economic elites attempt to stigmatize and contain 
demands for more citizen participation, egalitarian justice, and alternative 
economic policies (e.g. Crouch, 2004; Rancière, 2006). While the purpose of 
these critical and negative interpretations of populism might be to 
delegitimise certain political movements and parties, in pointing out the 
 151 
features of populist discourse they end up acknowledging the existence of 
distinct patterns of thought-practices: the articulation of the political field into 
two antagonistic blocs; the assumption of the existence of a homogeneous 
collective, ‘the people’; as well as an allegation of the moral and normative 
legitimacy of ‘the people’s will’ as the ultimate source for political authority 
and decision-making.  
 
Whether or not ‘populism’ has currently become a general – often abused – 
name for the censure of political alternatives to the status quo – as if 
denouncing populism would legitimize the economic and political elites to 
‘govern without the people’, ‘without politics’ (Rancière, 2006: 80) –, what 
results is that anti-austerity mobilizations resonate with these major 
theoretical issues. It is convenient to bear in mind that, as remarked by 
Margaret Canovan from a historical and theoretical perspective, popular 
sovereignty is the ‘foundational myth’ of modern representative politics: “we, 
the People’, is somehow the source of political authority” (Canovan, 2005: 
122). As well, within this foundational myth – to use Canovan’s terminology –, 
the constitutive tension between the redemptive and pragmatic faces causes 
the concepts of ‘the people’ and popular sovereignty to remain both central 
features of contemporary politics and the sites of contestation (Stanley, 2008: 
102). 
 
2.2.1 Angry legitimacy 
 
Given these statements, protest movements can be assimilated to some form 
of populism. With regards to populism – whose expression can be found at 
both ends of the political spectrum (Mény and Surel 2000) – its essential 
characteristic is the fact that it is expressed by parties and movements that 
claim to be the ‘true democrats’, the only ones who fight for the sovereignty of 
the people against the corrupt political class of professionals and bankers or 
the invasion of immigrants and foreigners. As highlighted by Eduardo 
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Gonzalez Calleja (2002, 967), populism is based on emotional speech that 
manages to mobilize the masses through its central axis, which is the idea of 
the people as the depositary of social virtues of justice and morality. Others, 
like Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, in the wake of Ernesto Laclau, 
define this phenomenon as ‘an ideology that pushes a virtuous and 
homogeneous people against an elite, or other groups depicted as dangerous, 
to give voice to the people's sovereignty, rights, values, property and identity’ 
(2008, 3).  
 
Amplifying the discourse of fear and anger within the political scene, protest 
movements emphasize the common perception that democratic and 
institutional procedures are something useless and, in essence, intrinsically 
condemned to corruption. Thus, the common rhetoric is based on anti-
establishment discourse and the centrality of the people against those who are 
perceived to have corrupted the original meaning of democracy: the power of 
the people. Then, although within both protest movements there is a complex 
articulation of beliefs held regarding institutional and electoral political 
participation, they are explicitly against the passive and marginal role that 
citizens have in public decision-making and in the global economy and politics, 
often perceived as forces of disaggregation and subjugation. In this context, 
Laclau argues that politics is now entering into its own specific core, with the 
advent of ‘globalized capitalism’ and the consequent ‘proliferation of new 
antagonisms’ that “makes traditional institutionalized forms of mediation 
obsolete” (Laclau, 2005: 231). Whether Laclau is right in his affirmation or not, 
what is clear is that ‘the construction of a ‘people’ is the sine qua non of 
democratic functioning’ (2005: 169) and that the “affective dimension is 
mobilized in the construction of political identities” (Mouffe, 2013: 137). 
 
Claiming to represent a broad and heterogeneous ‘the people’, protest 
movements target not only on politicians and bankers, but also on the 
representative system, political parties, the media and many of the institutions 
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– that is to say, ‘the system’ (Vallespín, 2011: 10). Because of this, we can see 
the wider malaise of democracy, as it confronts the reality of the modern 
global political and economic system. In other words, these movements show 
that ‘meta-questions’ of democracy are at the centre of their actions. They 
disclose the deep, inherent and recurrent – maybe irresolvable – dichotomies 
in the way politics is conducted: representation versus direct democracy on 
the one hand, and the forms and limits of political legitimacy on the other. 
Thus, it can be argued that the Indignados identify the problem at the heart of 
democracy.  
 
In this view, the Indignados, as well as other similar protest movements, wants 
to emphasize, especially through their use of emotional dimensions, the fact 
that democracy is entering a worrying time, not only in its procedural 
functioning, but more importantly in its legitimacy and in its relationship with 
the economic world. Movements such as the Indignados and Occupy Wall 
Street draw attention to this concern, through a discourse that underlines 
moral and civic indignation, the expression of resentment or rage, and through 
episodes of wrath. On the other hand, protest movements are representative 
of the denial of the ‘there is no alternative’ argument, hegemonic in the public 
discourse of the equilibrium of the economic system (Orlie 2009). Thus, by 
linking the economic and political crisis – which are seen as intertwined and 
seemingly going hand in hand – these phenomena show a broader political 
state of affairs, and fight against the political exhaustion brought by financial 
dominance over political domain. In this sense, a wide range of antagonistic 
movements reject the internalization of a sense of vain and useless of politics – 
generally linked to negative emotions, such as insecurity, uncertainty, fear and 
so forth. 2011 protest movements, linking economic crisis to a crisis of 
democracy, shifted the normative question of the equilibrium of the economic 
system to the survival of democracy as such. Other Indignados’ slogans are in 
this sense representative of this concern (Martí i Puig, 2011). 
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Populist articulation Slogan 
Democracy VS the 
“system” 
-‘It is not the crisis, it is the system’ (‘No es la crisis, es 
el Sistema’) 
-They call it democracy, but it is not’, (‘Lo llaman 
democracia y no lo es’)  
-‘Error 404: Democracy not found’ 
-‘The system is obsolete’ (‘El sistema está obsoleto’)  
-‘It is not a crisis, it is a scam’ (‘No es una crisis, es 
una estafa’) 
-‘You vote once every four years and they call it 
democracy’ (‘Votas una vez cada cuatro años y lo 
llaman democracia’). 
-‘The Government likes it when we are silent because 
it seems like we do not exist’ (‘Les gusta cuando 
callamos porque estamos como ausentes’) 
 
Table 5.5 Key slogans during the Indignados mobilizations in Spain. Own 
elaboration 
 
 
In other words, liberal democracy is also criticised for having allowed the 
abduction of democratic politics, by financial powers and international 
organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Union. Given this context, one should ask if political legitimacy – specifically in 
its democratic form – is at stake. In this regard, Lipset famously noted:  
   
“Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and 
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate or proper ones for the society”. (Lipset, 1959: 86) 
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Following Lipset’s remarks on legitimacy, we might say that there is a 
fundamental problem in the current legitimization of politics, and of 
democracy in particular. Indeed, if democratic theory has suggested that 
democracies need trustful citizens, then this is precisely what is lacking, and 
protest movements expose its depth. Bringing into play the use of emotional 
dimension, protest movements reveal that there is a general and progressive 
rift between some of the political institutions, such as the State, the political 
parties and supranational organizations on the one hand, and the market and 
global dynamics on the other. In fact, liberal democracies are being carved out 
by the growth of global institutions, whose mechanisms are often 
unaccountable. Although the Indignados or other Occupy moments don’t stand 
against the democratic form of government, it seems to be a general belief that 
democracy is weakened in its effectiveness in the face of contemporary 
globalization. Considering all this, it can be said that the current “system has 
lost its self-evidence, its automatic legitimacy, and now the field is open. (Žižek 
2011). 
 
What becomes apparent, in this context, is the fact that there is a deep struggle 
for the very legitimation of politics, and protest movements are part of it. The 
Indignados and Occupy movements, in other words, utilizing emotional 
elements and discourse, try to recuperate the collective action and find the 
right place where politics belong. All in all, they represent somehow an 
attempt to fill the ‘who’ of democracy, that is, re-give a deeply popular 
meaning to the open field of political legitimacy.  
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have focused on the study of protest and social movements 
giving special attention to the explicit theoretical questions these phenomena 
bring to the forefront. We have employed the scientific approaches oriented to 
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the analysis of the symbolic processes of collective action as both an inner 
character and a political consequence of protest and social movements. Here, 
themes such as identity and emotions resonate with the process of framing, 
that is the social construction of the political realm through the cognitive 
dynamics the same mobilizations foster. Scientific explanation of mobilization 
converges therefore with a broad interpretation of collective action as a factor 
in political change.   
 
As result, while it becomes clear that movements are at once strategic and 
emotional – concretely policy-oriented as well as factors in re-framing of 
political reality –, we have stressed that they often open up theoretical 
questions about the nature of politics and democracy. Particularly focusing on 
some reflections about the last wave of anti-austerity movements, we have 
shown that the transformative power of collective mobilization is thus 
attested in its questioning of the current state of affairs. The critique of 
representative politics, the experiences of participative decision-making, and 
the idea of a different place for democracy, which can enable the political 
exercise of a truly democratic subjectivity – ‘the people’, the ‘99-percent’ – are, 
in this sense, the theoretical criticism that protest and social movements bring 
to the forefront and must be recognised.  
 
Similarly, these phenomena can be seen as examples of the contemporary 
vectors through which the struggle for popular and democratic legitimacy is 
currently being fought. They represent an immanent critique of the 
contemporary forms of economic and political power, and a symptom of the 
declining legitimacy of political and economic institutions. Therefore, by 
stressing their significant relevance in the current situation as well as their 
use of emotional vectors, we have highlighted the fundamental role of 
emotions in politics, particularly when it concerns the creation of political 
subjects – ‘the people’ – as well as the strife for democratic legitimacy. 
Considering all this, anti-austerity movements here considered – somehow 
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representing contemporary rage-holders or ‘banks of wrath’ (Sloterdijk, 2010: 
62) – bring to light the fact that democracy faces an emotionally-based 
struggle for its very meaning. In this vein, we have seen that the relevance of 
emotions lies in showing the struggle for the meaning of political realm, and 
that studying emotions in political disciplines equips social scientists and 
theorists with useful theoretical tools to grasp the vectors in the legitimization 
of politics.   
 
All in all, as we will show, a perspective centred on the role played by 
emotions can also shed light on a major point of contention in the 
contemporary debate in democratic theory – as we will further show in the 
next chapter: the peculiar and uneasy relationship between populism and 
democracy. Cas Mudde and Crisóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2012b) have indeed 
summarized this point through a crucial question: should populism be 
considered as a threat or as a corrective to democracy? Or both? And under 
which conditions? On the one side, there are scholars and intellectual who are 
critical of the way populist movements claim to represent ‘the people’, and the 
general threat to liberal democratic institutions they entail. Specifically, the 
critique highlights the dangers of a politics that relies on charismatic leaders 
who invigorate ‘harmful’ emotions such as resentment and anger, and that 
attacks the practice of representation – virtually aiming at its institutional 
bypass –, and often contains an illiberal, and even nationalist potential 
(Taggart, 2000: 98; Urbinati, 2014). On the other hand, those who sustain that 
such a critique does not take into account the inclusionary aspect of populism. 
Either drawing on the Latin American experience or critically looking at the 
post-democratic malaise of European construction (e.g. Habermas, 2009; 
2011; Beck, 2011), some scholar argue that essential democratic aspects, such 
as the same idea of popular sovereignty and the practice of representation, 
have been wiped out by recent alteration of liberal democracies (Crouch, 
2004). In this sense, some political theorists critically engage with this debate 
and argue that, by representing excluded groups and fostering an egalitarian 
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political program, inclusionary populism has to be seen as part and parcel of a 
renewed democratic politics (e.g. Canovan, 1999; Laclau 2005; Mouffe, 2013; 
Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). Populism, in this vein, would resonate 
with the struggles between different conceptions of democracy, between 
liberals and radical theorists.  
 
Before focusing on this particular aspect in the seventh chapter, we will, in the 
next chapter, deal with this debate – namely the uneasy relationship between 
populism and democracy – on the basis of our discourse analysis of the role of 
emotions in anti-austerity mobilizations. In so doing, we will be able to better 
address the normative questions about the relationship between democratic 
politics and the role of emotions. 
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Chapter 6. Disfiguring democracy? Populism and the vacuum of ‘the 
people’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The idea of democracy as the ‘self-government of the people’ is of public 
domain.  However, in the political realm it is almost impossible to find a 
definition that is beyond debate. Democracy is not exception, and it is at the 
centre of the most important theoretical debates. Moreover, as we have 
already stressed in the previous chapter, recent anti-austerity movements 
resonate with different kinds of democracy, and especially with participatory 
and direct decision-making processes. But what about populism and its 
normative implications? 
 
Although ‘populism’ is very frequently deployed as a negative epithet with the 
purpose of discrediting political opponents, depending on the geographical 
context its meaning and political value varies. Typically, critics of populism 
highlight its intrinsic demagogic practices, which involve fuelling an 
atmosphere of enmity and distrust towards political representatives, often 
playing on emotions, and making popular and unrealistic promises to the 
citizenry, and so forth. Indeed, this criticism has often contributed to the 
conflation of two concepts of populism and demagogy. While within the liberal 
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perspective populism is generally regarded as something to be feared and 
discredited, one might argue that the stigma attached to populism is itself 
evidence that populism exists and it has some distinct features and patterns, 
which are directly related to its twin/counter-concept: democracy. The 
relationship between these two concepts is indeed far to be easy and 
axiomatic. Moreover, their usage in everyday politics has exacerbated both 
their vagueness – populism and democracy are notoriously elusive and 
slippery concepts – as well as their conceptual connection.  
 
As shown by an increasing amount of recent literature (e.g. Mudde and Rovisa 
Kaltwasser 2012a; Canovan, 2005; Arditi, 2007) and as we will further argue, 
the role and connotation of the term populism may differ depending on the 
political perspective. On the one hand, populism is seen as a threat to liberal 
democracy, to the extent that it damages some of its core values. On the other 
hand, positive assessments are often supported from a theoretical standpoint, 
which maintains firstly that populism is an essential aspect of any political 
articulation – populism is the “sine qua non requirement of the political” 
(Laclau, 2005a: 154) – and secondly that it also has an inclusionary potential.  
 
In this vein, as we have mentioned in the previous chapter, some scholars have 
tried to answer whether populism should be considered as a threat or as a 
corrective to democracy, and under which conditions (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2012b). While at the theoretical level, for Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser populism is essentially democratic (e.g. Canovan, 1999; Laclau, 
2005a), they also show that it is ambivalent towards liberal democracy (e.g. 
Mudde, 2007; Plattner, 2010). In this sense, they develop an empirical position 
and argue that populism can be both a corrective and a threat to democracy. In 
this dichotomy, the central distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary 
populisms acquires a key relevance (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). 
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In this chapter we will delve into the relationship between populism and 
democracy. Specifically, on the basis of our discursive analysis of recent anti-
austerity movements, we will draw on some recent accounts on this debate 
and argue that these theoretical insights can be useful for the aim of our 
research. Concretely, we will proceed as follows: we will (2) explore the 
relationship between populism and democracy, showing the concepts, and 
perspectives involved. Here, it will become clear that the idea of democracy is 
the point of contention. We will then (3) focus on some central questions 
appearing in recent literature on populist and democratic theory, concerning 
particularly the idea of ‘the people’ and the key dimension of representation. 
Finally (4), we will focus on the inner paradox of politics – what we call the 
vacuum of ‘the people’ – and asses the analysis for the following chapter, in 
which we will return to some normative political theories that have recently 
shown a strong interest in the role of emotions in the democratic-populist 
interaction.  
 
 
2. Populism and democracy: friend and foe? 
 
The term ‘populism’, like almost all political concepts, has a long history21. Our 
aim in not to examine its historical roots; nonetheless almost all scholars who 
focus on populism start by mentioning the historical and geographical context 
of its birth, and the different manifestations this phenomenon has had. It 
seems that grounding the concept in concrete contexts is somehow a step to 
deal with the term’s elusiveness and ambiguity – a problem related to both 
                                                             
21 The origin of the term ‘populism’ is obviously related to the term ‘the people’ and it is 
generally seen as directly linked to the changing meaning of ‘democracy’ in the first half 
of the 19th century. Particularly, the term ‘populism’ arises at the end of the 19th 
century, during an era in which the notion of ‘the people’ becomes a key word of modern 
politics and ‘democracy’ tends to be positively valued. In this context two political 
movements are worth noting: the Populist Party in the United States and the so-called 
Narodniki in Russia (Canovan 1981: 5-6). For more details on the history of populism, see 
for instance Germani (1978), Ionescu and Gellner (1969), Mudde (2002), Taggart (2000). 
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‘conceptual travelling’ (i.e. the application of a concept to different cases and 
contexts) and the ‘conceptual stretching’ (i.e. when a concept does not fit some 
cases) (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012b: 10). Although this might be true 
– and we think it is – the theoretical problems related to the concept of 
populism still persist in every scientific (and non-scientific) approach to the 
subject. Populism, as well as other political ideas, is a contested concept, and 
there is no consensus on its very definition.  
 
As we have seen in the third chapter, many scholars attempt to find a minimal, 
rigorous and yet flexible definition for the concept, in order to employ it in 
comparative research across cases and over time. Despite this effort in the 
recent literature, a rather pessimistic conclusion is shared by almost all 
scholars working on populism, who stress the essential contestability of the 
concept as well as the important differences between existing approaches to 
populism. As Canovan has pointed out, the term remains extremely vague “and 
refers in different contexts to a bewildering variety of phenomena” (Canovan 
1981: 3). In this vein, exploring the nature of populism, she also admits that it 
can be “doubted whether it could be said to mean anything at all’ (Canovan 
1981: 5; Canovan, 1982: 544).  
 
Nonetheless, the differences between the various approaches within scholarly 
debates do not exclude the presence of a common concern: the theoretical and 
empirical relationship between populism and democracy. How should we 
evaluate the normative character of populism, and its relationship with 
democracy? These are daunting questions for scholars of populism, who have 
never been able to reach a consensus on the interpretation of this political 
phenomenon and its relationship to democracy. As we have already 
mentioned, the core concepts of populism are indeed essentially related to 
democracy and democratic politics. Concepts such as ‘the people’, popular 
sovereignty, and representation, among others, are at the centre of both ideas 
of populism and democracy. Yet, we will show that the articulation of these 
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concepts within the ideas of populism and democracy is exactly their point of 
contention and friction.  
 
In the brief discourse analysis of recent anti-austerity movements we have 
developed in the previous chapter, we have highlighted the applicability of a 
formal approach to populism, according to which populism is characterized by 
a political logic that considers society essentially divided into two opposed 
groups, ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. At the centre of this perspective, as well as 
for the almost totality of other approaches, there is the idea that populism in 
modern democracies first and foremost correspond to an appeal to ‘the 
people’ against the established structure of power (Canovan, 1999: 3). 
Additionally, underlying this agonistic logic, the theoretical and discourse 
analysis we have previously outlined allows us to insist on the relationship 
between populism and democracy, highlighting especially the considerations 
of some authors, such as Ernesto Laclau and Margaret Canovan.  
 
Although they have developed different theoretical positions, both authors 
articulated strong arguments that maintained the idea of a deep relationship 
between populism and democracy. In fact, both authors stated that populism 
belongs to the democratic horizon, since it mobilizes two basic functions: 
polarization and simplification of the social complexity, and the incorporation 
of the largest majority in one collective subject: ‘the people’. On the one hand, 
Margaret Canovan argues that populism is a form of ‘politics of faith’ that aims 
at correcting normal institutionalised politics. In this context, people’s 
mobilization would be a redemptive force of democracy because its very 
meaning is “bringing politics to the people” (Canovan, 2002: 26). Canovan 
indeed states:  
 
“I have argued that reflections on populism illuminate the inescapable 
ambiguity of democracy. The tension between its two faces is a perpetual 
invitation to populist mobilization. But attempts to escape into a purely 
pragmatic interpretation of democracy are illusory, for the power and 
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legitimacy of democracy as a pragmatic system continues to depend at 
least partly on its redemptive elements. That always leaves room for the 
populism that accompanies democracy like a shadow”. (Canovan, 1999: 
16) 
 
Similarly, Ernesto Laclau additionally argues that populism operates through 
the merging of different popular claims, discontents and demands, and thus 
resonates with a process of counter-hegemonic struggle against the power 
bloc. In this sense, populism would possibly be a more egalitarian or 
democratic politics than the formal, liberal one (Laclau, 1977: 18).  
 
On the other hand, from a liberal standpoint Nadia Urbinati (2014) has 
recently focused on this issue and criticised Laclau’s support of populism, 
arguing that the polarization of the totality of the social field he prefigures 
contributes to create an ideology of the people less inclusive than democratic 
citizenship. Populism does not suggest, in her account, a politics of inclusion; 
rather it prefigures a politics of exclusion. Since the concept of the people is 
essentially identified with a specific portion of the people, ‘the people’ – the 
pivoting entity of populism – cannot be more democratic than the citizen(s) as 
sovereign actor(s) in a liberal democratic context. Hence, Urbinati thinks of 
populism as a phenomenon that is parasitical on representative democracy, 
which is its true and radical target. In this sense, she argues contra Laclau, 
affirming that populism does not produce more democratic politics – at least 
not necessarily. According to Urbinati – as we will further argue below – 
populism is not only defined by its political style and discourse; properly 
speaking, populism is an attempt to implement a political agenda whose main 
features are in collision with liberalism and the principles of constitutional 
democracy, in particular minority rights, division of powers, and party 
pluralism. 
 
All in all, regardless of the theoretical and political standpoint one adopts, 
populism and democracy seem to be strictly – and inevitably – linked together. 
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Benjamin Arditi (2004) famously argued in his dialogue with Margaret 
Canovan, that populism not only follows democracy like a shadow, rather 
more accurately like a spectre. Populism emerges as a product of the very 
existence of democracy, illuminating its very boundaries.  
  
“To put it in a schematic manner, and drawing from psychoanalysis, we 
can depict this mode of populism as the return of the repressed, as a 
symptom of democracy – as an internal element of the democratic 
system that also reveals the limits of the system and prevents its closure 
in the presumed normality of institutional procedures” (Arditi, 2007: 
74). 
 
As stressed by Benjamin Arditi, populism flourishes within democracy as its 
fellow traveller. Nonetheless, the relationship between populism and 
democracy seems more an issue of contention rather than compatibility: 
 
“As a symptom of democracy, populism functions as a paradoxical 
element that belongs to democracy – they both endorse the public 
debate of political issues, electoral participation, informal forms of 
expression of the popular will, and so on – and at the same time 
interrupts its closure as a gentrified or domesticated political order”. 
(Arditi, 2007: 77) 
 
Thus, Arditi argues that populism functions as a symptom of democratic 
politics in two senses. First, as a promise of redemption and reaction against 
‘normal’ institutionalized politics, populism claims to expand the scope of 
citizen involvement in public affairs. Second, populism also positions itself in 
the edges of democratic politics, “in a grey area where it is not always easy to 
distinguish populist mobilization from mob rule” (2007: 81). 
 
Beyond the consideration on the merit of populist forms of politics, what 
emerges is that the controversial debate around the relationship between 
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populism and democracy is far to be simple. Putting emphasis especially on 
the theoretical level of the analysis will help us to show the broad implications 
of what is involved: the struggle between different conceptions of democracy. 
If on a general note it is clear that one cannot exclude possible anti-democratic 
allegations of popular demands and populist articulation – the risk of 
democratic collapse is intrinsic to democracy itself –, nonetheless the 
relationship between populism and democracy directly points to the 
theoretical and practical struggle between different theories of democracy. 
This debate first and foremost refers to the various ‘models’ of democracy, and 
particularly the dichotomy between liberal and radical theories.  
 
On the one hand, those who follow a Schumpeterian conceptualization of 
democracy, understood as method by which rulers are selected in competitive 
elections. On this basis, liberal democracy – although rich in variants – has 
been mainly developed on the assumption that some minima criteria must 
take place to define a political regime as democratic. Starting from the idea 
that the term ‘democracy’ represents an ideal political system that does not 
really exist in the real world, Dahl’s notion of ‘polyarchy’ denotes those 
regimes in the real world that ensure certain minimal standards (Dahl, 1971: 
8), especially for what concerns public contestation and political participation. 
In this sense, according to Dahl, in liberal democracy both majority rule and 
the defence of minority rights are essential. On the other hand those who, 
especially in the wake of heterodox Marxism, insist on normative alternatives 
to the current liberal model of democracy. Being an influential reference in 
this regard, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, for instance, have highlighted 
the contingent historical articulation of the liberal and democratic tradition. 
According to this view, the conciliation of liberal principles, such as the rule of 
law, individual rights, etc., and democratic values, such as the idea of popular 
sovereignty, equality, etc., is the result of political and never-ending struggles 
(Mouffe, 2000). In this line, criticising the liberal ‘sacralization’ of consensus, 
this perspective also wants to acknowledge the inevitable conflictual 
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dimension of politics, and populism is somehow the concrete manifestation of 
this. Hence, the idea of ‘agonistic pluralism’ (Mouffe, 2005b) acquires 
relevance: radical theorists argue that political antagonism – the power 
struggle made up also of passions and affects – although it can be tamed, 
cannot be eliminated from the political scene, and normatively, should be take 
into account as the main driver of democracy.   
 
However, we will not delve specifically into the normative level of this debate 
here, as it is not the aim of this research. We will rather stress the key 
concepts around which the theoretical and empirical dispute is conducted. 
Drawing on some liberal critiques, we will here place emphasis on some 
inherent paradoxes of populism – hence of democracy.  
 
 
3. Dangers, paradoxes, and boundaries 
 
Focusing on a theoretical level of analysis does not mean that the relationship 
between populism and democracy causes any empirical repercussion. On the 
contrary, focusing on the empirical horizon could possibly help to better deal 
with the theoretical debate. In this sense, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2012) try to bridge the gap between pure normative analyses and empirical 
and comparative studies. Using a minimal definition of liberal democracy, they 
aim at analysing in which ways populism can be considered a corrective 
and/or a threat to the quality of democracy, its positive and negative effects. 
Drawing on Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino’s (2005) account – which 
makes a distinction between three dimensions of the quality of democracy: 
procedure, content, and result – Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser think that 
populism can strengthen political participation, but potentially weakens 
public contestation (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012a). If on the one hand, populism 
may support and increase political participation by the inclusion of 
marginalized groups in society, on the other hand it may limit the political 
 168 
space for contestation, since it moves towards a centralization of power and 
consequently damages the liberal division of powers. Although it has been 
argued (Kazin, 1998) that populism is a democratic expression of politics that, 
without calling the entire system into question, is particularly needed to 
rebalance political power to benefit of the people, it becomes clear that the 
peculiar vector populism is built around is the perennial tension between, on 
the one hand, popular will and majoritarianism and, on the other hand, 
constitutional mechanism and ‘checks and balances’. 
 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argue that this tension is directly related to the 
inner contradiction of liberal democracy, that is the strain between, on the one 
hand, the promise of majority rule and, on the other hand, the constitutional 
protection of minority rights (see also Mény and Surel, 2002). In this vein, 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser go further asking under which circumstances 
populism becomes a corrective rather than a threat for (liberal) democracy. By 
operating with two key variables – namely the distinction between populism 
in government, and populism in opposition on the one hand, and consolidated 
and unconsolidated democracies on the other hand – they suggest a series of 
hypotheses: Populism in government has stronger and more negative effects 
on democracy than populism in opposition; populism has stronger effects on 
unconsolidated democracies than on consolidated ones. Within this context, 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser believe that populism represents a challenge for 
liberal democracy. Within this context, populism would be on the side of 
majority rule and hostile towards pluralism, as it relies on the idea of the 
existence of ‘a general will of the people’.  
 
On a similar note, Nadia Urbinati has recently argued (2014) that populism in 
government has deep and severe effects on liberal democracy. In Democracy 
Disfigured. Opinion, Truth and the People, Urbinati focuses especially on the 
role of opinion and will formation, as a key element for a liberal – 
proceduralist – vision of democracy. Democracy, she states, involves a 
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permanent struggle between different opinions and demands of citizens. This 
struggle is essential to democracy, to the extent that opinion is the 
fundamental basis for modern democracy and its electoral procedures. Given 
this context, Urbinati supports a model of democracy in which citizens’ 
opinion and will formation must not collapse into one another. If it occurs, 
then democracy can be disfigured. Urbinati identifies three types of 
democratic disfiguration, which come from the inner potential enemies of 
democracy – which means enemies of free opinion of citizenry: the unpolitical, 
the populist, and the plebiscitarian disfigurations. Each of these horizons 
challenges key liberal principles on citizens’ opinion and will formation. 
Whether unpolitical democracy delegitimizes political opinion in favour of 
technocratic expertise, and the plebiscitary democracy overvalues the 
mediatic, and ‘aesthetic’ aspects of opinion, populist democracy radically 
polarizes the public forum in which opinion is created. The problem with 
populism is that opinion and will formation collapse into the figure of the 
people. For Urbinati, the people can and should be understood as a plurality, 
that is never at one with itself and only exists through representations of it. In 
this sense, Urbinati is sceptical of both left-wing and right-wing populism. 
 
Urbinati’s analysis is particularly interesting for our purpose, and helps us to 
uncover some central paradoxes of democracy, and their relationship with 
populism. At the outset, as Urbinati bears in mind, it is convenient to 
differentiate protests and political movements from populism in power. 
Although recent anti-austerity movements, she argues, fit inside the formal 
sketch of populist discourse, they are not yet populism because they are not 
organised enough in order to gain power at government level. Although 
Urbinati does not disclaim some possible fluidity between popular movements 
and populism – and therefore clear-cut distinctions may be problematic – she 
argues that the discursive polarization between ‘the people’ and the elite is not 
enough to consider contentious mobilizations such as we have lately 
witnessed as completely populism (2014: 129). Urbinati underlines the 
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central feature of charismatic leadership that can transform the populist 
movement into a populist system. 
 
Grounding her theoretical analyses on some historical examples – she points 
to Napoleon’s demagogic strategy, as well as Mussolini and Berlusconi 
caesarism –, and recuperating ancient rhetorical and political figures – the 
populous, demagoguery, etc. –, she outlines both the profound roots of 
populism and the deep consequences of the relationship between populism 
and democracy. In this sense, briefly considering the European experience, 
Urbinati argues that populism as a distinctive form of political phenomenon, 
although borrowing central political concepts from ancient traditions, was 
born in the representative and constitutional age. Seeing European populism 
as often being characterized as a right-wing form of politics, Urbinati affirms 
that populism has never aimed at implementing the promises of constitutional 
democracy, but has disfigured them instead. 
 
Mainly drawing on a series of authors, such as Norberto Bobbio, Margaret 
Canovan, Claude Lefort, and Benjamin Arditi, Urbinati sets out a series of 
general assumptions. Firstly, populism is both internal and critical to 
representative democracy, its formal procedures and institutions. In this 
sense, populism is a permanent possibility within representative democracy, 
although it can be a danger for its development. Moreover, Urbinati draws a 
direct parallelism between populism and demagoguery: the former is to 
representative democracy what the latter was to direct democracy: internal to 
it and parasitical on it22. Populism is then to be seen as an ideology of the 
people that, in spite of its use of democratic concepts, is in opposition with real 
                                                             
22 Urbinati often makes use of parallels between ancient and modern forms of 
democracy. According to Aristotle's pivotal analysis, demagoguery within democracy is: 
a) a permanent possibility insofar as it relies upon the public use of speech and opinion 
as democracy; b) a more intense use of the principle of the majority so as to make it 
almost absolute or a form of power more than a method for making decisions (populism 
is the rule of the majority rather than a politics that uses majority rule); and c) a waiting 
room for a possibly tyrannical regime. 
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and existing democracies. Considering all this, Urbinati thinks that it can be 
potentially dangerous for liberal and constitutional democracy: the ultimate 
effect of populism can be reached when it leads to the centralization of power, 
weakening of checks and balances, disregarding political oppositions, and 
transforming elections into a plebiscite for the leader. If a populist movement 
succeeds in dominating the democratic state, Urbinati argues, populism may 
also modify its figure radically and open the door to an exit from democracy 
(2014: 170).  
 
The dangers of populism, therefore, seem clearly related to the role and 
function one gives to the political subject ‘the people’. Citizens’ opinions and 
will formation – in Urbinati’s terms – are at the centre of the dispute. Before 
continuing the examination of the uneasy relationship between populism and 
democracy, we will focus on two interrelated questions, which represent at 
once the paradox and the boundaries of democratic politics. 
 
 
3.1 Who is ‘the people’? The paradox of politics 
 
Populism, one might argue, attempts to resolve the ‘paradox of politics’ which 
is determining ‘who’ constitutes the people. (e.g. Frank, 2010: 5) But who are 
the ‘people’ who form the ultimate source of political authority? No simple 
answer to this fundamental question can be taken for granted.  
 
Nowadays, the term ‘the people’ has assumed new visibility in recent decades, 
saturating the grammar of many actors and political phenomena. At least at 
the European level, the semantics of ‘the people’ is present in the wide 
ideological-political spectrum (Mény and Surel, 2000), since in both (extreme) 
right-wing and (extreme) left-wing poles we find examples of this. The 
ubiquity of the term points to the success of the concept and to its ambiguity. 
In fact, ‘the people’ can mean many different things in many different 
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circumstances (e.g. Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2004). It can refer, for instance, to 
peasants, the working class, the electorate, the nation, and so forth. 
 
Moreover, Juan Francisco Fuentes identifies the three dimensions that are 
intrinsic to the notion of people: the political, the social and the moral 
dimensions. The political dimension, firstly, is explicit when thinking of the 
people as representing the sovereign subject and the source of legitimacy. The 
social dimension, in turn, is reflected in the extent to which the people 
represent the cluster or set of groups, communities or social classes. Finally, 
the moral dimension is given as ‘the people’ is seen as made up of different 
virtues, passions and vices. In this sense, ‘the people’ often represents the 
natural and the original of a community and is generally given a positive value 
because it is perceived as something authentic that must be rescued and 
valued above all other dimensions of social life (Fuentes, 2004: 98). 
 
In this context, it is appropriate to note the problematic value that the term 
‘the people’ has always assumed in the political discourse. Indeed, many 
authors emphasize the polysemic value of the term ‘the people’. Raphael 
Samuel (1984: 23) notes that the people “is a word whose meaning has as 
many nuances as applications have the term”. Other authors emphasize the 
ambiguity and the indetermination of the term: Pierre Rosanvallon (1998: 32) 
reminds us of the words of Mirabeau in 1789, “le mot peuple signifie 
nécessairement ou trop ou trop peu […] c’est un mot qui se prêt à tout”; 
Margaret Canovan (1984) also underscores the elasticity of the notion of the 
word ‘the people’. Ernesto Laclau argues that “the people is a concept without 
a defined theoretical status: despite its frequent use in political discourse, its 
conceptual precision remains exclusively at the allusive or metaphorical level” 
(Laclau, 1977: 165). 
 
What seems clear is that, studying populism and its relationship with 
democracy means dealing with the question of the ‘who’ of politics. In this 
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sense one is confronted by the uses and the role of the signifier ‘the people’, 
and the ways in which it has been articulated and politically theorized 
throughout time and space, as well as both idealized and demonized. A 
historical and conceptual reconstruction would certainly shed much light on 
the variability of the term and its political significance. However, it is 
impossible for us to offer an exhaustive historical and conceptual picture of 
the term ‘the people’. We will mainly draw on Canovan’s (2005) seminal 
contribution, in order to sketch some central aspects of the notion, and its 
value for the debate we are dealing with.  
 
The definition of the term ‘the people’ is controversial and leads to conceptual 
ambiguity. “The blurred boundaries of the people reflect conflicts and 
dilemmas that continue to bedevil democratic politics” (Canova, 2005: 3). In 
this context, according to Canovan the concept of the people involves two 
problematic horizons. The first one is that the same term the ‘people’ 
produces a division between two separated and differentiated communities, 
ourselves and others. Asking who belongs to the people means interrogating 
the borders of the political community, thereby defining an inside and an 
outside of communal space limiting and defining the political subject. 
Although it seems clear that the external borders of a state – or a national or 
regional community – do not automatically correspond to the boundaries of a 
people, its concept intrinsically needs an external definition. The second 
question is that internally the situation is as complex as externally. It is 
evident, at the outset, that the term “has meant both the whole political 
community and some smaller group within it” (Canovan, 2005: 5), such as the 
excluded, the poor, and so forth. In this context, is seems accurate to affirm 
that, throughout history, ‘the people’ has functioned as a sign of the internal 
division of every political community between a part and a whole, between 
the few and the many, and those governing and those governed, and so forth. 
In sum, an ambiguous political identity that “cannot be included in the whole 
of which it is a part and […] cannot belong to the set in which it is always 
 174 
already included. Hence the contradictions and aporias to which it gives rise 
every time that it is evoked and put into play on the political scene” (Agamben, 
1998: 178) 
 
It is also interesting to note that, throughout history, this intrinsic ambiguity of 
‘the people’ – and the political theories that operate through it – have caused 
paradoxical outcomes. On the one hand, appeals to it permitted the elevation 
of the ‘people’ into the basic democratic subjectivity and allowed the inclusion 
of the popular strata and their demands within the political community. On 
the other hand, it stands for the idea of the dangers involved in mass 
mobilizations as well as the idealization of ‘the people’ as a political subject, 
and the belief of its factual presence in politics. In this sense Claude Lefort 
(1988) foresaw the paradoxical risks contained within democratic 
government, and its aspiration of materializing the sovereign collective – not 
yet as characterized by pluralism – but as if it were a homogenous actor. In the 
wake of Tocqueville’s critique of democracy, Lefort thinks that the democratic 
subject, ‘the people’, is an abstraction – a contentless and unstable notion that 
is even more abstract than ‘the majority’ – and as such, cannot be assumed as 
effectively governing itself. In this way the locus of rule in a democracy is void 
of real people – it is an ‘empty place’ as Lefort calls it: 
 
“Democracy inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable 
society in which the people will be said to be  sovereign, of course, but 
whose identity will constantly be open to  question, whose identity will 
remain latent” (Lefort, 1988: 304). 
 
If, with Lefort, one might argue that the emptying of the space of political 
power is an historical event – he emphasizes this through the example of the 
French Revolution – it is nonetheless interesting the process of filling this 
space. Lefort normatively thinks that democracy is especially susceptible to 
demagogy: since the political power in it is ‘empty’, democracy permanently 
risks turning to tyranny when a populist demagogue or an autocratic political 
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party manages to ‘fill’ the empty space by claiming to embody ‘the people’ 
 
However, referring to the contemporary debates about populism, Michael 
Kazin shows that in the context of the American Revolution the idea of “We the 
people’ initially functioned more as an incantation than a description of a 
concrete reality, as an empty signifier designating the whole of the 
community: “it indicated who the ultimate sovereign was but did not specify 
who was actually to rule the nation” (Kazin, 1998: 13).  
 
Margaret Canovan, for her part, notes the peculiar characteristic of ‘the 
people’ as sovereign power, and its location between action and myth (2005: 
105, 124)23. If on the one hand the people embodies the founding, mythical 
idea of a political community that gives life to a legitimate order, on the other 
hand it is problematic to conceive this same community in action: how can ‘the 
people’ exercise its sovereignty? Is the representation the only mechanism 
through which it can act politically?  
 
 
3.2 Representing ‘the people’? The boundaries of democracy 
 
The question of representation, then, becomes central to any analysis of ‘the 
people’, populism, and democracy. Indeed, it has been argued that populism, 
in its different forms, exhibits a strong reservation and hostility to the 
mechanisms of representation (Mény and Surel, 2002). The usual way of 
dealing with this is to say that populism is the result of a crisis of 
representation; populism is considered as a response to either the incapacity 
or the refusal of elites to respond to people’s concerns. Beyond this, there 
seems to be an inner concern. In the name of the ‘will of the people’ – which is 
often translated into the ‘will of electors’), populism may seek a more genuine 
                                                             
23 Although Edmund Morgan’s idea of ‘the people’ as a fiction (1988: 15, 75, 78-93), 
invented and used by political elites for their own purposes, could appear similar to 
Canovan’s argument, she does not completely agree with him. (2005: 130).  
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identification between the represented and the representatives. However, the 
objection that “the people cannot rule as a corporate body” is confronted by 
the simple fact that elections, referenda and other similar moments of political 
participation are the sine qua non for the legitimacy of representatives in that 
they enable voters to act as if such a corporate body existed (Stanley, 2008). 
Moreover, returning to Bourdieu’s argument of ‘symbolic power’, Canovan 
(2005: 133) stresses the idea that a group can “exist only by delegating power 
to a spokesperson who will bring it into existence by speaking for it, that is, on 
its behalf and in its place” (Bourdieu, 1991: 249).  
 
In this context, Pierre Rosanvallon in his Le peuple introuvable (1998) has 
rightly observed that the great absentee of modern liberal democracy is – 
paradoxically – ‘the people’. While ‘the people’ as a political subject is given a 
creative, and legitimizing role in political institutions, it then ‘liquefies’ itself in 
the same institutional machinery it is built (Duso, 2004: 107; Manin, 1997: 
174). Through the fundamental abstraction of the universality of the people, 
democracy necessarily enters the mechanism of representation. Hence, 
democracy belongs to this basic modern alienation: the legal and universal 
citizenship is not – as logic goes – the government of ‘the people’, but the 
government on behalf of the universality of the people, carried out by its 
representatives. 
 
In this context, then, two things become clear. The first one is that, as 
highlighted by Canovan, the appeal to ‘the people’ is an unavoidable aspect of 
modern political practice. Drawing on Oakeshott’s distinction between the 
‘politics of faith’ and the ‘politics of scepticism’, she insists that the 
‘redemptive’ and ‘pragmatic’ faces of democracy are “opposed, [yet] are also 
interdependent” (Canovan, 1999: 9). The second thing is that, as stressed by 
liberal theorists, populism infiltrates the tension between the will formation – 
in the construction of a political subject – and its representation. Liberal 
criticisms towards populism show indeed that the latter is essentially 
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impatient with the dialectic between pluralism and unity that the mechanism 
of representation involves. Canovan has stressed that “a vision of ‘the people’ 
as a united body implies impatience with party strife, and can encourage 
support for strong leadership where a charismatic individual is available to 
personify the interests of the nation” (Canovan, 1999: 5). 
 
Urbinati, for her part, insist on this line on the fact that populism, when it 
achieves state power, can be very inimical to representative democracy. 
Populism is in her view ‘parasitical’ on representative democracy, as far as it is 
internal to it and it competes with its meaning and use of representation, as 
well as the way of affirming and enabling the ‘will of the people’. In this sense, 
although temporal and spatial contexts are important variables, Urbinati 
affirms that populism is more than a historically contingent phenomenon, and 
it belongs to the very interpretation of democracy, and the function of ‘the 
people’ within it. She supports in this sense a democratic proceduralism that 
acknowledges that citizens have the right to make bad decisions, while in her 
account populism presumes that ‘the people’ is always right. 
 
“Populists’ strive for an all-encompassing unity of the people beyond 
procedures and against political representation denies and harasses 
disagreement instead of overcoming it. Procedural democracy offers 
instead an antagonistic stance that takes dissent as the main feature of 
social relations, and expects politics and procedures to reflect it 
meaningfully” (Saffon and Urbinati, 2013: 442). 
 
Although Urbinati affirms that her argument is akin to Chantal Mouffe’s notion 
of agonistic democracy – in that it positively values the existence and 
persistence of diverse and conflictive perspectives in the political arena –, she 
differs from Mouffe’s critique of democratic procedures and her claim that 
democratic antagonism entails the construction of an agonistic relationship 
between ‘us/them’– a divide that Urbinati thinks as dependent on 
extraprocedural principles, and that seems to be an operation of simplification 
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of the complexity of social realm. This observation suggests to her that 
populism does not create people's sovereignty – as it is often claimed by its 
supporters – but appears once the people's sovereignty already exists and is 
‘secured’ in a constitution. Thus, populism is to be seen as an ideology of the 
people that belongs to a political order in which the people is formally already 
the sovereign. 
 
Urbinati, therefore, concludes that populism is an expression of extreme 
majoritarianism – which potentially can become despotic, in so far as it leads 
to plebiscitarian forms of politics. While from a normative point of view it 
seems that representative democracy secures a broader range of political 
possibilities than populism – and thus pursue a project of democratization –, it 
does not mean that liberal democracy is exempt of criticisms: distribution of 
power and social and economic inequalities are key concerns to face. At any 
rate, what becomes clear is that the representation of ‘the people’ is a central – 
often paradoxical – element within democratic context. Regardless of whether 
one agrees with the liberal position Urbinati defends – that is, populism 
ultimately is a violation of liberal democracy –, it becomes patent that 
populism is a permanent possibility within the democratic process. 
 
In sum, whether or not one takes a stand and thinks that ‘the people’ 
effectively exists, somewhere behind the mundane surface of everyday 
politics” and is “the ultimate source of authority” (Canovan, 2005: 138), it 
seems clear that ‘the people' confers legitimacy on any political issue – the 
political regime, constitutions, borders, concrete policies, etc. – and therefore 
all those who want to be legitimized must appeal to the people or pretend to 
speak on their behalf. This means that liberal democracy – practically based 
on politics of scepticism’ – cannot do without a modicum of ‘the politics of 
faith’ (Canovan, 2005: 138).  
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4. Populism and the vacuum  
 
What these considerations show is the fact that there is an unavoidable 
paradox of democracy. We have already affirmed that the ‘paradox of 
politics’24 is given by the indetermination of ‘who’ constitutes the people. More 
precisely, it consists in a sort of vacuum, derived from the mechanism of 
abstraction democratic subjectivity has entered. As far as it has been argued 
up to now, populism makes this emptiness visible and, at once, attempts to fill 
this vacuum. As we have seen, while formal and proceduralist liberal 
approaches assume this emptiness, populism tends to supply a substantial-
ontological answer to the ‘who’ of politics – or, more accurately, states that 
this ontological trends (in the form of collective identifications) is somehow 
inevitable. Populism’s first aim, then, consists in filling out the empty space of 
democracy (Laclau, 2005a: 168), and liberal approaches have stressed the 
potential danger of this operation. What is clear is that there is a fundamental 
problem within democracy, and it is related to the constitution of the people. 
While claiming for ‘the people’ is a way of filling this emptiness, liberal theory, 
for its part, overstates the historical interpretation of the constitution and 
legitimacy of the people as a historical event, rather focusing almost 
exclusively on the legitimacy of government25.  
 
Drawing on Panizza’s advice to distinguish ‘populism in the streets’ from 
‘populism in power’ (2000: 190), Urbinati argues that populism in its nascent 
form can play a democratizing role, insofar as it often leads to mobilization 
and helps the critique of existent state of affairs, and forms of political 
representation. However, once in power populism can have significant 
                                                             
24 Certainly not the only paradox, but perhaps one of the deepest and unsolvable 
paradoxes of politics. 
25 An interesting argument has been advanced in this sense by Sofia Näsström who 
underlines the shortcoming of the liberal interpretation in current debates around 
political and democratic legitimacy, in so far as it does not account well for the 
constitution of ‘the people’, considered as merely a contigent and historical event. (2007: 
638) 
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negative effects on democracy. Populism, we have underlined, competes with 
representative democracy on the very meaning of representation. Since its 
aim is to reach a more genuine identification between the represented and the 
representatives, populism operates through a process of people's unification, 
understood as a better form of representation. Here, the question of 
leadership is of central importance. The central figure of the leader is indeed a 
core aspect for every theorist of populism: populism and the politics of 
personality go hand with hand. This also leads us to the fact that, while there is 
certainly a process of polarization of the social and the political field, there is 
also a process of verticalization, brought about by the presence of a 
charismatic leader. Again, this move has been interpreted as a radical 
challenge to representative democracy (Urbinai, 2014: 155). Following 
Rosanvallon’s argument (2006), Urbinati argues that populism can lead to the 
most devastating corruption of democracy, since it radically downturns 
representative institutions, and drastically polarizes the social realm, 
depicting democracy essentially as a conflict between two different and 
potentially hegemonic positions that merge the plurality of opinions into two 
antagonistic blocs.  
  
At any rate, beyond the concrete judgment on the matter, what all 
perspectives recognise is the fact that, whereas normatively the act of filling 
the vacuum can be dangerous, at the same time it is an essential – and 
inevitable – process that belongs to the democratic process. Analogously to the 
‘redemptive’ aspect of modern politics underlined by Canovan (1999), the 
filling of the vacuum is inherent in the idea of popular sovereignty, and 
belongs to the idea of the ‘will of the people’ as the foundation of any 
legitimate action. As we have already partly seen through the example of the 
anti-austerity movements, redemption resonates with a series of elements, 
brought to the forefront by other scientific traditions: the perception of an 
injustice, identity formation – specifically the democratic subjectivity –, and 
the transformation of all this in action.  
 181 
 
Within populist discourse, in fact, ‘the will of the people’ is generally 
interpreted as belonging to two ideas: political majoritarianism and moral 
authenticity. The invocation of authenticity and ordinariness is a key aspect of 
populism’s appeal to the people. In this vein, this populist operation towards 
authenticity would resonate with what Paul Taggart (2000: 95) has called 
‘heartland’. Dealing with the slippery concept of ‘the people’, Taggart makes 
use of this term as a mythical ideal of a given population, an ‘imagined 
community’. In fact, populists seek to emphasise their physical proximity to 
the people and distance from the elites, and portray themselves as those who 
resonate with the reason, emotions and ‘truth’ of the ordinary people. ‘The 
people’ is conceived of as a homogeneous entity, and all ‘ordinary’ men and 
women have a shared interest in their opposition to the elite.  
 
Although the critique that liberalism raises towards populism affirms that 
there is an intrinsic danger in a politics that relies on a charismatic leader who 
invigorates ‘harmful’ emotions such as resentment and anger, still emotional 
factors play a fundamental role. Authenticity, in this sense, becomes a pivotal 
axe around which other emotional dynamics converge and contribute in the 
construction of the identity formation. Moreover, as we have seen, recent anti-
austerity movements resonates with a populist ‘move’, bringing into play a 
manifest use of the emotional dimension, and polarizing the political field in 
opposed blocs. The aim is, as we have argued, is to fill the emptiness of ‘the 
people’.  
 
In the previous chapter we have focused on the discursive level, aiming at 
‘registering’ the role of emotions in the essential contestability of political 
concepts – especially those related to the idea and practice of democracy –, 
here we have grounded the theoretical reflection in populism and democratic 
theory. We have seen that even within political theories the articulation of a 
political discourse takes place around what we can call empty signifiers. 
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Liberal and radical perspectives tend to fill such emptiness, and are therefore 
in a ‘articulatory’ struggle for the ‘matter’ of these empty signifiers. Anti-
austerity movements, resonating with these debates, somehow represent an 
attempt to fill the empty signifiers of popular sovereignty and democracy.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have focused on a problematic horizon that recent anti-
austerity movements bring to the forefront: the uneasy relationship between 
populism and democracy. We have outlined the theoretical and empirical 
consequences involved, presenting different perspectives and approaches of 
analysis. Taking up the inquiry of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser – and their 
question about the threatening or as a corrective nature of populism for 
democracy –, we have dealt with the intellectual tradition that sees populism 
as a threat to liberal democracy, to the extent that it damages some of its core 
values. At the same time we have highlighted the positive assessments offered 
by those who maintain that populism is an essential aspect of any political 
articulation.  
 
Our argument was intended to show the inner, and fundamental tension in the 
relationship between democracy and populism. Particularly drawing on recent 
literature on the matter, we have focused on the ‘paradoxes’ of democracy, as 
well as on the location and function of ‘the people’. Moreover, although from a 
normative point of view, liberal criticisms have the merit of underlying some 
inaccuracies of populist theory, we affirm that it partly fails to capture the role 
of emotions within politics – and the way in which they operate in the 
discursive filling of the vacuum of democracy. Indeed, as we have partly shown 
through our discursive analysis of recent anti-austerity mobilizations, 
emotions have an evocative role in the struggle for popular sovereignty; a role 
that formal approaches hardly grasp. Nonetheless, different kinds of analyses, 
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such as those of Canova, Urbinati, and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 
contribute to the analytical task of clarifying the extent and the cogency of 
contemporary political theories and their usefulness in the understanding of 
the current phenomena we have studied.  
 
Therefore, in order to continue our research, in the next chapter we will 
return to the normative questions about the role of emotions in the 
democratic domain. Particular attention will be paid to the agonistic approach 
– developed by a series of authors, and especially by Chantal Mouffe –, which 
represents an interesting normative standpoint on this matter. 
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Chapter 7. Agonism and the role of passions: conflict, populism, and the 
struggle for democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between populism and democracy is at the centre of the 
contemporary political debate, and recent anti-austerity mobilizations 
resonate, among other things, with this issue. Taking up the inquiry of Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012), we have specifically outlined the theoretical 
consequences involved, and highlighted the two main scientific positions. On 
the one hand, the intellectual tradition that sees populism as a threat to liberal 
democracy, to the extent that it damages some of its core values. On the other 
hand, the positive assessments offered by those who maintain that populism is 
an essential aspect of any political articulation and can have progressive 
outcomes. Moreover, stressing the inner and fundamental ‘paradoxes’ of 
democracy, as uncovered by the relationship between democracy and 
populism, is a way to further delve into the theoretical questions the recent 
anti-austerity mobilization bring to the forefront. As well, outlining the main 
arguments in this matter allows us to go back to the core value of emotions, 
which are deeply related to this debate. As we have mentioned, if liberal 
criticisms about populist theory have the merit of underscoring some of its 
inaccuracies, they seems to partly fail in capturing the role of the affective 
dimension within politics – and the way in which it contributes to the process 
that we have referred to as the discursive filling of the vacuum of democracy. 
Bearing all that in mind, the question of how emotions play a role in this 
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process – which has been partially addressed through the discourse analysis – 
is again at the centre of this chapter. 
 
Here we will go back to considering the normative issues about emotion, 
especially putting emphasis on the recent democratic developments that have 
contributed fruitful insights regarding the place and role of emotions in 
democracy. In this sense we will draw particularly on the work of Chantal 
Mouffe and her agonistic approach, in which passions are essentially involved 
in the conception of democracy and the conflictive nature of politics. The idea 
is to see if and to what extent her perspective offers fruitful insights to the 
understanding of the role of emotions, especially regarding the problem we 
are facing with. For this purpose we will sketch the agonistic democratic 
account Mouffe develops throughout her work, particularly highlighting some 
central aspects and notions that we think worthy of note for our research. 
Here, we will put emphasis on concepts such as conflict, passion and agonism, 
trying to underline their link and to show how they can be useful for an 
understanding of both the political role of emotions within democracy, and the 
same debate about populism and democracy. In this sense, it will become clear 
that the conflictual vision of politics Mouffe develops, as one of her main 
contribution to democratic theory, is directly linked to her vision of human 
passions, which are in turn at the centre of any possible democratic 
articulation.   
 
While, as we will clarify below, Mouffe struggles to overcome the (perhaps 
inescapable) dichotomy between reason and emotions, her agonistic account – 
this is our argument – can contribute to move beyond the pure normative 
conceptualization of the role of emotions in the political field. In fact, a critical 
engagement with the agonistic approach allows a shift of attention from the 
interplay between emotions and reason for democratic purposes – and the 
concern of what kind of emotional engagement liberal and democratic regimes 
need – to another way of conceptualizing the political field that, while 
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fostering the liberal and democratic form of society, shows the contingent, 
discursive, and conflictual struggles over its own interpretation. This also is, in 
our view, a valuable contribution of Mouffe’s perspective to the understanding 
of recent anti-austerity mobilization. 
 
Although Mouffe’s account is not free from criticism, the aim is to link the 
advantages of assuming an agonistic vision in the democratic debate arisen 
from the recent anti‐austerity movements. As much as political theories, these 
phenomena tend to fill the political emptiness, being in an ‘articulatory’ 
struggle for the ‘matter’ of politics itself. While through a discursive analysis of 
recent anti-austerity mobilizations we have briefly shown the role of emotions 
in the contention for the meaning of political concepts, we now translate this 
issue to a more theoretical level. We will draw on the agonistic account 
therefore with special lens for these debates and the conceptualization of the 
role of emotions in the struggle for popular sovereignty. In this chapter, then, 
we will firstly outline the general perspective of agonism, and its focus on 
conflict, and passions (2). After highlighting briefly the core aspects of this 
approach, we will specifically consider its usefulness for what concern this 
study (3). 
 
 
2. Conflict, passion and agonistic democracy  
 
Conflict is a central issue in contemporary democratic theory. It can be 
interpreted as a cleavage around which different conceptions of democracy 
have been developed. In an extreme effort of simplification: on the one hand 
those who take conflict as the horizon democracy has to overcome; on the 
other hand, those who think that conflict must find a productive place within 
democracy. The former approach includes a series of perspectives, such as 
classical liberal, pluralist and deliberative theories. The latter can be seen as 
belonging to the broad range of radical perspectives. Needless to say that one 
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has to be aware not to read theories of democracy – both liberal and radical – 
as homogeneous corpi of literature, nor to consider any author or to interpret 
any theoretical approach as a homogeneous whole26.  
 
Beyond this extreme simplification – which implies, admittedly, skipping the 
myriads of nuances – the point is to highlight the central function of conflict in 
political and democratic theory. Contemporary authors such as Chantal 
Mouffe, James Tully, Claude Lefort, and William Connolly in particular have 
focused on a ‘productive’ idea of conflict, and conceptualise theoretical 
positions that do not see conflict as a problem for democracy, rather one of its 
qualities. In this context, one common supposition is that the constitutive 
nature of the socio-political pluralism, which politically raises the stakes for 
the ways that democracies respond to it. Although in different forms, all 
agonistic theorists see conflict as inherent to society and politics, and stress its 
productive function. In this sense, conflict is seen not only as an unavoidable 
fact of political life, but a strength of democratic culture and practice, which 
needs to be recognised and institutionalised in order to avoid the ‘conflation’ 
of democracy into other types (autocratic of technocratic) of political regimes. 
In this sense, it is important to highlight that Mouffe’s work – the most 
notorious ‘agonistic’ approach, and the one we will mainly focus on here – is 
placed within a broader context of similar accounts on the conflictual and 
contestatory nature of politics, in which the agonistic perspective is seen as a 
channel for disagreement and a challenge for the hegemonic distribution of 
power27.  
                                                             
26 This means, for instance, that radical democracy is not equal to agonistic democracy as 
such, nor completely conflates with poststructuralist positions. Radical pluralism, 
agonism, and other forms of radical thinking are characterized, as much as the ‘classical’ 
liberal theory, for the plurality of interpretation and positions developed.  
27 For instance, James Tully places contestation at the heart of democratic politics and 
stresses the constructive role of dissent. However, he also highlights the importance of 
dialogical participation – what he calls practices of civic freedom (Tully, 2008) – in the 
process of democratic change. William Connolly, for his part, goes beyond the ‘light’ 
agonism of Tully, and speaks of ‘agonistic respect’ – rather than ‘agonistic democracy’ 
(Connolly, 1995) –, referring to the specific kind of civic disposition (a respectful one) 
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Within the wide spectrum of democratic theory, the recent work of Chantal 
Mouffe has been influential and has activated numerous theoretical debates. 
Mouffe undoubtedly represents a reference for all those who approach 
contemporary debates on democratic theory as well as on pluralism and 
contentious politics. Theoretically, her work critically engages with other 
relevant contemporary political theories – such as discursive and deliberative 
perspectives, sociological perspectives on modernity and pro-‘third way’ 
positions, as well as theories on ‘exodus’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004; 2012) – 
particularly drawing on (and somehow recuperating) other intellectual roots, 
such as Antonio Gramsci and Carl Schmitt.  
 
In opposition to Rawls and Habermas’s models of democracy, which – 
according to this perspective – overstress the rational deliberation and 
consensus, these theories insist on the presence and necessity of radical 
conflict in the concrete practice of democracy. Clearly, this does not mean that 
rational deliberation and consensus are impossible, but they are not the 
required conditions nor the necessary purpose of democracy (e.g. Connolly 
1991; 1995; Mouffe, 2000). Agonistic perspectives, in this sense, envisage a 
model of democracy grounded in passionate competition and struggle among 
competing ideals, and values. Having said that, it is worthy to note that radical 
theorists also insist on the value of liberal democracy, and some of its basic 
principles. In fact, radical perspectives share an “adhesion to the ethical–
political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree 
concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a 
disagreement is not one that could be solved through deliberation and rational 
discussion” (Mouffe, 2000: 245). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
that political actors have to adopt when expressing their constitutive differences and 
disagreements. In sum, these examples of conceptualisation of agonism, although they 
sketch different kinds of agonistic struggles, are certainly related in the emphasis they 
put on the centrality of conflict within democracy.  
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Beyond the critique of deliberative procedures, there is a deeper 
conceptualization of the relationship between conflict and democracy. In fact, 
while classic liberal pluralism sees conflict as to be contained within formal 
and institutional arrangements – mainly the check and balance system –, 
radical thinkers, and Mouffe in primis, conceive conflict as the core of social 
relationships and organizing structures, and as affecting the same 
interpretation of liberalism and democracy. Moreover, the relationship 
between liberal and democratic horizons is itself subject to contestation. This 
conflict, according to Mouffe, takes place within ongoing social and political 
conflicts themselves (2000: 2-5) – and not only within scholarly debate.   
 
In the political theory of Chantal Mouffe, there are different assumptions that 
need to be taken into account. Firstly, according to this position democracy 
supposes the recognition of the constitutive pluralism and openness of society, 
which implies diversity and – as we have said – conflict, beyond (an even 
legitimate desire for) consensus. In this sense, the pluralism of values and 
beliefs – the different conceptions of the good, in deliberative terminology – is 
constitutive to democratic politics. However, whereas theorists working on 
deliberative democracy aim, at least partially, at finding a common basis for an 
harmonic conjunction of this plurality, Mouffe stresses that the radical 
difference within democratic context cannot (and should not only) be resolved 
through deliberative practices, nor appeals to common and public reason. In 
this sense, Mouffe normatively states that the constitutive pluralism and 
conflictual disagreements of a democratic context should not only be 
acknowledged, but also articulated agonistically. Any attempt to deny the 
conflictual essence of democracy is indeed an assault on its very essence: the 
focus on consensus, according to Mouffe, is not only conceptually erroneous, 
but also politically dangerous. The risk is either to fall into an apolitical 
dimension of politics or to generate the condition for the extreme, non-
democratic, expression of conflict. An overrated desire for consensus, in fact, 
may not give conflict an appropriate democratic venue, thus pushing it 
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towards undemocratic routes. 
 
Mouffe summarises this point through two dichotomies, on the one hand the 
political versus politics, on the other hand antagonism versus agonism. In fact, 
for Chantal Mouffe, the political is: “the dimension of antagonisms that I take 
to be constitutive of human society”, while politics is the “set of practices and 
institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence 
in the context of conflictuality provided by the political” (Mouffe, 2005a: 360). 
This is directly related to the second dichotomy, antagonism versus agonism. 
 
“while antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are 
enemies who do not share any common ground, agonism is a we/they 
relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is 
no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy 
of their opponents. They are ‘adversaries’ not enemies. This means that, 
while in conflict, they see themselves as belonging to the same political 
association, as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict 
takes place” (Mouffe, 2005a: 20) 
 
Antagonism, somehow representing the political essence of pluralism, denotes 
the intrinsic, ontological dimension of the political. The democratic task is then 
to convert the we/they relationship from antagonistic to agonistic. Agonism, 
precisely because it differs from antagonism, becomes a clear democratic task. 
Moreover, agonism involves a confrontation between adversaries, not 
enemies, and encompasses therefore limited forms of struggle. This is what it 
would mean to think ‘with Schmitt against Schmitt’: Mouffe follows his 
critique of rationalist democratic theories, without embracing his rejection 
thereof. 
 
“Conflict, in order to be accepted as legitimate, needs to take a form that 
does not destroy the political association. This means that some form of 
common bond must exist between the parties in conflict, so that they will 
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not treat their opponents as enemies to be eradicated, seeing their 
demands as illegitimate, which is exactly what happens with the 
antagonistic friend/enemy relations”. (Mouffe, 2005a: 20) 
 
It is this shared common ‘democratic grammar’ that makes struggles to be 
conducted in a peaceful – although often non-reconcilable – way. In this 
context, the function of democracy is to provide institutions that will allow 
conflict to take an agonistic form. While the intrinsic conflictual nature of the 
political – the radical pluralism – implies the need for agonism, agonism itself, 
in turn, sustains and safeguards democratic pluralism. Within this context, 
between this agonistic approach and the liberal deliberation there are 
differences both of in terms of style and purpose. For what concerns the aim of 
her agonistic perspective, Mouffe stresses that: 
 
“The fundamental difference between the “dialogical” and the “agonistic” 
perspectives is that the aim of the latter is a profound transformation of the 
existing power relations and the establishment of a new hegemony”. 
(Mouffe, 2005a: 30) 
 
Mouffe seeks indeed to theoretically put forward an alternative democratic 
model that can fight against liberal-conservative discourse, aiming to create a 
counter-hegemonic project within liberal-democratic theory and practice, and 
turn liberal democracy away from the conservative direction it is taking. The 
agonistic approach highlights assuming the ‘dialogical’ and ‘consensual’ 
principles within democracy in an un-critical manner fails to see the 
ideological level that lies beyond this assumption. In this sense, the agonistic 
project implies defending liberal democratic principles from their critics on 
the left and on the right, while challenging and providing alternatives to the 
conservative interpretations of the floating signifiers of liberal democracy – 
freedom, equality, public and private, and so forth.  
 
For this purpose, Mouffe thinks that liberalism has to be deeply and 
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genealogically criticized. Within liberal and deliberative perspectives, Mouffe 
argues, politics is seen as a neutral terrain in which different groups compete 
to occupy the positions of power, whose objective is simply to dislodge others 
in order to occupy their place. Here there is no critical questioning of the 
dominant ideological hegemony, nor projects for the transformation of power 
inequalities. It is simply a competition among elites. The intrinsic presence of 
antagonism in the political is somewhat denied. Contrary to the liberal view, 
the agonistic perspective sees the antagonistic dimension of the political as 
always present: what is a stake is the struggle between opposing hegemonic 
projects that cannot be reconciled rationally, and one of them necessary 
dominate the other. Mouffe thinks of this agonistic perspective as a real 
confrontation, which is played out nonetheless under conditions regulated by 
democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries. The liberal and 
deliberative failure to see the inescapable presence of antagonism within the 
political realm has caused, according to Mouffe, the incapacity of traditional 
parties to provide forms of identifications around political alternatives28. 
Moreover, Mouffe moves against the liberal-deliberative vision, which is seen 
as a reduction politics to individual motivations. It has to be recognized 
instead, according to the Belgian author, that politics always consists in the 
creation of conflicting groups such as ‘Us’ versus a ‘Them’ and that it implies 
the creation of collective identities.  
 
Within this context, Mouffe also moves another critique to the current 
mainstream of liberal-deliberative perspectives, which underlines their 
shortcomings in taking into account the power of collective forms of 
identification. In criticising the consensual perspective of democratic politics, 
she argues that any plausible account of politics needs to take stock of 
passions, understood as both the milestone of collective identifications and as 
motivational forces. Indeed, what endangers democracy for Mouffe is precisely 
                                                             
28 For Mouffe this explains the success of right-wing populist parties in Europe, the only 
ones which attempt to mobilize passions and to create collective forms of identifications.  
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the excess of the mainstream rationalist approach, since it is blind to the 
nature of the political and rejects the central role that passions play in the field 
of politics. 
 
Moreover, Mouffe asserts that the blindness to the affective dimension of 
politics and its role in creating and maintaining collective identifications 
inhibits liberal and deliberative democrats of acknowledging that reason 
cannot be seen as the unique motivational force for political participation. 
Passions, in this sense, have to be seen as the concrete forces that make people 
move politically, and they also characterize the encounter of political agents in 
the public field. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment of the role of passion does 
not mean that reason and reasoned argument do not have a role in Mouffe’s 
conception of politics. Reason, in her account, is not the only mode of engaging 
legitimately in politics:  
 
“A well functioning democracy calls for a clash of legitimate democratic 
political positions. If this adversarial configuration is missing, passions 
cannot be given a democratic outlet and the agonistic dynamics of 
pluralism are hindered. The danger arises that the democratic 
confrontation will therefore be replaced by a confrontation between 
essentialist forms of identification or non-negotiable moral values”. 
(Mouffe, 2005a: 30) 
 
 
2.1 Passions and democracy 
 
The idea that passions have to be recuperated in the consideration of politics 
is of importance in the work of Chantal Mouffe. She has often criticised 
rationalist thinkers – especially those who work in the wake of Rawls and 
Habermas – for their accounts of politics in which passions are considered 
either as something to be managed or suppressed, or are not considered at all. 
Not without grounds, one might criticise this position, claiming that Mouffe’s 
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agonism is not as ‘radical’ as it purports to be, being instead a heterodox 
interest-group politics in post-structuralist clothing. However, Mouffe moves 
against deliberative-rational thinkers, whose vision of passions – she argues – 
is essentialist, to the extent they are seen in opposition to reason and as 
perpetual sources of political instability. We have seen, Mouffe is very critical 
of theories that conceive of politics in terms of rational consensus. Liberal and 
deliberative democrats are guilty, according to her, of assuming the perfect 
transparency of the subject, and of diminishing passions from their 
understanding of the political.  
 
“The domain of politics – even when fundamental issues like justice or 
basic principles are concerned – is not a neutral terrain that could be 
insulated from the pluralism of values and where rational, universal 
solutions could be formulated” (Mouffe, 2000: 92). 
 
Against such views, Mouffe draws on Lacan and advances an understanding of 
the Self as lacking in essence, split, and as irreducible to a rational ego. The 
idea of the Self as perpetually seeking an identity in which to invest libidinally 
is a central theme that democratic politics cannot avoid (Mouffe, 1993: 75; 
Stavrakakis, 1999) 
 
As we have already stated, Mouffe outlines an interesting theoretical 
perspective that allows seeing that passions are not only ineradicable from 
politics, rather they are also constitutive of it. Furthermore, emotions mark 
collective political identifications, which are important sources of motivation, 
as well as an essential part of political-hegemonic struggles. For these reasons, 
she emphasises that theorists of democracy cannot ignore the affective forces 
that make collective identifications, and fuel democratic politics. In fact, 
passionate attachment to collective identifications is what keeps individuals 
motivated and facilitates their political engagement. The affective bonds that 
tie groups together as well as group identities – and the distinction ‘we’ versus 
‘them’ – is an essential dimension of politics, so that for Mouffe the social, as 
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much as the individual self, is split. Hence, the identity formation and group 
distinction are related to the role of the affective dimension, and plays a 
structuring function in politics, which means that it can never be done away 
with. Although for Mouffe emotions arise at the level of identity formation, 
passions are neither something personal nor something superfluous, as 
suggested by rationalist accounts of politics. Rather, passions are both 
intrinsic and necessary for politics. They ground democratic practice, and in so 
doing, they both define and drive democracy: passions capture the necessary 
bonds that develop among democratic citizenries.  
 
What one should envisage, according to Mouffe, is a way of transforming the 
conflictual distinction between groups, from an antagonistic relationship – 
which can degenerate into violence and negate the very democratic principles 
– into an ‘agonistic’ relationship. Therefore, emotions in Mouffe’s writings 
serve to shape democratic practice. Since conflict is libidinally charged – that 
is fuelled by passions –, one should reflect on the conditions under which the 
public sphere could flourish as a space where various hegemonic collective 
identifications are generated and contested. Understood as the way of 
identifying with the democratic – agonistic – grammar, passions infuse 
commitment to democracy, and carve out a way of practicing politics that 
dodges the excess of rationalism and proceduralism, according to Mouffe. 
Therefore, Mouffe sees the passionate agonistic and democratic practice as 
grounded in the same commitment to democracy, more than in rational 
justifications for democracy (Mouffe, 1993: 115, 140). However, Mouffe is 
aware of the fact that not all emotions have the same effect for democratic 
practice: some emotions move individuals to identify with democratic goals, 
while other may not. As much as the excess of rationalism, Mouffe thinks that 
emotions can also be blamed for undemocratic identifications. Nonetheless, 
attributing the problematic aspects of politics to passions is only one-sided 
and an incomplete vision. 
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Within this context, Mouffe is attentive to the both associative and dissociative 
effects of passions. Insisting on the necessary transformation of antagonism 
into agonism means for Mouffe that the dissociative effect of emotions has to 
be channelled into an agonistic-democratic path. The agonistic approach 
Mouffe contributes to outline does not seek to eliminate passions, since they 
are firstly impossible to eradicate, and secondly necessary for the same 
expression of truly democratic engagement. Thus, the mobilization of passions 
serves not just to consolidate the agonistic struggle, and the democratization 
of dissensus, but also the formation of counter-hegemonies. Therefore, for 
Mouffe, democracy is intrinsically related to passions. Democracy is the field 
of expression of them and, at the same time, is the result of their articulation. 
However, passions have to find the right democratic channels in order not to 
become democratically dangerous. Mouffe in fact stresses that, if democratic 
institutions are not able to supply venues for agonistic encounters, passions 
can erupt publicly in destructive ways. As well, there is the possibility that 
undemocratic parties somehow hijack citizens’ passions and play them against 
democracy itself. For Mouffe, such is the case of the extreme right-wing 
parties: the absence of democratic alternative can push citizens to feel 
libidinally attracted to non-democratic collective identifications, such as the 
support to radical right-wing parties29.  For these reasons Mouffe calls for a 
taming of passion: they have to be given the chance to be politically expressed, 
rather than eliminated, but expressly through the public expression of passion 
their potential dissociative effect can be moderated. The goal of the agonistic 
approach then is not to repress but to tame passions: they have to be 
agonistically expressed and thus suit the ‘adversary’ model of democracy.  
.  
2.1.1. Taming passions 
 
Given the unavoidable presence and importance of passions for politics, for 
                                                             
29 Interestingly, Mouffe observes that most of the appeal of right-wing parties is related 
to their being parties in opposition: “they seem able to strive only when on opposition” 
(2005b: 70). 
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the agonistic model that Mouffe advances it is crucial to make emotions 
compatible with democratic values. The first task of democratic politics, then, 
is neither to eliminate passions nor to relegate them to the private sphere in 
order to establish a rational consensus in the public sphere. Rather, Mouffe 
insists on the taming of passions by mobilizing them for democratic ends and 
by creating collective forms of identification around democratic objectives.  
 
An agonistic account of democratic politics does not conceive of citizens as 
being blindly driven by passions; rather the rational Self in an agonistic 
account goes hand in hand with the affective and intersubjective engagement. 
In turn, agonism implies that citizens adjust their affective commitments and 
make them compatible with the democratic ethos. The Belgian political 
theorist thinks that in the absence of proper venues for democratic 
expression, affects can threaten the very existence of the democratic 
association, as demonstrated firstly by the fact that the political spectrum has 
become hospitable to non-democratic parties. Therefore, it is imperative to 
rethink the role that democratic institutions can have in the process of 
channelling the intrinsic affective dimension of politics. The aim is not to erase 
passions from politics, but to ‘tame’ them and foster forms of identification 
that are conducive to democratic-agonistic practices, ensuring that conflicts 
will be played out agonistically – as opposed to antagonistically (Mouffe, 
2005a: 149). Concretely, Mouffe develops the idea of institutional mechanisms 
through which passions can be expressed publicly, enabling (and at the same 
time requiring) commitment to democratic values:  
 
“Democracy requires a ‘conflictual consensus’: consensus on the ethico-
political values of liberty and equality for all, dissent about their 
interpretation. A line should therefore be drawn between those who reject 
those values outright and those who, while accepting them, fight for 
competing interpretations”. (Mouffe, 2005a: 120) 
 
This means that for Mouffe the ethico-political values of liberty and equality 
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for all constitute the line that defines the passionate, yet respectful, 
encounters between political adversaries. In this sense, Mouffe’s radical 
pluralism finds its limits in the acceptance of these political ideals: the 
implication of Mouffe’s position is that passions related to identities in 
contrast with shared principles or passions that are expressed in inimical – 
rather than adversary – ways, do not have any possible place in democratic 
politics.  
 
2.1.2 Passions, adversaries, and public fora 
 
This position, as we have seen, directly links the support for an agonistic 
theory of politics with the affective dimension and the role of emotions in 
identification and mobilisation. In this context, Mouffe stresses that the harsh 
dichotomy between reason and emotion has to be overcome, and that 
passions and reason are intertwined. In her view, however, emotions have to 
‘fit’ with the ethico-political principles of a democratic society, which means 
that political emotions can be considered as apt to democratic contexts to the 
extent that allow collective identifications that are compatible with an 
adversarial mode of politics. In other words, while passionate confrontations 
are the essence of the agonistic politics developed by Mouffe, not all emotions 
and not all ways of expressing them are conducive to the liberal-democratic 
principles, nor to agonistic practices: if emotions find political a development 
through undemocratic identities, agonistic politics degenerates into 
antagonism30. Therefore, the troubling side of passions is that they sometimes 
get attached to undemocratic identities, such as racism, xenophobia, and ‘bad’ 
nationalism, which can lead to non-democratic behaviour.  
  
With the aim of avoiding this ever-menacing possibility, Mouffe normatively 
                                                             
30 Mouffe for instance highlights that a conflation of the space between right and left-
wing parties can push citizens to feel attracted by undemocratic groups and movements 
– such as extreme right-wing parties –, and will emotionally sympathize with political 
discourses that not only undermine agonism, but the very nature of democracy.  
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proposes that democratic institutions provide arenas for agonistic encounters, 
and consequently encourage a variety of meaningful sources of democratic 
identification. In so doing, she urges for institutional arenas in which agonistic 
politics can find place: Mouffe supports institutionalised fora as the 
appropriate spaces for agonistic encounters between passionately motivated 
citizens (Mouffe, 2000: 104). According to her, democratic institutions should 
create opportunities and loci where citizens can meet as adversaries, so that 
passionate political struggles can find a public outlet and therefore be 
politically constructive. In their absence, Mouffe maintains, emotions’ 
dissociative effects could be dangerous for democratic purposes. In a similar 
vein, the dissociative effects of emotions are linked to what Mouffe calls the 
moralisation of political debates in contemporary democracies (2005a: 5):  the 
ever-present tendencies of moralising public discourse, she argues, is 
dangerous as far as it mobilises aggressive passions and destroys the agonistic 
public sphere. More concretely, Mouffe thinks that depoliticizing democratic 
encounters and moralising them leads to a deterioration of democratic 
debates and their slide into inimical confrontations.  
 
 
3. Criticism and strengths of agonism 
 
Chantal Mouffe outlines an interesting theoretical position that takes on 
contemporary problems in democratic practice and theory and tries to make a 
contribution through her notion of agonism. Here we have briefly sketched 
her arguments, especially focusing on the central place of emotions within the 
ensemble of her work. Summing up, Mouffe’s agonistic model of democracy 
emphasises permanent conflict rather than consensus, the primacy of power 
over morality, hegemony rather than consent, and the passionate struggle 
rather than reasoned consensus. At the same time her model seeks to ‘defuse’ 
or ‘tame’ antagonism (2005: 19-20), converting it into agonism, which 
involves respect for the freedom and equality and toleration for the 
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expression of differences. However, it is worth noting some critiques as well 
as the strengths of agonistic model for our research.  
 
First of all, it has Mouffe’s specific vision of the relationship between the field 
of politics and the emotional dimension has to be mentioned. As we have seen, 
Mouffe starts raising a robust critique of rationalism and liberal-deliberative 
models, and its tendency to underestimate the political role of emotions, 
especially so far as these are associated with collective identities. Mouffe 
moves away from a general critique of rationalism and a liberal vision of 
politics. Indeed she insists that rationalism is based on an idealised view of 
human sociability, which thinks of individuals “as being essentially moved by 
empathy and reciprocity” and sees “[v]iolence and hostility are seen as archaic 
phenomenon, to be eliminated, thanks to the progress of exchange and the 
establishment, through a social contract, of a transparent communication 
among rational participants” (2005a: 2-3) In this context, she argues that “the 
mistake of liberal rationalism is to ignore the affective dimension mobilised by 
collective identifications and to imagine that those supposedly archaic 
“passions” are bound to disappear with the advance of individualism and the 
progress of rationality’ (2005a: 6). Is the objection that Mouffe raises to the 
liberal-deliberative approach truly founded? Surely, it can be stressed that 
liberalism – at least in its Kantian version – does appeal more to rational 
argument than to the emotional dimension, neglecting the role of the emotions 
as a constructive force in politics. As well, in the case of deliberative 
democracy, it is true that deliberation involves reasoning.  
 
However, one might doubt that liberalism as such ‘ignores’ or ‘eliminates’ 
emotions31. As we have already mentioned in the previous chapters, different 
perspectives within liberal traditions have recently been developed with the 
aim of highlighting the central role of passions in politics, both for identity 
formation and the deliberative process. Regarding this aspect, for instance, it 
                                                             
31 See, for instance, Cossarini and García Alonso (2015). 
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has been underlined that people engaged in deliberation may have strong 
feelings about the questions at issue, thus Mouffe’s critique might seem 
exaggerated. Moreover, one can contend that the basic point of liberalism with 
respect to reason is the great value it attributes to the autonomy and 
perfectionability of people. Therefore it results clear that the concrete value 
on the merit depends on the general vision one has of politics itself.  All in all, 
what Mouffe rightly points out is the fact that in certain forms of democratic 
liberalism, and especially in some theories envisaging at the deliberation 
consensus, there is a vision of politics as the progressive victory of reason at 
the expense of passions.   
 
Criticising the deliberative model, Mouffe addresses the problem of 
democratic affective dimensions in terms of availability: passions have to find 
the institutional, agonistic channels in order to be democratically constructive. 
Here, another criticism becomes evident: it can be argued that Mouffe does not 
escape the same dichotomy of reason versus emotions she strongly criticises. 
While she criticises deliberative theorists for not taking into account the 
affective dimension of politics and suggests public fora as the agonistic-
institutional channels for expressing it in a democratic manner, Mouffe seems 
nonetheless trapped in the dichotomy between reason and emotion. In fact, if 
she affirms that in the absence of institutional fora for agonistic politics, 
emotions cannot be democratically and publicly expressed, Mouffe risks 
reproducing the same understanding of affects that the liberal and 
deliberative perspectives (as she conceptualises them): passions hardly 
escape from being interpreted as passive, uncontrollable and in need of 
‘management’. In this sense, although Mouffe intensely criticise the ignorance 
of passions within contemporary liberal and deliberative theory, she does not 
adequately stress the fact that emotions are to be understood in a 
comprehensive manner, together with other human faculties. Moreover, one 
may rightly argue that the agonistic model does not adequately take into 
account the advancement in political theory made by those fields that have 
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centred on education, rhetoric and persuasion. In fact, it has been argued that 
an account of emotional education, which incorporates the possibility of 
responsibility for political expressions of affect (e.g. Hall, 2005; Nussbaum, 
2001), would be compatible with democratic agonism, without marking a 
return to the perfectly transparent and rational Self of liberal discourse 
(Mihai, 2014: 43) 
 
As we have outlined, Mouffe’s account of passions inevitably suffers from the 
same modern ‘Cartesian’ dichotomy as the whole field of political studies. In 
this sense, the same idea of ‘taming’ passions has strong disciplinary 
connotations, which – one might argue – do not suit an agonistic account of 
democracy that conceives of citizens as agents engaged in collective processes 
of contestation. Similarly, if one insists on her idea of the democratic affective 
identification as only a matter of availability (of public institutions and fora for 
agonistic encounters), that might lead to the interpretation of citizens as non-
responsible for their affective identifications. However, that would be only a 
part of the story. It is true that giving a great emphasis on the ‘systemic’ 
context could make it difficult to account for the individuals’ responsibilities. 
Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, her perspective also offers some fruitful 
insights that allows our research, as far as it sheds light on the conflictual, 
passionate, and contingent nature of political struggles. Mouffe’s agonistic 
model develops an account that allows us to read the current phenomena 
through a theoretical lens that put special emphasis on these central aspects of 
politics. Moreover, it directly resonates with a discourse theory of affects, a 
theory according to which passions are at least partially discursively 
articulated, and play a role in the process of framing reality. 
 
Our main point is that, if one wants to go beyond the dichotomical thinking 
that opposes ‘reason’ to ‘emotion, we need to conceive of ‘passion’ – as well as 
of ‘reason’ – as at least partially articulated discursively and as transformable 
through agonistic encounters. Mouffe’s account is a good starting point in this 
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direction. In fact, following Mouffe in her plea to acknowledge the role affect 
plays in identification and in democratic practices, we are able to see the way 
emotions operate discursively through what we have called their geometrical 
and evocative role. We have already stressed that emotions take part in 
identity formation, which is an essential component of collective action.  
Mouffe’ account develops this point and resonates with the action of anti-
austerity protests and their formation of individual and collective identities. If 
building identities is one of the processes through which individuals and 
groups give meaning to their experiences and the political realm, it is 
important to bear in mind that this process implies the creation of a “we” as 
well as the identification of the “others”. This is particularly important, as we 
have seen in the previous chapters, when it concerns the creation of the 
political subject – such as ‘the people’.  
 
Here we will sketch a connection between Mouffe’s perspective on passions 
and the discursive account we have outlined of recent anti-austerity 
mobilizations. A perspective that mixes discourse analysis, populist theory 
and agonistic democracy – that is a critical engagement with agonistic theory – 
allows seeing the way in which emotions play a role in the attempt of filling 
the empty signifiers of popular sovereignty and democracy, an attempt 
represented by recent anti-austerity mobilization. In fact, emphasizing the 
role of emotions in anti‐austerity protests can shed light to the contemporary 
vectors through which the struggle for popular and democratic legitimacy is 
currently led.  
 
 
3.1 Indignation and agonistic democracy: injustice and action  
 
Mouffe’s agonistic model of democracy relies on a constructivist vision of 
reality, to the extent it strongly questions the idea of those who portray 
emotions as purely irrational forces; conversely she sees them as part of the 
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socially and discursively constructed political domain. It also echoes with the 
rejection of the naturalist thesis, according to which emotions are mere 
biological responses. Contrary to these interpretations, emotions are seen as a 
guide to social interaction and a motivational force: passions are central to our 
life plans, our intersubjective and political identifications, and hence the 
democratic engagement of individuals and groups. Charyl Hall rightly 
summarises this point: 
 
“In order to become politically involved, then, people must care about an 
issue, they must have some vision of how things ought to be done, and they 
must have hope that at least some progress can be made towards realizing 
this vision. But this caring, this vision and this hope are precisely the work 
of passion. It is passion that motivates people to engage with the world 
around them and try to make a difference in their lives” (Hall, 2005: 125-
126) 
 
Emotions play a crucial role in political identification, moving people in 
pursuit of their vision of the good. Hence emotions fulfil important functions – 
both morally ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ – in the re-production of individual and 
collective identity. What is more, we argue that Mouffe’s account also 
resonates with the injustice frame formulated by Gamson (1992), and if taken 
together they provide a useful analytical tool to our research. In this vein, if 
one looks for instance at the indignation expressed by recent anti-austerity 
movements, one can see that people’s desires and passions are directly linked 
to both the perception of the unjust situation, the formation of a collective 
identity, and the articulation of future political alternatives. Effectively, 
indignation can also be seen as the chief catalyst for political reform. In 
Arendt’s words, who talks about rage rather than indignation: 
 
“Rage is by no means an automatic reaction to misery and suffering as 
such; no one reacts with rage to an incurable disease or to an earthquake, 
or for that matter, to social conditions that seem to be unchangeable. Only 
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where there is reason to suspect that conditions could be changed and are 
not does rage arise. Only when our sense of injustice is offended do we 
react with rage, and this reaction by no means necessarily reflects 
personal injury, as is demonstrated by the whole history of revolution, 
where invariably members of the upper class touched off and then led the 
rebellions of the oppressed and downtrodden” (Arendt, 1969: 162) 
 
Within this context, one can argue indeed that these kinds of passions are 
permanently related to the perception of injustice. Indignations, rage and 
similar emotions, framed in such a way, have characterized many movements 
in the modern world, which caused political changes and often generated 
inclusion of the marginalized32. As Martha Nussbaum (2004) has stressed, 
anger and similar emotions are important elements in ethics because there are 
things that are worthy of our indignations. Asking for the moral sentiments 
that are at the basis of a political‐liberal society, she suggests that “anger and 
indignation will be such core sentiments because they react to harm or 
damage” (Nussbaum, 2004: 345). In this sense, it is reasonable to argue that 
the passionate engagement in the field of politics has often been linked to 
questions of justice33.  
 
Moreover, as we have already stressed, indignation represents an important 
form of collective identification: this essential phase for both individuals and 
groups is also based on cognitive and affective investments, and effectively 
traces the political targets and direction of political action. Mouffe is aware of 
this, and has placed special emphasis on the role of socially constructed 
                                                             
32 One could read many political phenomena through this lens, and argue that – for 
instance – women were included in the liberal citizenship when they perceived their 
absence as injustice and passionately expressed their demand to be part of it. A similar 
judgment can be made for black people and the civil right movement, in which public 
indignation were expressed about political and racial discrimination. See Kingston and 
Ferry (2008).  
33 Interestingly enough, in the 8th book of his Eudemian Ethics Aristotle describes 
indignation as the noble emotion because it responds to a comprehensive notion of 
justice: we become indignant at injustice. 
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identities within the political domain. Concerning the role of indignation, she 
also stresses the fact that dissatisfaction with politics pushes individuals 
towards the extremes of the political spectrum, with both positive 
consequences and eventual risks, such as that passions latch onto political 
agendas inimical to democracy itself. Looking at the recent anti-austerity 
movements, Mouffe states that: 
 
“What is at stake is a profound dissatisfaction with the existing order. If so 
many people […] are now taking to the street, it is because they have lost 
faith in traditional parties and they feel that their voices cannot be heard 
through traditional political channels” (Mouffe, 2013: 119) 
 
Now, although indignation clearly seems to correspond to the experience of an 
injustice, one might argue that it belongs to the register of morality, a field that 
Mouffe firmly separates from the domain of politics as such. In this sense, 
indignation might not at first sight be considered as relevant for democratic 
politics, and especially for Mouffe’s account of agonistic democracy. 
Moralisation of politics is dangerous for Mouffe, in so far as it can lead to a 
transformation of agonistic adversaries into antagonistic enemies: demonizing 
the ‘other’ is not the right way of competing in a democratic context. Similarly, 
Mouffe distrusts indignation to the extent that it often leads to violence and 
endangers democratic fairness. Nonetheless, if one considers indignation as a 
civic reaction to a perceived injustice and think of it as oriented to the change 
of an unjust situation – always within the common democratic principles – 
then indignation can fit with Mouffe’s democratic theory. Indignation, in this 
sense can further democratic goals by drawing attention to political injustices 
and democratic deficits. Mouffe writes about the events of 2011 that: 
 
“Understood as refusal of the post-political order, I suggest that current 
protests can be read as a call for a radicalisation of liberal democratic 
institutions, not for their rejection. What they demand are better, more 
inclusive forms of representation. To satisfy their desire for a “voice”, 
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existing representative institutions have to be transformed and new ones 
established, so as to create the conditions for an agonistic confrontation 
where the citizens would be offered real alternatives. Such a confrontation 
requires the emergence of a genuine left able to offer an alternative to the 
social liberal consensus dominant in centre-left parties” (Mouffe, 2013: 
119-120) 
 
This means that indignation can move citizens to challenge the state-of-affairs 
and propose alternative paths – concretely a radical left horizon that, in 
Mouffe vision, acknowledges the ways in which power works, and seeks to 
radically transform its institutions from within34. In Mouffe’s account, the 
Spanish Indignados is an example of how political indignation sheds light on 
important democratic deficits and at the same time can agonistically challenge 
hegemonic interpretations of political values. Indignation then, within a broad 
series of political passions, also contributes to the alternative reading of the 
political values reinforcing democracy. Therefore, passionate responses to a 
situation perceived as unjust can lead individuals and groups to mobilizations: 
from framed emotions to action. As already mentioned, Mouffe stresses that 
institutions must give voice to the expression of passions within democratic 
fora, and especially for those who dissent from hegemonic political discourses. 
In this sense, while emotions fuel agonism, they should not conflate into a 
form of antagonism.  
 
 
3.2 Emotions and political discourse: the vacuum and the never-
ending struggle for democracy  
 
In this context, one can argue that in Mouffe’s view injustice generates 
indignation among citizens and allows political action. This leads us to 
                                                             
34 Mouffe thinks that it is the duty of traditional parties to offer distinctive political 
programmes, rejecting ‘the third way’ – the post-political consensus – and providing an 
array of truly diverse political options that citizens could identify with and struggle for. 
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contend that, in Mouffe’s account, the place and role for emotions cannot be 
seen just as a matter of fitting into democratic institutions. Agonistic 
democracy, as far as it is constructed around conflictual and passionate 
identifications and is intertwined with political action, resonates with the 
identity formation and the struggle for political alternatives. That is, the 
agonistic model of democracy is related to a conflictive and contingent 
struggle for democratic projects, hence echoes a specific process of filling 
(although contingently) the ‘empty space’ of democracy – what we have called 
the vacuum of politics. Therefore, if the common discourse of recent anti‐
austerity protest movements is based on antielitism, and the centrality of the 
people against those who are perceived as corrupting the original meaning of 
democracy, then this discourse is also a mobilization of certain passions that, 
firstly, allow the shift from the perception of an injustice to political action 
and, secondly, contributes to the formation of collective identities – and 
specifically to give meaning to the central category of ‘the people’. In fact, 
political identifications are discursively linked with the mobilization of 
affective, and libidinal investments. Mouffe has highlighted this aspect, 
stressing that “the crucial role played in politics by what I have called 
‘passions’: the affective dimension which is mobilized in the creation of 
political identities” (Mouffe, 2013: 137). Moreover, in order to read current 
democratic tendencies Mouffe also draws on psychoanalytical advancements: 
 
“To grasp what is at stake in a process of identification, it is absolutely 
necessary to take account of the insights provided by psychoanalysis. 
Freud, for instance, brought to the fore the crucial role played by affective 
libidinal bonds in processes of collective identification. […] A collective 
identity, a ‘we’, is the result of a passionate affective investment that 
creates a strong identification among the members of a community” 
(Mouffe, 2013: 47) 
 
Now, being ruled by a mix of passions and reason, citizens – especially if 
feeling injustice – anchor their identification to collective memberships that, 
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as the populist analysis has shown, contribute to the division of the social field 
into separated and opposed camps. Opposed political camps that are also 
mobilised through the affective dimension of politics and discourse. 
 
“[N]o political party or movement that sets itself against the established 
hierarchies of power and wealth ever succeed unless it arouses the 
affiliative and combative passions of the people at the lower end of the 
hierarchies. […] Anger at injustice and the sense of solidarity are also 
among the passions aroused by any anti-hierarchical politics” (Walzer, 
2002: 631) 
 
If from a normative point of view, the issue is not to eliminate passions but to 
register their political effects and to promote democratic forms of 
identification, analytically the force of emotions lies in the same process of 
identification itself, which consists in the production of political meanings. As 
a result, agonistic democracy shows this productive role of emotions and, in 
this sense, resonates with recent anti-austerity mobilizations. Both agonistic 
theory and the concrete events – at least considered in their ‘populist’ facet – 
allow delving into the current struggle over the same meaning and legitimacy 
of democratic practice. What is more, they show the way in which political 
concepts are constantly involved in discursive-affective struggles for their 
own meanings. In the case of populism, for instance, the claim for ‘the people’ 
– the ‘we’ – is related to the discursive dispute over the definition of 
democracy. Thus, an agonistic model of democracy and the mobilization of 
passions within it goes hand in hand with the struggle for political 
alternatives, and the interpretation of political values. Emotions, in sum, are 
intrinsic to both the critique and the proposition of alternative political 
discourses.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
Here we have dealt with the agonistic theory of democracy, and especially the 
formulation of Chantal Mouffe, specifically focusing on the central value given 
to the role of emotions. Alongside the key aspect of conflict, in Chantal 
Mouffe’s account of politics passions acquire importance in so far as they 
inform human behaviour, the individual and collective forms of identification, 
and the struggle over the same conceptions political concepts and over 
concrete political alternatives.  
 
We have especially linked concepts such as conflict, passion and agonism in 
order to show the way they can be useful for an understanding of both the 
political role of emotion within democratic context, and the same debate about 
populism and democracy. While from an analytical point of view, the agonistic 
model of democracy is not exempt from some criticism, as it is not immune 
from the dichotomy between reason and emotions, it nonetheless allows to 
draft a political conception of emotions that, if taken critically, opens up 
interesting horizons for both theoretical and empirical analysis. The argument 
developed here shows in fact that a critical engagement with the agonistic 
approach allows one not only to delve into the interplay between emotions 
and reason for democratic purposes, but consents particularly to make a 
further step towards another way of conceptualizing the function of emotions 
in the political field in such a manner that, while fostering the liberal and 
democratic form of society, discloses the contingent, discursive, and 
conflictual struggles over its own interpretation.  
 
From a normative point of view, an agonistic model of democracy shows how 
an affective identification with the democratic ethos must underlie all political 
engagements. Critically assuming the opposition between reason and emotion 
– so that democratic politics does not imply submitting passions to reason – 
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agonism encourages cultivating a passion for democracy itself. Furthermore, 
Mouffe’s account of agonism reads the struggle among adversaries – which 
agree on the basics of liberal democracy, yet disagree on their interpretations 
–, and therefore tallies well with recent anti-austerity mobilizations. Framing 
reality and operating in the populist’-democratic paradox, the mobilization of 
passion in recent mobilizations is part and parcel of today’s struggle for 
democratic legitimacy and popular sovereignty. All in all, if one considers both 
the analytical and normative aspects of the agonistic account, it is also possible 
to acknowledge the useful contribution of Mouffe’s perspective to the 
understanding of recent anti-austerity mobilizations. 
 
“Balancing (the need for) unity with (the need for) plurality; (the defence 
of) democracy with (the inescapability of) conflict; and (the mobilisation 
of) dissensus with (the construction of discourses and projects that 
encourage) democratic renewal, Mouffe’s account of agonism sketches out 
the tasks of politics and, in so doing, it stirs interdisciplinary discussions 
over their contours” (Tambakaki, 2014: 1) 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion. Emotions, protests and populism: beyond the 
threatening/corrective dichotomy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We began the dissertation by noting the peculiar relationship between 
emotions and politics, highlighting its relevance for both scholarly debate and 
concrete political phenomena. In this vein, if slogans shouted during recent 
anti-austerity movements, such as “listen to the people’s wrath” represented 
the starting point for our research, this thesis has developed a series of 
theoretical arguments around this topic. Now, as we come to our conclusion, it 
is worth reflecting on the whole of these arguments. 
 
The object of our research has been a critically engagement with a wide range 
of literature that has recently focused on the political role of emotions. We 
have specifically considered this question in debates around three main axes: 
protest and social movements, populism and democracy. Using the insights of 
this variegated literature, the several chapters of this dissertation have sought 
to assess the specific theoretical problems the recent anti-austerity 
mobilizations have uncovered, with particular emphasis on the place and role 
of emotions. For this purpose, throughout the thesis we have put particular 
emphasis on a series of political approaches that offer thought-provoking 
understandings of the relationship between the affective dimension and 
politics, and unveil normative and theoretical consequences for the political 
domain as such. We have stressed that many authors have started addressing 
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theoretical and normative questions about the role of emotions in protest 
events and, more broadly, in democratic regimes, putting special attention on 
states of feeling that mobilize, or demobilize citizenries.  
 
In this vein, we have argued that, within the broad scientific literature, the role 
of emotions has particularly been assumed in the mobilization process and, on 
the other hand, through the dichotomy between suitable versus harmful 
democratic emotions. On the one hand, the affective dimension has been re-
introduced into the explanation of collective action and social movements, 
specifically considering emotions in movements’ emergence, organization, 
identity, framing, repertoires, etc. On the other hand, particularly by the hand 
of political theorists, emotions have been incorporated in normative questions 
about the nature of political regimes, questions of justice and democratic 
deliberation. Moreover, the general liberal perspective interprets this issue in 
terms of good and suitable versus bad and harmful emotions for democratic 
purposes, so that it differentiates between emotions that fit with democracy 
and those that are not beneficial to liberal and democratic values. 
 
The perspective adopted in this investigation has tried to go beyond the pure 
normative perspective, highlighting the fascinating forms of analysis that a 
conjunction of different scientific fields can open up when dealing with the 
questions faced. Although it has been recognised the difficulty (perhaps the 
impossibility) to break free the modern dichotomy between reason and 
emotion – and similar instances –, the thesis shows that this same dichotomy 
informs a great deal of recent literature in the field of political studies and, for 
this same reason, constitutes a focal point of analysis. While within certain 
political science perspectives the dichotomy between reason and passions has 
either been reinforced or uncritically considered, recent developments in 
theoretical and cross-methodological perspectives, along with the same 
contentious phenomena we have considered as a case study, have suggested 
the angle from which to explore the role of emotions in our thesis.  
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Within this context, if the theoretical question that guides us in this study is 
related to the contribution of a focus on emotions in democratic theory, the 
main idea was to critically reflect on this role as uncovered by recent anti-
austerity mobilizations. Specifically, from a theoretical point of view, this 
investigation has focused on the possibility of combining different fields of 
research. Studies in social and protest movements, and democratic and 
populist theory are then taken as part of a theoretical inquiry on the place and 
function of the affective dimension in politics. Indeed, we have argued that a 
combination of methodological perspectives – and concretely discourse 
analysis and democratic and populist theory – represents a fruitful way to 
comprehend the role of emotions in politics and, in turn, contributes to the 
enhancement of these perspectives. In fact, these perspectives and theories 
are not only lens through which to read the issue, but they also belong to the 
issue itself. In this sense, the general aim has been vindicating the cogency of 
some theoretical reflections, to the extent that they critically engage with the 
modern relationship between reason and emotions and, as well, can shed light 
on the recent anti-austerity movements we have taken into account as a case 
study. Moreover, focusing on these contentious phenomena and using the 
insights of these analytical perspectives, we have sought to explore the role 
emotions play in the process of framing the discursive struggle over the 
meaning of current political concepts such as democracy and popular 
sovereignty.  
 
In this context, the hypotheses we have developed in the different chapters 
have allowed us to sustain certain assertions. (1) Emotions have a 
‘geometrical’ role in shaping political subjects, in so far as they actively 
contribute in the process of identity formation (for both individuals and 
groups). Moreover, this function in the formation of political identities, 
creation of basic democratic bounds, and consolidation of democratic beliefs is 
particularly evident if one addresses the issue at the discursive level. In this 
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sense, we think that emotions operate politically through a discursive 
construction capable of dividing the social into two camps, and giving birth to 
political identities. All this echoes with populist logic articulated by the Essex 
School, in which the division between ‘the people’ and the establishment 
acquires a central political value (Laclau, 2005a: 110). 
 
Moreover, (2) we contend that emotions have an ‘evocative’ role, contributing 
to the latency of political concepts. Emotional factors take part, through the 
ideological and symbolical function of the concepts they contribute to create, 
to the constant discursive struggle over political ideas. Referring to the case 
study we have focused on, we have argued that key political concepts such as 
‘the people’ and ‘democracy’ are involved in the discursive-affective struggles.  
 
Furthermore, we have stressed (3) that a discursive approach to emotions – 
such as the one outlined in this thesis – can contribute to the normative debate 
about the relationship between populism and democracy. Focusing on 
emotions (and inevitably in the dichotomy between reason and passion) 
allows observing the articulated ways in which the struggle for conceptual 
meaning is articulated, and therefore adds interesting nuances to the 
normative debate about the threatening or corrective nature of populism for 
democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012a). In this sense, a discursive 
focus on emotions enhances democratic theory, insofar as it opens up a space 
for theoretical reflection that goes beyond the purely normative dichotomy 
between good and suitable versus bad and harmful emotional dispositions for 
democratic purposes, and incorporates other dimensions of analysis and 
necessarily involves an alternative normative theoretical perspectives.  
 
All in all, through engagement with the scholarly debates on democracy and 
populism, the purpose has been to delve into theoretical reflections that are 
attentive to emotional dimensions. Accordingly, the idea has been to explore 
the role of emotions in the process of democratic legitimacy, drawing on the 
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case of the recent wave of anti-austerity movements, and their rhetoric for 
popular sovereignty. 
 
This research has obviously faced different difficulties and found some critical 
points along the way. Without a doubt, the main critical question has been 
dealing with the profound theoretical nature of some ideas developed, and 
particularly the abstractness and fluidity of concepts related to the very notion 
of ‘emotion’ (and alike). If one assumes, nonetheless, that defining concepts is 
a contested and challenging task in political studies, then the wide and 
sweeping definitions that one might find in this thesis are not out of tune with 
the general activity of political thinking. Moreover, one of the aims of this 
thesis has been to show the articulated ways in which the emotional 
dimension plays a role in the framing of political reality. In this sense then, 
although it might seem to be a circular argument, the discursive act of defining 
the reality acquires a special significance for the puzzle of this thesis.  
 
Similarly, merging the various theoretical and methodological perspectives 
has presented different difficulties. Nonetheless, the purpose has been to 
bridge the difference between theory and empirical evidence, as well as 
debates on democracy and debates on social movements, contributing to the 
dialogue between normative theories and discourse analysis. Linking 
contemporary political theories to the discursive level of current contentious 
phenomena is, in our opinion, a good way to answer the questions of this 
investigation and to make a scientific contribution. 
 
The structure of the thesis itself resonates with the aim of our investigation 
that, in order to delve into the problems studied, mixes reflections on protest 
events with theoretical debates. The first part of this thesis (chapter two) is 
indeed dedicated to a critical literature review of different accounts on the 
place and function of passions and affect within the social and political realm. 
Although there seems to be no reason to highlight that emotions are 
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ubiquitous in individual and social life – just think of recent anger about the 
government rescue of financial institutions, the ‘wrath of the people’ –, the 
affective dimension has long had a complex and uneasy relationship with the 
political domain, and the political thinking. Indeed, we have – although briefly 
– shown the broad historical and theoretical implications that a focus on 
emotions involves: political thinking about the affective dimension is, at once, 
rooted in ‘classical’ philosophical disputes – the concern with emotions for 
social life is as old as philosophy itself –, and opens up relatively new and 
thought-provoking lines of research. Bearing this in mind, we have shown that 
many scholars have recently attempted to reinvigorate the study of emotions, 
highlighting its importance for the understanding of political phenomena.  
 
In the following chapter (chapter three) we have dealt with the 
epistemological consequences that the literature on emotions and politics has 
brought to the forefront, and we have set our methodological proposal. As we 
have already suggested, we have argued that discourse analysis and 
theoretical inquiry about the link between populism and democracy have 
several interesting points of convergence, and therefore constitute the centre 
of the research. A conjunction of theoretical and discursive perspectives has 
allowed a better comprehension of this puzzle. In this sense, we have briefly 
taken into account the discourse approach and the perspective on populism 
developed by the so-called Essex School. Also drawing on this perspective, we 
have explored the place and function of the affective dimension in contentious 
phenomena and populism. It is through the populist logic, we have argued, 
that emotions operate what we have called their geometrical function. 
Populism, in other words, activate a politicization of passions. 
 
In the following two chapters (chapter four and chapter five) we have turned 
to discourse analysis of recent anti-austerity mobilization, combining it with 
theoretical reflection on social movements. After having focused on the 
multiple scientific explanations of political mobilization, we drew on the 
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scientific approaches oriented to the analysis of the symbolic processes of 
collective action. We have argued in this sense that themes such identity and 
emotions resonate with the process of framing, that is the social construction 
of the political realm through the cognitive dynamics the same mobilization 
foster. On the one hand, we have stressed that the affective dimension, as 
much as other cultural, strategic, and ideological factors are necessary to the 
understanding of the current wave of mobilizations. In this vein, drawing on 
the injustice frame put foreword by Gamson (1992), we have highlighted the 
ways in which emotions are involved in political dynamics: they have – we 
have argued – a constructive role in the perception of the unjust situation, in 
framing collective identity, and in encouraging political action. The case of 
anti-austerity mobilizations is then taken as an example of the way in which 
the affective dimension is, first of all, present in political processes and, 
secondly, part of the concrete activity of collective action. Hence, two 
consequences of this perspective are worth noting: the first one is that, 
political movements are at once strategic and emotional, that is, they are 
concretely policy-oriented as well as public agents that contribute to the re-
framing of political reality. Secondly, it has been argued for social mobilization 
and particularly for recent anti-austerity movements, that they uncover deep 
theoretical questions about the nature of politics and democracy. Theoretical 
questions that, we have stressed, resonate directly with the same affective 
dimension and the dichotomy between reason and emotions.   
 
Consequently, the fifth chapter has been explicitly dedicated to these 
theoretical questions recent protest mobilizations have brought to the fore. 
Here the critique of representative politics, the experiences of participatory 
decision-making processes, and the idea of a different place for democracy, 
which can enable the political exercise of ‘the people’ – who is claimed to be 
the truly democratic subject – are the theoretical criticisms that protest and 
social movements uncover, and directly resonate with the discursive and 
emotional struggle for the meaning of the political realm. In this sense, 
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highlighting the discursive elements employed within the contentious 
phenomena, we have showed the emotional dynamics that properly interplay 
with the same definition of political ideas, such as ‘the people’ and 
‘democracy’. Therefore, we have shown that a perspective centred on the role 
of the affective dimension can also shed light to the peculiar and uneasy 
relationship between populism and democracy. 
 
In fact, the last two chapters delve into this issue, and the normative debate 
about the place of affective dimension within democratic politics. Concretely, 
in the sixth chapter the uneasy relationship between populism and democracy 
is assessed by taking into account recent complementary perspectives that 
highlight the magnitude of such an issue. Taking on the inquiry of Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser (2012a; 2012b) about the threatening or corrective nature 
of populism for democracy, we have dealt with different theoretical positions 
on the matter. On the one hand, the intellectual tradition that sees populism as 
a threat to liberal democracy, to the extent that it damages some of its core 
values. Here recent readings of this relationship such as that of Urbinati 
(2014) is illuminating in the task of resuming the historical and theoretical 
issues one faces when dealing with a concept such as ‘the people’.  
 
On the other hand, we have highlighted different theoretical assessments 
(Laclau, 2005a) that are no less rigorous and analytically successful in 
maintaining that populism is, at the end of the day, an essential aspect of any 
political articulation. Moreover, drawing on the insights of this literature, we 
have focused on the ‘paradoxes’ of democracy, as well as on the location and 
function of ‘the people’. This, it has been argued, resonate directly with our 
case study and the function of emotions in the political realm. All in all, our 
argument has showed that, while agreeing with the liberal position in 
underlying some inaccuracies of populist theory, this criticism does not 
discredit this latter theoretical perspective in giving an account of the role of 
emotions in politics – and the way in which they operate at a discursive level.  
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Although the different analyses we have outlined, such as those of Canovan, 
Urbinati, and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, contribute to the task of clarifying 
the historical and theoretical roots of populism, they partly fail to grasp the 
profound connection between this theme and the affective dimension. As we 
have shown through our discursive analysis of recent anti-austerity 
mobilizations, which are seen as a form of populism, emotions have a specific 
function in democratic politics – a role that we have called both ‘geometrical’ 
and ‘evocative’ – and straightforwardly resonate with the struggle for popular 
sovereignty. In our view, this function does not find the right recognition in 
much of the recent literature in democratic theory.  
 
In this context, we have then continued the research focusing on the agonistic 
approach in democratic theory recently developed by Chantal Mouffe. In the 
seventh chapter, in fact, we have drawn on her account of politics in order to 
show a productive way of conceptualising both the role of affects and the 
relationship between populism and democracy. Linking concepts such as 
conflict, passion and agonism, Mouffe develops a fruitful perspective that 
offers a critical horizon of analysis. Her normative contribution resonates with 
our discursive approach to emotions in contentious phenomena and, in this 
sense, allows seeing the way in which the affective dimension operates in the 
process of framing political reality – what we have specifically called the 
process of filling the vacuum of democracy. Now, despite the agonistic model 
of democracy not being immune, from an analytical point of view, from the 
dichotomy between reason and emotion, we have argued that Mouffe’s 
perspective allows us to give comprehensive – yet not definitive – account of 
the puzzle we have been facing in this thesis. 
 
All in all, if one has to accept – at least theoretically – the impossibility of going 
beyond the dichotomy between reason and emotion (as far as we keep these 
two different notions conceptually, we will operate through them), 
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nonetheless – at least normatively – one can act politically beyond this 
opposition.  
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Annex: Introducción y conclusiones en lengua castellana 
 
Capítulo 1. Protestas, emociones y democracia: presentación del 
problema 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. La ira del pueblo 
 
El 2011 ha sido definido como el año de la indignación global. A raíz de la 
Primavera Árabe, fenómenos como los Indignados y Occupy Wall Street han 
caracterizado una ola mundial de movilizaciones que ha llevado consigo 
consecuencias políticas profundas. Plaza Syntagma de Atenas, la Puerta del Sol 
de Madrid, Zuccotti Park en Nueva York son algunos de los lugares símbolo de 
la protesta ciudadana y del cambio de la agenda política en muchos países. 
Como resultado de la crisis financiera mundial, estos movimientos de protesta 
surgieron – por primera vez en Europa y Estados Unidos, y en un segundo 
momento en escala global – como manifestaciones de crítica de los asuntos 
políticos y económicos, y como reivindicaciones de más participación 
ciudadana en el proceso de decisión política. A pesar de las diferencias y 
peculiaridades de cada una de estas protestas, el objetivo común de estos 
fenómenos era ser un vector de cambio político y social: careciendo de fe en 
los procesos y los actores políticos tradicionales, todos ellos exigieron más 
democracia (directa y participativa). 
 
Es evidente que las protestas y los movimientos sociales no son un fenómeno 
nuevo, ya que han caracterizado los principales cambios en los sistemas 
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políticos contemporáneos, y sin duda seguirán siendo protagonistas en el 
futuro. Tampoco es un fenómeno novedoso la trasformación de movimientos 
sociales en partidos políticos institucionalizados. Sin embargo, la reciente ola 
de movilizaciones ha vuelto a despertar el interés científico para los 
movimientos sociales y de protesta. El surgimiento de las protestas anti-
austeridad llamó la atención científica en los últimos años, y se ha producido 
una gran cantidad de literatura acerca de en estos fenómenos. De hecho, desde 
que la nueva ola de movilización alcanzó una dimensión global en 2011, 
académicos y activistas se han concentrado en sus demandas y sus 
implicaciones políticas. Los científicos sociales han analizado estos fenómenos, 
destacando sobre todo las amplias implicaciones políticas para las 
democracias contemporáneas (y otros tipos de regímenes políticos, en el caso 
de la Primavera Árabe), y la desafección hacia las instituciones políticas y el 
sistema financiero. Del mismo modo, han puesto el énfasis en los nuevos 
partidos políticos que han nacido en buena medida tras la experiencia de 
protesta de 2011, y que han comenzado a competir en las elecciones locales y 
generales, sobre todo en el sur de Europa. 
 
Una mezcla heterogénea de enfoques y perspectivas desarrolladas en los 
últimos años tratan de responder a una serie de cuestiones planteadas por 
estos fenómenos contenciosos. En este contexto, algunas preguntas han 
captado la atención en el debate académico: cómo abordar los movimientos 
anti-austeridad? ¿Qué relación se da entre estos movimientos sociales y las 
nuevas tecnologías? ¿Deberían ser considerado como un fenómeno global, o 
como experiencias plurales y diferenciadas? Y en un plano más teórico, ¿qué 
tipo de visión política conllevan estos fenómenos de protesta? ¿Son eventos 
aislados y efímera o pertenecen a la onda mundial de protestas anti-
capitalistas que, aunque con bases locales, tienden a la radicalización de la 
democracia? ¿Cuáles son las relaciones entre estos movimientos y los partidos 
políticos institucionalizados? 
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En este contexto, un sector concreto de las ciencias sociales – principalmente 
la sociología de los movimientos sociales, y el análisis de los eventos de 
protesta – ha producido una copiosa cantidad de literatura, centrándose sobre 
todo en temas como los recursos organizativos y las redes que estos 
movimientos emplean para movilizar a los ciudadanos, el tipo de 
movilizaciones, y la estructura interna de los movimientos (i.e. Benski, 2013; 
Jasper, 2011). Por otra parte, en consonancia con la difusión de la protesta, los 
académicos también han señalado, entre otras cosas, la importancia y el 
alcance de los discursos anti-austeridad, la lucha contra las desigualdades 
económicas y el precariado (Tejerina et al 2013;. De pie, 2011), las relaciones 
entre los movimientos y la teoría democrática (della Porta, 2009; 2013), el 
surgimiento de populismo de izquierdas en Europa (Stavrakakis y 
Katsambekis, 2014; Urbinati, 2014), y la crítica de la representación política 
(Tormey 2012; Prentoulis y Thomassen, 2013). Cabe señalar, en este sentido, 
el hecho de que los manifestantes que ocupan plazas y calles en las 
manifestaciones  anti-austeridad no solo actúan contra el sistema financiero, 
ni solo critican la democracia representativa actual como profundamente 
corrupta, sino que también experimentan diferentes modelos de la 
democracia. De hecho, como se señalará en los capítulos siguientes, gran parte 
de los defensores de la democracia deliberativa encuentran en estos 
fenómenos un ejemplo concreto para aterrizar sus teorías en la realidad 
política (i.e. della Porta, 2009). 
 
Estos son sólo algunos de los temas relacionados con la creciente literatura 
que se centra en las recientes movilizaciones. Sin embargo, el punto focal de 
esta investigación, aunque estrechamente relacionada con este tipo de 
preguntas, no se desarrolla desde el mismo ángulo. Más bien, esta 
investigación se ocupa de un aspecto paralelo que estos movimientos 
desvelan, es decir el papel de las emociones en política. 
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De manera análoga a la creciente literatura sobre las estructuras organizativas 
de los movimientos, y las preguntas ‘tradicionales’ acerca de los problemas 
democráticos – como la deliberación, la representación política y los esquemas 
institucionales – se ha prestado cada vez más atención a la dimensión 
emocional intrínseca a estos fenómenos. La relación entre emociones y 
política, cabe admitirlo, no es un tema novedoso. La política, de hecho, es 
inundada de emociones: entre otros sentimientos, miedo, ira, culpa, pena, 
envidia, vergüenza juegan un papel en la vida de cada ciudadano, así como 
operan en la formación de los movimientos sociales, en la estrategia de los 
partidos políticos, y en otros muchos procesos sociales. En este sentido, como 
subrayaremos también en los capítulos siguientes, la reflexión política sobre 
las emociones no es novedosa, y el papel político de las emociones 
evidentemente ahonda sus raíces en las tradiciones de pensamiento clásicas y 
modernas. Cabe destacar que, sin embargo, a pesar de ocupar un rol central en 
muchos procesos políticos y sociales, al parecer las emociones han vuelto solo 
recientemente a estar presentes en las investigaciones de las ciencias sociales, 
y de alguna manera es como si el estudio de la dimensión afectiva fuera 
abandonado por en la corriente dominante de la ciencia política durante 
décadas. Basándose en los diferentes enfoques y tradiciones de pensamiento 
crítico, el relativamente nuevo ‘giro afectivo' en las ciencias sociales (i.e., Greco 
y Stenner, 2008; Clough y Halley, 2007; Clough, 2008) ha desarrollado una 
vasta literatura interdisciplinaria acerca de las emociones que abre 
interrogantes sugerentes sobre la relación entre las dimensiones afectiva y 
política. Las investigaciones han incluido, entre otros temas, preguntas sobre 
la relación entre razón y emoción, el lugar de las emociones en el proceso de 
juicio político, la deliberación, y el papel de las pasiones en el surgimiento y 
desarrollo de los movimientos de protesta y sociales. Por otra parte, mientras 
que los estudios recientes sobre las emociones sostienen su creciente 
centralidad en todo tipo de proceso político (i.e. Hall, 2005; Krause, 2008; 
Morrell, 2010; Kingston, 2011), cabe señalar que la atención ha aumentado 
recientemente de manera paralela al crecimiento de las movilizaciones anti-
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austeridad, así como el éxito electoral de los partidos de extrema derecha en 
toda Europa (i.e. Perugorría y Tejerina, 2013; Wodak et al, 2013). 
 
Poniendo el foco  especialmente en los sentimiento que movilizan o que 
desmovilizan la ciudadanía, muchos autores han comenzado a abordar 
cuestiones teóricas y normativas sobre el papel de las emociones en los 
eventos de protesta y, más ampliamente, en los regímenes democráticos. En 
este contexto, las ciencias sociales se han centrado principalmente en el papel 
de las emociones en el proceso de movilización política y, por otro lado, en la 
dicotomía entre pasiones adecuadas y emociones dañinas para el desarrollo 
democrático. De hecho, por un lado, los académicos han hecho el esfuerzo de 
incluir las dinámicas emocionales en la explicación de la acción colectiva y los 
movimientos sociales, poniendo el énfasis en las emociones en el surgimiento, 
en la organización, la identidad, y los repertorios de acción de las 
movilizaciones (Jasper, 2011). Por otro lado, los teóricos políticos han 
explorado la cuestión normativa acerca de cuáles son las dimensiones 
afectivas adecuadas para  los propósitos democráticos, frente a las pasiones 
perjudiciales. De manera general, estas preguntas se han centrado en qué tipo 
de compromiso emocional necesitan los regímenes liberales y democráticos: 
¿qué disposiciones afectivas la democracia liberal requiere de la ciudadanía? 
¿Cómo diferenciar las emociones que se ajustan con la democracia y las que no 
son beneficiosas para los valores liberales y democráticos? (i.e. Hall, 2005; 
Krause, 2008; Morrell, 2010). 
 
“Escuchad la ira del pueblo”. Este fue uno de los numerosos lema que los 
jóvenes en la Puerta del Sol de Madrid gritaron en la primavera de 2011 
(Ramonet, 2011: 4). ¿Cómo se debe interpretar este lema? ¿Cuál es el papel de 
la ira – la ira del pueblo – en la política? Refiriéndose a la reciente ola de 
movilizaciones anti-austeridad, Zygmunt Bauman observa que el movimiento 
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de protesta conocido como los Indignados es una movilización ‘emocional’35, y 
añade que las emociones son especialmente adecuados para la parte 
destructiva, pero son inútiles para funciones constructivas. En una nota 
similar, Charles Taylor abre su prólogo a la obra de Rebecca Kingston y 
Leonard Ferry, Bringing Passion Back in: the Emotions in Political Philosophy 
(2008), con una declaración tajante: “La idea de que la democracia se ve 
amenazada por las pasiones es extraña, pero, en cierto sentido, es verdadera” 
(2008, vii). Es la ira del pueblo una amenaza para la democracia? Es ira la 
única emoción expresada por estos movimientos? ¿Qué podemos decir de las 
otras emociones expresadas por la reciente ola de movimientos anti-
austeridad, como la indignación, el resentimiento, la humillación, el miedo, la 
esperanza, la alegría, y similares? 
 
La cuestión normativa sobre el encaje entre las disposiciones emocionales y 
los principios democráticos tiene sin duda un valor teórico significativo y, 
recientemente, una cantidad notable de literatura científica se ha centrado en 
este tema. Más allá del supuesto valor ‘hostil’ de la ira para la democracia, lo 
que sin duda los movimientos de protesta nos iluminan es la necesidad de un 
análisis de la relación entre emociones y política. En este contexto, esta 
investigación gira alrededor de la disputa teórica y política sobre la función de 
las emociones en la política y, más concretamente, en la práctica democrática. 
Aunque algunos autores han demostrado que las emociones han sido borradas 
por la teoría política liberal contemporánea con el argumento de que 
representan un peligro para debate razonado (Hall, 2002; 2005; Mouffe, 
2002), aún así, muchos autores contemporáneos que trabajan dentro de la 
teoría democrática reconocen que se requiere un compromiso emocional para 
una comunidad verdaderamente democrática (i.e. Ferry y Kingston, 2008: 14; 
                                                             
35 Entrevista por Vicente Verdú, El País, 17 Octubre 2011. “Si la emoción es apta para 
destruir resulta especialmente inepta para construir nada […] La emoción es inestable e 
inapropiada para configurar nada coherente y duradero […] [El movimiento crece y crece 
pero] lo hace a través de la emoción, le falta pensamiento. Con emociones solo, sin 
pensamiento, no se llega a ninguna parte”. 
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Kingston, 2011; Krause, 2008, Morrell, 2010). Además, el desarrollo de los 
acontecimientos de protesta en los últimos años, así como la aparición de 
nuevos actores políticos en toda Europa hace que se sumen problemas 
políticos a la relación entre emociones y política (y el estudio de la misma). 
Por lo tanto, si esta investigación nace de un rompecabezas general – ¿cuál es 
el papel de las emociones en la política democrática, y cómo tratarlo teórica y 
políticamente? –, varias preguntas concretas surgen del enfoque metodológico 
que consiste, como se desarrollará más adelante, en la vinculación de las 
cuestiones normativas acerca de las emociones con el análisis teórico y 
discursivo de la reciente ola de movilizaciones anti-austeridad que ha 
caracterizado el contexto Europeo particularmente desde 2011. 
 
 
2. Objeto de estudio y preguntas de investigación 
 
En este contexto, y con el objetivo de maximizar la claridad y la precisión en el 
análisis, es necesario detenerse en el objeto de estudio. Investigar el papel de 
las emociones en la política democrática implica especificar los límites de la 
propia investigación. 
 
En primer lugar, cabe subrayar que a pesar de centrarse en los recientes 
movimientos anti-austeridad, esta tesis no es una investigación sobre los 
Indignados, o movimientos similares, como tal. Más bien, es una tesis que 
surge de estos fenómenos originados en el 2011 con el fin de explorar las 
implicaciones democráticas que conllevan. En concreto, el objeto de nuestra 
investigación será un examen crítico de la amplia literatura que se ha centrado 
en el papel político de las emociones. Además, vinculando el papel de las 
emociones en los debates académicos sobre democracia y populismo, el 
objetivo es reivindicar algunas reflexiones teóricas que pueden, a su vez, 
arrojar luz sobre los mismos fenómenos contenciosos. Por lo tanto, vamos a 
enfocar el estudio principalmente a través de consideraciones que 
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profundizan en la naturaleza de la relación entre las emociones y el ámbito 
político. En particular, se pondrá énfasis en una serie de enfoques políticos – 
de diferentes campos científicos, como los estudios de los movimientos 
sociales, la teoría democrática y el análisis sobre el populismo – que sugieren 
enfoques sugerentes para la comprensión de esta relación y abren 
consecuencias teórico-normativas interesante para el ámbito político. 
 
En segundo lugar, cuando se trabaja con términos y perspectivas tan amplias – 
y se apela a conceptos tales como democracia, populismo, emociones – parece 
necesaria una operación de definición terminológica. Sin embargo, como se 
verá en los capítulos a seguir, las emociones intervienen directamente en la 
elaboración de la realidad política y en la propia definición conceptual. Eso 
quiere decir que la definición terminológica es lo que está a menudo en juego, 
como resultado de la interacción entre las dinámicas emocionales y el ámbito 
político. No obstante, cabe mencionar aquí algunos puntos de clarificación, 
aunque de manera preliminar. Como casi todas las categorías políticas, los 
conceptos de democracia y populismo son objeto de disputas, y hay un 
animado debate en curso en torno al significado de ambos. La teoría 
democrática es en este sentido la concreta manifestación de la lucha por 
definir lo que la democracia es y debería ser. Aunque un acuerdo mínimo 
parece ser alcanzado en torno a una combinación de soberanía popular y el 
gobierno de la mayoría – lo que implica la existencia de elecciones libres y 
justas, la protección de los derechos de las minorías, la igualdad ante la ley y el 
respeto de los derechos humanos básicos –, diferente enfoques, visiones y 
‘modelos’ de la democracia han sido propuesto tanto por la ciencia política 
empírica como por la teoría política normativa. Asimismo, el término 
‘populismo’ abarca muchas interpretaciones diferentes, y a pesar de los 
intentos científicos para llegar a una definición consensuada, los estudios 
políticos por el contrario han abierto el campo de los usos terminológicos, que 
van desde la demagogia, hasta un particular tipo de movimientos, o estilo 
político y discursivo (i.e. Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Müller, 2011). En 
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los siguientes capítulos, que se dedican específicamente a estos problemas 
teóricos, se profundizará en el significado conceptual de estos términos. 
 
En tercer lugar, cabe desarrollar una consideración acerca de las emociones en 
esta introducción. Aunque las emociones como tales no sean el objeto ‘puro’ 
de nuestra investigación, es cierto que ocupan un papel central en toda la 
argumentación de esta tesis, y serán por lo tanto un objeto de análisis en los 
capítulos siguientes. Lo que cuenta por ahora es poner de relieve que la ciencia 
política tiene una relación difícil con la presencia y las funciones de las 
emociones dentro del ámbito político – lo cual probablemente es debido a su 
propio desarrollo histórico como una ciencia social. Como ya hemos 
mencionado y explicaremos ulteriormente en el segundo capítulo, en los 
últimos años una amplia gama de disciplinas asumió la tarea de dar un nuevo 
protagonismo al papel de las emociones dentro de las ciencias sociales. La 
neurología, la psicología, la filosofía, la sociología y los estudios históricos, 
entre otros, contribuyeron a ampliar el interés por las dinámicas emocionales, 
de manera tal que también penetró los estudios políticos. No obstante durante 
mucho tiempo las emociones hayan ocupado un lugar marginal en la mayoría 
de las teorías científico-sociales, siendo considerada como algo personal, o 
confinadas en el ámbito irracional, recientemente un abanico heterogéneo de 
investigadores rompió esta tendencia (i.e. Damasio 1994; Elster 1999; Forgas, 
2000;. Goodwin et al, 2001; Kingston, 2008; 2011; de Sousa, 1987). Esta 
literatura diversa ha desafiado la tradicional dicotomía entre razón y pasión, 
haciendo que se re-coloque la dimensión afectiva en el centro del campo social 
y político, con especial énfasis en lo que concierne a las movilizaciones 
políticas: las emociones están directamente relacionadas con los movimientos 
de protesta (Goodwin et al, 2001;. Goodwin y Jasper, 2003); se ha subrayado 
además que las emociones tienen un carácter social propio y un peso 
específico en la formación de identidades colectivas y de los vínculos sociales 
(Ahmed, 2004); así como desempeñan un papel en el juicio político y moral 
(Nussbaum, 1994). 
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Una literatura múltiple, ésta, que ha traído las emociones de nuevo en el 
centro de la discusión. Este es sin duda un mérito que hay que reconocer. Sin 
embargo, a pesar de esta investigación incesante, existen motivos de 
insatisfacción. En primer lugar, porque parece que los investigadores de los 
movimientos sociales y los teóricos de la democracia apenas intentan colmar 
sus diferencias (bien que esto es una tendencia general dentro de los 
diferentes paradigmas de las ciencias sociales). En segundo lugar, porque 
todavía parece haber preguntas inexploradas en la comprensión del papel 
político de las emociones. Una laguna que esta tesis intenta colmar. 
 
En este sentido, es necesario mencionar algunos vacíos de esta literatura. En 
primer lugar, son pocos los autores que explícitamente tienden puentes entre 
las diferentes perspectivas teóricas y epistemológicas. Aunque muchos 
académicos ponen énfasis en las consecuencias epistemológicas de este ‘giro 
afectivo’, poco se ha hecho para conectar los diferentes puntos de vista con las 
consideraciones teóricas e históricas más amplias (i.e. Kingston y Ferry, 2008: 
108-125, Krause, 2008; Salomón , 1990; 1993). Como hemos argumentado en 
otro lugar (Cossarini, 2014), una perspectiva de longue durée que mezcla 
historia del pensamiento político y debates contemporáneos puede arrojar luz 
sobre la relación entre emociones y razón, y con ello proporcionar 
instrumentos análisis para la comprensión de los fenómenos de movilización 
contemporáneos. Sin embargo, debido a la limitación de espacio y a los 
objetivos de esta investigación, el desarrollo de este punto se limitará al 
capítulo metodológico. De entrada, cabe señalar que la tradicional dicotomía 
entre razón y emoción sigue siendo profundamente penetrante, y 
probablemente representa una característica intrínseca de los estudios 
políticos contemporáneos. 
 
El segundo punto que cabe destacar es que, dentro de la teoría política y 
democrática, la ‘razón’ – y sus términos correlativos, como racional, razonable, 
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y el ‘mejor argumento’ en la teoría deliberativa – ha tradicionalmente ocupado 
un lugar privilegiado. Con ello, no se quiere decir que el objetivo de la 
investigación es dar predominio de la dimensión emocional en el ámbito 
político. Más bien, significa que se ha demostrado que dentro de la teoría 
democrática, los estudios contemporáneos han puesto tradicionalmente 
énfasis en la razón, perpetuando (consciente o no) la dicotomía entre racional 
y emocional, y excluyendo (a menudo deliberativamente) gran parte de la 
dimensión afectiva del campo político (i.e. Holmes, 1995; Hall, 2005). Dentro 
de este contexto, los recientes fenómenos de protesta, junto con la evolución 
de las perspectivas teóricas y metodológicas, sugieren que es posible explorar 
el papel de las emociones desde una perspectiva diferente. En esta línea, la 
cuestión teórica que nos guía en la investigación es: ¿qué puede un enfoque en 
las emociones aportar a la teoría democrática? La naturaleza amplia y 
deslizante de esta pregunta, obviamente, implica otras cuestiones conexas que 
se deberán tener en cuenta en esta investigación. Estas preguntas incluyen 
interrogar la relación entre los factores racionales y emocionales en la 
epistemología de la investigación política, así como explorar el mismo 
significado de los términos controvertidos como ‘emociones’ y ‘democracia’, 
entre otros. 
 
Además, es evidente que esta pregunta de investigación puede dar a luz a 
varios estudios, dependiendo de la perspectiva, los métodos y el objeto de 
investigación. Investigaciones teóricas, históricas o empíricas pueden 
enriquecer la comprensión de las emociones en el ámbito político, así como en 
el proceso de legitimación democrática. Sin embargo, nuestro nivel de análisis, 
como se detallará más adelante en esta introducción, se encuentra en la 
conexión entre la teoría democrática, los estudios de movimientos de protesta 
y el populismo. Esto implica que, con el fin de dar forma a nuestra 
investigación, es preciso centrarse en un caso de estudio. 
 
Por otra parte, conectar las teorías aquí consideradas con un estudio de caso o, 
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más precisamente, asumir el caso de estudio como punto de partida, significa 
que sus límites deben ser detallados. En este sentido, se pondrá énfasis en la 
forma en que las emociones desarrollan un papel a nivel discursivo en los 
recientes acontecimientos anti austeridad, y en particular en el caso Español. 
No parece necesario subrayar que esta tesis no se centra en dar explicación 
histórica o sociológica alguna, ni busca un mecanismo causal de estos eventos. 
Las movilizaciones de protesta anti-austeridad son sólo parcialmente nuestros 
objetos de estudio, siendo sobre todo la realidad concreta donde poder 
aterrizar y comprobar algunas teorías políticas. Como se mostrará, a los 
efectos de esta investigación, centrarse en estos eventos tiene una ventaja 
científica doble: evidentemente se puede arrojar luz sobre los mismos 
fenómenos tenidos en cuenta, así como se puede sondear el contenido y las 
inconsistencias de la teoría política democrática que consideramos en esta 
investigación, y por lo tanto poner a prueba su fuerza para la comprensión de 
la realidad política existente. En este sentido, en él en el capítulo específico 
dedicado al análisis del discurso de la última ola de movilización y protestas 
en España se profundizará en ello, por lo que se da aquí una presentación de 
estos fenómenos sin demorar en detalles. En esta etapa se puede decir que la 
investigación se centrará principalmente en el nivel discursivo de estos 
fenómenos, poniendo especial énfasis en algunos lema clave que los 
manifestantes han estado empleando durante sus actos. 
 
Una última especificación sobre el objeto de estudio tiene que ver con el 
enfoque metodológico, que será el centro de atención del párrafo siguiente. Es 
la misma naturaleza del objeto de la investigación que necesita una 
combinación de perspectivas, y un análisis multi-metodológico. A través de la 
conjunción de las investigaciones teóricas y discursivas – esta es nuestra 
creencia – el papel de las emociones en la política democrática puede ser 
ulteriormente analizado y comprendido. 
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Dado que el dilema al que nos enfrentamos es el lugar y el papel de las 
emociones en el ámbito político, y dado el caso de estudio que se tendrá en 
cuenta, se centrará este trabajo en una serie de preguntas específicas. 
 
- Desde un punto de vista teórico, esta investigación se centra en la 
posibilidad de combinar diferentes campos de investigación, como el 
análisis de eventos de protesta y la teoría democrática y populista. En 
concreto, esta investigación se pregunta: ¿qué puede un enfoque 
discursivo acerca de las emociones aportar a las teorías de la 
democracia? Y a la inversa, en qué medida las teorías de la democracia 
deben de tener en cuenta el papel de las emociones? 
 
- Empíricamente, la pregunta que queremos responder está en relación 
con el papel que las emociones tienen en el complejo proceso de 
elaboración de la esfera política. ¿Qué rol desempeñan en la elaboración 
de la realidad? ¿Cómo toman parte en la lucha discursiva sobre el 
significado de conceptos políticos y en el proceso de la legitimación 
democrática? 
 
Es indudablemente cierto que una gran cantidad de investigaciones se ha 
centrado en el papel de las emociones en las movilizaciones sociales, en 
protestas, así como en la deliberación democrática y el agonismo político (i.e. 
Goodwin y Jasper, 2003; Krause, 2008; Kingston y Ferry, 2008; Mouffe , 2013). 
Uno podría argumentar en efecto, que el papel de las emociones ha sido 
analizado dentro de los movimientos sociales y, especialmente, como parte del 
proceso de movilización, vinculados a los recursos organizativos y a las redes. 
Además, podría afirmarse que, incluso en las teorías dominantes de justicia y 
de democracia deliberativa del siglo XX, hubo un reconocimiento del 
fundamento emocional de la política como, por ejemplo, el deseo intrínseco de 
la justicia como su propia base normativa (i.e. Banerjee y Bercuson, 2015 ). 
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Sin embargo, estas tradiciones científicas no han delineado sus investigaciones 
en la forma en la que estamos imaginando en esta tesis, y estas preguntas no 
se han explorado en mucha profundidad. Una laguna todavía existe en la 
combinación de estos estudios heterogéneos: la conexión entre, por una parte, 
las teorías de la democracia y el populismo y, por otro lado, el foco en las 
emociones que se dio con los estudios de los movimientos sociales, no ha 
recibido mucha atención entre los análisis académicos. En este sentido, este 
estudio intenta desarrollar una línea de investigación relativamente novedosa, 
contribuyendo a la combinación de estos enfoques y teorías de investigación. 
 
 
3. Métodos e hipótesis 
 
Como ya hemos mencionado, un corpus heterogéneo de literatura científica ha 
reciente rehabilitado el papel de las emociones en el debate político. 
Perspectivas y disciplinas diferentes, desde la psicología, los estudios 
epistemológicos, históricos, sociológicos y de teoría normativa han sido 
empleado por los académicos con el fin de abordar la función política de las 
dinámicas emocionales y afectivas. En esta investigación no se puede empezar 
adecuadamente el análisis sin antes reconocer los méritos de estas disciplinas. 
Sin embargo, cabe recordar que la perspectiva elegida para nuestra 
investigación, a pesar de ser multidisciplinar, está claramente definida dentro 
de un ámbito bien definido. Como ya se ha subrayado, el enfoque de este 
estudio se centra en los debates académicos propios de las teorías de la 
democracia y del populismo, con un particular énfasis en aquellas teorías que 
acentúan la dimensión afectivas de la política. El objetivo es profundizar en 
algunas reflexiones teóricas, reivindicando la eficacia y utilidad de éstas en 
arrojar luz sobre los mismos fenómenos de movilización considerados en esta 
investigación. En este sentido, esta tesis es una investigación de teoría política 
que, sin embargo, opera a través de un análisis discursivo. 
Metodológicamente, nos enfrentamos al problema de movernos entre 
 259 
diferentes enfoques y ámbitos de estudio, con lo cual se emplearán diferentes 
perspectivas teóricas y epistemológicas. Asimismo, cabe precisar que esta 
investigación no gira alrededor de un solo eje analítico ni de un único corpus 
teórico. El objetivo no es simplemente resaltar los argumentos, 
inconsistencias, puntos críticos, etc., de una línea de pensamiento, de un autor 
o de una ‘escuela’. Por el contrario, a partir de diferentes ámbitos de estudio se 
quiere abordar críticamente con un problema a la vez político y teórico. En 
este contexto, el objetivo es relacionar las reflexiones políticas con la realidad 
concreta de los fenómenos contemporáneos, vincular la teoría y la evidencia 
empírica, y los debates acerca de la democracia con los movimientos sociales. 
La intuición es que estas perspectivas tienen algo que aprender unas de las 
otras, y su vinculación permite desarrollar una línea de investigación original. 
En este sentido, mientras se examina la validez y el rigor de algunas 
reflexiones sobre el rol de las emociones en el ámbito democrático, a su vez se 
darán ulteriores herramientas teóricos para la comprensión de las recientes 
movilizaciones que se tienen en cuenta como caso de estudio. 
 
TEORÍA  ESTUDIO DE CASO  TEORÍA 
 
Figura 1.1 Vinculación entre teoría y estudio de caso 
 
Nos centraremos en detalle acerca de este enfoque metodológico en el capítulo 
que recoge las consideraciones epistemológicas; sin embargo, lo que sí es 
importante tener en cuenta es el alcance de la combinación de estas 
perspectivas. John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig y Anne Phillips, en su ‘Introducci n’ a 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (2006: 5) afirman que la teoría 
política se encuentra “en algún lugar entre los principios universales de la 
filosofía normativa y el mundo empírico de la política”36. Si estamos de 
acuerdo con esta declaración, entonces debemos reconocer que la conexión 
                                                             
36 In the original English: “somewhere between the distanced universals of normative 
philosophy and the empirical world of politics”. 
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entre la filosofía normativa y el mundo empírico se da mediante el lenguaje y 
los discursos. Como Juan Dryzek sugiere, “el discurso es una forma común de 
comprensión el mundo”, que “permite a aquellos que lo emplean interpretar 
partes de información y con ellas contruir historias o relatos coherentes” 
(Dryzek 1997: 8)37. En otras palabras, es a través de discursos que la teoría 
política se desarrolla y puede comprender los fenómenos políticos, elaborar 
conceptos, y perpetuar ideas. Al mismo tiempo, como la tradición crítica del 
análisis de discurso ha demostrado (i.e. Laclau y Mouffe, 1985), las ideas y los 
conceptos son involucrados diariamente en luchas discursivas sobre el 
significado de la realidad. Cabe observar que, en este sentido, mientras que los 
objetos naturales, físicos y culturales claramente ‘existen’ 
independientemente de cualquier discurso particular, es también cierto que se 
‘construyen discursivamente’, lo que significa que su significado se transforma 
constantemente a través de articulaciones discursivas concretas. 
 
Dentro de este marco teórico, la investigación se centrará específicamente en 
el papel de las emociones en sus ‘traducción’ discursiva. Se hará hincapié de 
manera particular en la teoría de  análisis de discurso, y se subrayarán algunos 
resultados aportados por los estudios de los movimientos sociales, es decir 
dos de los ámbitos de investigación que recientemente han desarrollado 
enfoques y métodos fascinantes para el análisis de las emociones en el 
horizonte político. También gracias a estos sectores científicos, como veremos 
en el capítulo dedicado a la propuesta epistemológica y metodológica, se han 
podido evidencias las dimensiones esenciales e intrínsecas que se atribuyen a 
las emociones. Estas son su dimensión cognitiva y evaluativa, así como su 
carácter asociado a la sensibilidad y al origen motivacional en el 
comportamiento humano. Teniendo en cuenta estas consideraciones, esta 
tesis sostiene que una combinación de análisis del discurso y de teoría 
democrática y populista representa un enfoque fructífero en el análisis y 
                                                             
37 In the original English: “discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world”, which 
“enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together 
into coherent stories or accounts” 
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comprensión del papel de las emociones en política. Además, se explorará en 
qué puede contribuir un enfoque discursivo de la dimensión emocional a la 
teoría democrática en su conjunto. Con todo, este carácter multi-metodológico 
es uno de los elementos definitorios de esta investigación. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figura 1.2 Vinculación entre los diferentes enfoques teóricos 
 
Esta aproximación, yendo más allá de la perspectiva normativa pura – 
empleada generalmente por los aquellos que operan dentro del paradigma 
liberal – abre fascinantes formas de análisis que pueden complementar ambas 
investigaciones teóricas y empíricas. En nuestra opinión, esto debería 
aumentar el interés en esta investigación, conllevando, sin embargo, también 
algunas dificultades. En primer lugar, la ampliación de nuestras herramientas 
descriptivas y analíticas nos obliga a cumplir con las pautas de diferentes 
metodologías. En segundo lugar, emplear diferentes metodologías aumenta el 
riesgo de abrir el ámbito y el objeto de análisis de manera incontrolable. 
 
Sin embargo, esta investigación se basará sobre todo en consideraciones 
teóricas sobre la naturaleza del populismo, su relación con la democracia y el 
análisis del discurso de los recientes movimientos anti-austeridad, con el fin 
de explorar algunas hipótesis generales. Por otra parte, nuestras hipótesis, 
como se verá más en detalle, derivan de una revisión crítica de la reciente 
literatura sobre las emociones y su relación con el ámbito político. Esta 
Teoría del 
Discurso 
Teoría 
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Sociología de 
la 
movilización 
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literatura heterogénea, como veremos en los capítulos siguientes, indica, entre 
otras cosas, que: (1) los factores emocionales son esenciales tanto en la 
movilización colectiva, así como en la creación de vínculos sociales. Además, 
desde un punto de vista teórico y epistemológico, siguiendo algunos estudios 
recientes se puede sostener que (2) las dicotomías modernas basadas en la 
separación entre dimensión racional/ dimensión irracional, bien que muy 
generalizada en los estudios políticos, tiene que ser revisada. 
 
Estas premisas nos permiten formular algunas hipótesis sobre la 
potencialidad de un enfoque discursivo de las la dimensión emocional para la 
teoría de la democracia y el populismo. En concreto, teniendo en cuenta el 
nivel discursivo de análisis, podemos articular algunas consideraciones sobre 
el papel de las emociones en el proceso de elaboración de la esfera política. En 
este sentido, se afirma que: 
 
- Las emociones desempeñan un rol ‘geométrico’ en la formación de 
sujetos políticos. Desde un punto de vista puramente teórico, uno 
puede encontrar demostración de esta función en la propia historia del 
pensamiento político, siendo las emociones parte concreta de las 
teorías políticas – a menudo en contraposición a la ‘razón’ – y el 
propósito que éstas persiguen de crear un orden político legitimado 
(Holmes , 1995: 271). Esta tesis presupone la idea de que las emociones 
tienen un amplio y fundamental papel histórico y teórico en la 
construcción del orden político. Además se sostiene que tienen un papel 
en la actual lucha por el significado de las categorías políticas y, como 
consecuencia, los movimientos de protesta son parte de esta lucha. A 
nivel discursivo, la hipótesis es que las emociones operan en la 
formación de las identidades políticas, la creación de los límites 
democráticos básicos, y la consolidación de las creencias democráticas. 
En concreto, se argumenta que las emociones funcionan a través de una 
construcción discursiva capaz de dividir lo social en dos campos, y dar a 
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luz a identidades políticas. Como se muestra en la literatura sobre el 
populismo, esta lógica a menudo significa la división entre ‘el pueblo’ y 
la élite (Laclau, 2005a: 110). 
 
- Por otra parte, se sostiene que las emociones tienen un papel 
‘evocador’, que contribuye al carácter latente e ideacional de los 
conceptos políticos. Los factores emocionales participan, a través de la 
función simbólica de los conceptos que contribuyen a crear, a la 
transformación constante de las ideas políticas. Desde un punto de vista 
discursivo, las emociones operan en la lucha diaria por la definición de 
la realidad y de las categorías políticas centrales, como el sujeto político 
– ‘el pueblo’ - y por lo tanto de la misma idea de ‘democracia’. Tales 
conceptos son públicamente disputados y se redefinen de manera 
continua –  esto es lo que las recientes movilizaciones nos enseñan y 
reclaman, también a través de horizontes emocionales. 
-  
En este contexto, se hará hincapié en la medida en la que un enfoque 
discursivo de las emociones puede contribuir al debate normativo sobre la 
relación entre populismo y democracia. 
- Por estas razones, la hipótesis es que un enfoque discursivo de las 
emociones refuerza la teoría democrática, en la medida en que abre un 
espacio para la reflexión teórica más allá de la dicotomía normativa 
entre las disposiciones emocionales adecuadas y aquellas que son al 
revés perjudiciales para el proyecto democrático. En este orden de 
ideas, un enfoque teórico y discursivo de las emociones también 
pueden contribuir al debate normativo sobre la relación entre 
democracia y populismo – a menudo formula a través de un enfoque 
dicotómico parecido. Con lo cual, centrarse en las emociones añade 
matices interesantes para el debate normativo sobre la naturaleza y el 
carácter del populismo con respecto a la democracia, ya que muestra 
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las formas articuladas en las que se produce la lucha por el significado 
conceptual. 
 
En este sentido, resulta evidente la relevancia del caso de estudio – la reciente 
ola de movilizaciones anti-austeridad. En efecto, estas movilizaciones 
representan un ejemplo reciente del papel de las emociones en la política, 
sobre todo en su nivel discursivo y teórico. Además, siendo una expresión del 
fundamental papel de las emociones en política, nos permite entrever el papel 
de las herramientas emocionales en lo que concierne la creación de sujetos 
políticos y democráticos, así como su utilización en la lucha para el significado 
de algunas categorías políticas claves. 
 
 
4. Objetivos y estructura de la investigación 
 
Como ya hemos mencionado, si exploramos los debates académicos sobre 
democracia y populismo, es porque el propósito es profundizar en las 
reflexiones teóricas que están particularmente atentas a la dimensión 
emocional. En concreto, la idea es investigar el papel de las emociones en el 
proceso de legitimidad democrática, basándose en el caso de la reciente ola de 
movimientos anti-austeridad, y su los problemas relacionados con el concepto 
de soberanía popular. Al hacerlo, también vamos a revelar en qué medida un 
enfoque discursivo de las emociones puede contribuir a ampliar ciertos 
ámbitos relativos a la teoría democrática. 
 
Para alcanzar este objetivo, cabe subrayar que el caso de estudio nos permite 
profundizar en consideraciones teóricas. En este sentido, se construye una 
investigación que opera en el cruce entre diferentes metodologías de 
investigación política. Aspectos teóricos y discursivos se entrelazan, de modo 
que se pueden juntar perspectivas diferentes con el objetivo de construir una 
narrativa completa sobre nuestro objeto de estudio, que es – como ya hemos 
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dicho – un problema teórico y político relevante. En otras palabras, si la 
intención de llevar a cabo un análisis exhaustivo del tema estudiado, el 
objetivo es explorar la función de las emociones en los procesos fluctuantes de 
la legitimidad democrática, así como reivindicar una particular perspectiva 
democrática. Para ello, se seguirá una estrategia cuádruple: 
 
a) Se explorará cómo la teoría política y social ha tenido en cuenta el 
papel de las emociones y su relación con el ámbito político. A través de 
un análisis de la reciente literatura, se pondrá énfasis en sectores 
heterogéneos de la investigación política contemporánea acerca de la 
dimensión afectiva y emocional. Se destacarán los diferentes 
argumentos en el seno de esta literatura, y se pondrá especial acento en 
las consecuencias políticas asociadas a la teoría social. 
 
b) Ahondaremos en la naturaleza de las investigaciones políticas 
relacionadas con las emociones, y en las consideraciones 
epistemológicas que ello conlleva. Además, se desarrollará una 
propuesta teórica y metodológica para este estudio, lo que nos 
permitirá vincular ámbitos de estudio heterogéneos y aparentemente 
separados, tales como el análisis político de las emociones y las teorías 
sobre populismo y democracia. 
 
c) Nos centraremos en el caso de estudio – las recientes movilizaciones 
anti-austeridad y en particular en el caso español –, y a través de un 
análisis del discurso se identificará el papel de las emociones y las 
dimensiones afectivas. 
 
d) Teniendo en cuenta el estudio epistemológico y el análisis del 
discurso, se profundizará en recientes teorías sobre populismo y 
democracia. Si el objetivo es reivindicar algunas reflexiones teóricas, sin 
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embargo, se vincularán las cuestiones normativas al enfoque discursivo 
desarrollado en los capítulos anteriores. 
 
De acuerdo con todo ello, se procederá por diferentes etapas. La estructura de 
esta investigación, en efecto, está  directamente vinculada con el objetivo 
metodológico, que apunta a la conexión entre teoría democrática normativa y 
análisis del discurso. Basándose en una literatura heterogénea sobre 
movimientos sociales, populismo, y teoría de la democracia, la investigación 
tiene como objetivo explorar una vía para la comprensión del papel político de 
la dimensión emocional, refiriéndose específicamente a las movilizaciones 
ciudadanas que han caracterizados los años de la reciente crisis financiera y 
económica. 
 
Desde esta perspectiva, los capítulos que siguen están divididos en tres 
bloques principales: revisión de la literatura, metodología, y desarrollo de 
análisis teórico y discursivo. Más concretamente, el segundo capítulo (capítulo 
2) se centra en un examen crítico de la relación entre emociones e 
investigación política. Después de detenernos brevemente en un análisis 
conceptual de las emociones y de la dimensión afectiva, se prestará especial 
atención a la relación entre emoción y razón en la investigación política 
moderna y contemporánea. Por otra parte, se pondrá énfasis en los 
argumentos desarrollados por la teoría social y política normativa 
contemporánea que ha profundizado en el role de las emociones en el ámbito 
político. El siguiente capítulo (Capítulo 3) pertenece al segundo bloque, es 
decir el núcleo metodológico y epistemológico de nuestra investigación. De 
hecho, abordaremos en primer lugar las consecuencias epistemológicas que la 
literatura sobre las emociones ha puesto en evidencia. Posteriormente, se 
propondrá una posición teórica que facilite la combinación de diferentes 
metodologías. Este marco teórico, caracterizado por una conjunción de 
perspectivas teóricas y discursivas, permitirá una mejor comprensión del 
objeto de estudio. Por otra parte, sobre al base del enfoque discursivo 
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desarrollado por la Escuela de Essex, se vinculará el nivel discursivo de las 
recientes movilizaciones anti-austeridad con el populismo y la teoría 
normativa. Con ello, se explorará el lugar de las emociones en la misma 
relación entre lógica populista y horizonte democrático. Es a través de la 
lógica populista, se argumenta, que las emociones operan lo que hemos 
llamado su función ‘geométrica’. El populismo, es decir, activa una politización 
de las pasiones. 
 
Los dos capítulos siguientes combinan el análisis del discurso con la reflexión 
teórica acerca de los movimientos sociales. El cuarto capítulo (Capítulo 4) se 
centra en las formas en que las ciencias sociales han considerado la acción 
colectiva, y su particular relación con la dicotomía entre la razón y emoción. Se 
abordan en primer lugar una revisión de los estudios sobre movimientos 
sociales y de protesta. Se prestará particular atención tanto al nivel explicativo 
de la acción colectiva y la movilización social, así como a las formas en que las 
que estas perspectivas sociales han ido incluyendo las emociones en la 
comprensión de los movimientos sociales. El siguiente capítulo (Capítulo 5) se 
centra en los elementos emocionales empleados discursivamente en los 
fenómeno de movilización que hemos mencionado. Subrayaremos las 
consecuencias políticas de ello, enseñando que la dinámica emocional 
interacciona directamente con la misma definición de ideas políticas que están 
en el centro de la lucha discursiva, tales como ‘el pueblo’ y ‘democracia’. 
Finalmente, los dos últimos capítulos (Capítulo 6 y 7) vuelven a centrarse en 
cuestiones propiamente teórico-normativas acerca de la relación entre la 
política democrática y el papel de las emociones. Concretamente, el sexto 
capítulo está dedicado a la compleja relación entre populismo y democracia. 
Ahora bien, resulta evidente que la literatura sobre democracia y populismo es 
tan grande que cualquier intento de exhaustividad sería inútil. No obstante, se 
analizarán perspectivas recientes que ponen de relieve la naturaleza 
problemática del populismo con respecto a la democracia liberal; con ello el 
capítulo considera la profunda magnitud teórica e histórica de dicha relación, 
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e intenta aportar una contribución a través de un enfoque discursivo de las 
emociones. Por último, en el séptimo capítulo se analizan algunas teorías 
políticas normativas que recientemente han desarrollado un fuerte interés por 
el rol de las emociones en la política democrática, y se argumenta que un 
enfoque agonistico puede ser una perspectiva fructífera para el desarrollo de 
este debate. 
 
 
5. Ventajas y limitaciones de la investigación  
 
Al presentar las principales líneas de nuestra investigación, es importante 
dejar claro que hemos tenido que enfrentarnos a una serie de obstáculos. 
Creemos que es esencial referirse explícitamente a ellos, así como a las 
limitaciones intrínsecas de la investigación. De alguna manera, discutirlas 
abiertamente es una forma de abordar y circunscribir sus consecuencias. 
 
La primera dificultad ha sido enfrentarse con la cuestión de las definiciones de 
los ejes conceptuales de esta investigación. Definir los conceptos políticos es, 
por razones evidentes, una de las tareas más difíciles y controvertidas a las 
que los científicos sociales se enfrentan. Por otra parte, debido a la misma 
naturaleza del objeto de investigación – que es, de alguna manera, mostrar el 
papel que las emociones juegan en la redefinición de las categorías políticas – 
resulta evidente el círculo vicioso al que esta investigación se puede enfrentar. 
Cualquier definición, por otra parte, siempre corre el riesgo de ser o bien 
demasiado general – y con ello perder poder explicativo – o bien demasiado 
especifica – y por lo tanto convertirse en inutilizable para la comprensión más 
general de los fenómenos sociales. El mismo razonamiento se puede aplicar a 
las hipótesis de investigación. Ahora bien, el desafío planteado por esta 
perspectiva resulta ser una motivación adicional para la reflexión teórica que 
se pretende llevar a cabo en esta investigación. Por otra parte, la combinación 
de diferentes perspectivas metodológicas ha sido otro inconveniente a la que 
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esta investigación tuvo que enfrentar. El carácter multidisciplinar y la 
combinación de perspectivas, obviamente, puede convertirse en una crítica 
sólida para la investigación en su conjunto, ya que se puede sumar la crítica de 
los diferentes enfoques empleados y, más importante aún, la crítica a 
cualquier investigación con estos rasgos metodológicos (para decirlo de 
manera simple: no sería ni un estudio de caso, ni una investigación puramente 
de teoría política). 
 
A pesar de estos problemas y las posibles críticas relacionadas, es posible 
resaltar también los resultados y las ventajas que esta investigación presenta. 
El carácter amplio y abierto de la investigación no impide que se puedan 
evidenciar algunos ejes centrales: en las siguientes páginas  se trata de 
desarrollar una línea metodológica para explorar el papel de las emociones, y 
en particular modo su dimensión discursiva, en la política democrática y la 
legitimidad política, teniendo en cuenta sobre todo las perspectivas teórico-
normativas que recientemente han profundizado en ello. Aún siendo 
consciente de la inmensa cantidad de variables que intervienen en todo ello, 
nos centraremos principalmente en el nivel teórico y discursivo, a través del 
cual – esta es una de las tesis – es posible llevar a cabo una investigación 
fructífera. En otras palabras, cabe subrayar una vez más que el marco teórico 
de esta investigación constituye a nuestro parecer una contribución relevante 
para el fin del estudio mismo. La principal ventaja es precisamente que puede 
ayudar a ampliar la comprensión del papel de las emociones en el ámbito 
político, y contribuir a reivindicar determinadas teorías democráticas y, 
conjuntamente, el fenómeno del populismo. 
 
Del mismo modo, la combinación de múltiples metodologías, lejos de ser un 
problema en sí mismo, puede enriquecer la comprensión de las movilizaciones 
que han tenido lugar recientemente a raíz de la crisis económico-financiera. La 
combinación de diferentes perspectivas, como la teoría política normativa, la 
literatura sobre populismo y sobre los movimientos de protesta es de hecho 
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un punto de fortaleza de esta investigación. Evidentemente, incluso un 
enfoque de este tipo encuentra sus dificultades en ir más allá del positivismo y 
el reduccionismo que caracteriza los estudios politológicos acerca de la 
dimensión emocional y afectiva. Sin embargo, con esta tesis se pretende dar 
un paso en esta dirección. El objetivo es tender un puente entre teoría 
normativa y estudios empíricos, entre las cuestiones de teoría de la 
democracia y los problemas relacionados con los movimientos sociales, e 
trazar un horizonte de análisis más allá de esta brecha – que sin duda 
constituye un obstáculo para el análisis del rol de las emociones en el ámbito 
político democrático. Con todo, se tratará de contribuir al diálogo entre teoría 
normativa y análisis del discurso, de manera que, vincular la teoría 
democrática contemporánea al nivel discursivo de las recientes 
movilizaciones, en nuestra opinión, es una buena manera para responder a las 
preguntas de esta investigación. Asimismo, la formulación abierta de la 
pregunta de investigación se inscribe por lo tanto en el intento de ir más allá 
del mero análisis de la dimensión afectiva y de las emociones en los 
movimientos sociales. En este sentido, esta investigación pretende contribuir a 
la exploración de lo que podemos llamar la ‘legitimidad emocional’ de la 
democracia, y no se centra solamente en el caso de los movimientos sociales, 
ni trata de caracterizar el role de las emociones como mecanismo causal de los 
fenómenos sociales de protesta. 
 
Por último, la teoría que desarrollamos en esta tesis se apoya sin dudas sobre 
importantes precedentes teóricos, así como en nuestras propias 
contribuciones anteriores. No obstante, a través de la comprensión discursiva 
de la reciente movilización anti-austeridad, el estudio también tiene como 
objetivo delinear un horizonte teórico original. En particular, se apuntan a una 
línea de investigación que combina teoría democrática y análisis del discurso 
como horizonte teórico propio para la comprensión de la reciente ola de 
movilización. Además, a través de esta línea teórica se puede llegar 
comprender el rol de las emociones en su relación con la política democrática: 
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la lectura de las movilizaciones a través del foco las emociones en la política, 
ayuda en la lectura de los mecanismos de legitimidad popular y democrática 
contemporáneos. En efecto, las movilizaciones han claramente representado 
una crítica inmanente de las formas contemporáneas de poder económico y 
político, siendo el síntoma del declive de la legitimidad de las instituciones 
políticas y económicas. Por lo tanto, haciendo hincapié en el uso de vectores 
emocionales dentro de los movimientos anti-austeridad, se puede poner de 
relieve el papel fundamental de las emociones en política, sobre todo por lo 
que concierne la creación de sujetos políticos - y en particular la articulación 
política alrededor de concepto de ‘pueblo’ -, así como el proceso de 
legitimación política y la disputa por el significado de democracia. 
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Capítulo 8. Conclusiones: Emociones, protestas y populismo: más allá de 
la visión dicotómica? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Esta investigación comienza señalando la peculiar relación entre la dimensión 
emocional y la política, destacando su relevancia tanto para el debate 
académico como para los fenómenos políticos concretos. En este orden de 
ideas, si los lemas y eslóganes utilizados durante los recientes movimientos 
anti-austeridad, como ‘escuchar a la ira del pueblo’, representan el punto de 
partida de nuestra investigación, esta tesis ha desarrollado una serie de 
argumentos teóricos en torno a este tema. Ahora, al llegar a las conclusiones, 
cabe reflexionar sobre el conjunto de estos argumentos. 
 
El objeto general de nuestra investigación ha sido abordar de manera crítica el 
amplio corpus de literatura que recientemente ha se centrado en el papel 
político de las emociones. Hemos considerado específicamente esta cuestión 
en los debates acerca tres ejes principales: los movimientos sociales y de 
protesta, el populismo y la democracia. Empleando las ideas y los argumentos 
de esta heterogénea literatura, en los varios capítulos de esta tesis se ha 
tratado de evaluar los problemas teóricos evidenciados por las recientes 
movilizaciones anti-austeridad, con especial énfasis en el lugar y el papel de 
las emociones. Para ello, a lo largo de la tesis hemos subrayado una serie de 
planteamientos políticos que ofrecen interesantes elementos de reflexión 
sobre la relación emociones/política, y al mismo tiempo desvelan las 
consecuencias normativas para el ámbito social y político en su conjunto. En la 
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investigación se ha destacado el hecho de que diferentes disciplinas y muchos 
autores han comenzado a abordar las cuestiones teórico-normativas sobre el 
papel de las emociones en los movimientos sociales, en los eventos de protesta 
y, más en general, en los regímenes democráticos, poniendo especial atención 
en las dimensiones afectivas y emocionales que movilizan la ciudadanía. 
 
En este sentido, se ha evidenciado que, dentro de la amplia literatura 
científica, el papel de las emociones ha sido abordado y enfocado, por un lado, 
el proceso de movilización y, por otro lado, a través de la dicotomía emociones 
propias para el contexto democrático versus emociones dañinas. Es notorio 
que, por un lado, la dimensión afectiva ha sido reintroducida en la explicación 
de la acción colectiva y de los movimientos sociales, teniendo en cuenta su rol 
específicamente en el surgimiento, la organización, la identidad, y los 
repertorios de la movilización política. Por otro lado, sobre todo de la mano de 
los teóricos políticos, las emociones se han incorporado en las cuestiones 
normativas acerca de la naturaleza de los regímenes políticos, así como en las 
cuestiones de justicia y de deliberación democrática. Por lo general, la 
perspectiva liberal interpreta esta cuestión en términos de buenas emociones 
para los propósitos democráticos, frente a aquellas que se consideran 
perjudiciales. Eso hace que a menudo se diferencie entre las emociones que 
tout court se ajustan con la democracia y las que no son beneficiosas para los 
valores liberales y democráticos. 
 
Teniendo en cuenta todo ello, la perspectiva adoptada en esta investigación ha 
tratado de ir más allá de una perspectiva puramente normativa, destacando 
los fascinantes horizontes de análisis que una conjunción de diferentes 
ámbitos científicos puede abrir. Aunque se ha reconocido la dificultad (tal vez 
la imposibilidad) de liberarse de la dicotomía moderna entre razón y emoción, 
la tesis muestra que esta misma dicotomía sustancia una gran parte de la 
literatura reciente en el campo de los estudios políticos y, por esta misma 
razón, constituye un punto central de análisis. Aunque en ciertos ámbitos de la 
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ciencia política la dicotomía entre razón y pasiones ha sido o bien reforzada o 
considerada acríticamente, la reciente evolución de perspectivas teóricas y 
metodológicas, junto con los mismos fenómenos de movilización que hemos 
considerado como caso de estudio, han sugerido el ángulo desde el que se ha 
ido explorando el papel de las emociones. 
 
En este contexto, si la cuestión teórica que nos guía en este estudio se 
relaciona con la contribución de un enfoque en las emociones en la teoría 
democrática, la idea principal era hacer una reflexión crítica en este papel de 
descubierta por las recientes movilizaciones contra la austeridad. En concreto, 
desde el punto de vista teórico, esta investigación se ha centrado en la 
posibilidad de combinar diferentes campos de investigación. Los estudios en 
los movimientos sociales y de protesta, y la teoría democrática y populista 
Luego se toman como parte de una investigación teórica sobre el lugar y la 
función de la dimensión afectiva en la política. De hecho, se ha argumentado 
que una combinación de diferentes perspectivas metodológicas – 
concretamente, el discurso y la teoría democrática y populista – representa 
una vía fructífera para comprender el papel de las emociones en la política y, a 
su vez, contribuye a la mejora de cada una de estas perspectivas. De hecho, 
estas perspectivas y teorías no son solamente la lente a través del cual leer el 
objeto de análisis, sino que también pertenecen ellas mismas a la cuestión 
planteadas aquí en esta investigación. En este sentido, el objetivo general ha 
sido el de comprobar y reivindicar de la utilidad teórico-interpretativa de 
algunas reflexiones, en la medida en que abordan críticamente la relación 
entre razón y emociones y, además, pueden arrojar luz sobre los recientes 
movimientos anti-austeridad que se han tenido en cuenta como caso de 
estudio. Por otra parte, con el foco de análisis en estos fenómenos de 
movilización, se ha tratado de explorar el papel que juegan las emociones en el 
proceso de disputa discursiva sobre el significado de conceptos políticos tales 
como ‘democracia’ y ‘el pueblo’, y con ello la misma soberanía popular. 
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En este contexto, las hipótesis que hemos desarrollado en los diferentes 
capítulos nos han permitido mantener algunas afirmaciones. (1) Las 
emociones desempeñan un rol ‘geométrico’ en la formación de los sujetos 
políticos, en la medida en que contribuyen activamente en el proceso de 
formación de la identidad (tanto para los individuos, como para los grupos). 
Por otra parte, la función que tienen en la formación de las identidades 
políticas, en la creación de los límites democráticos básicos, y en la 
consolidación de las creencias democráticas es particularmente evidente si se 
aborda la cuestión a nivel discursivo. En este sentido, se ha argumentado que 
las emociones operan políticamente a través de una construcción discursiva 
que divide lo social en dos campos, y con ello contribuye a la creación de las 
identidades políticas. Todo esto en una línea similar a la lógica populista 
articulada por la Escuela de Essex, en el que la división entre ‘el pueblo’ y el 
establishment adquiere un valor político central (Laclau, 2005a: 110). 
 
Por otra parte, (2) se ha argumentado que las emociones tienen un papel 
‘evocador’, lo cual contribuye al carácter latente de los conceptos políticos. 
Más en detalle, los factores emocionales participan, a través de la función 
simbólica de los conceptos que contribuyen a crear, a la constante disputa 
discursiva acerca de las ideas políticas. Refiriéndose al caso de estudio, se ha 
podido sugerir que los conceptos políticos clave como ‘el pueblo’ y 
‘democracia’ están involucrados en la esta misma disputa discursivo-afectiva. 
 
Por otra parte, se ha subrayado (3) que un enfoque discursivo de las 
emociones –  como el que se emplea en esta tesis – puede contribuir al debate 
normativo sobre la relación entre populismo y democracia. Centrarse en las 
emociones (e inevitablemente en la dicotomía entre razón y pasión) permite la 
observación de las complejas formas en las que se articula la lucha por el 
significado de la realidad política, y por lo tanto, añade matices interesantes al 
debate normativo sobre la naturaleza del populismo con respecto a la 
democracia (Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012a). En este sentido, un enfoque 
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discursivo de las emociones refuerza la teoría democrática, en la medida en 
que abre un espacio de reflexión teórica que permite ir más allá de la 
dicotomía puramente normativa entre las disposiciones afectivas adecuada 
para la democracia y aquellas que son, por el contrario, perjudiciales. Todo 
ello, evidentemente, permite incorporar otras dimensiones de análisis, así 
como perspectivas teórico-normativas alternativas. 
 
Con todo, a través de los debates académicos sobre democracia y populismo, 
el objetivo ha sido profundizar en las reflexiones teóricas que están atentos a 
las dimensiones emocionales. En consecuencia, la idea ha sido la de explorar el 
papel de las emociones en el proceso de la legitimidad democrática, basándose 
en el caso de la reciente ola de movimientos anti-austeridad, y su retórica de la 
soberanía popular. 
 
Esta investigación obviamente se ha enfrentado a diferentes dificultades y 
encontró algunos puntos críticos a lo largo del camino. Sin duda, la principal 
cuestión crítica ha sido la de enfocar correctamente algunas de las ideas 
desarrolladas, y hacer frente en particular al carácter abstracto de los 
conceptos relacionados con la noción de ‘emoción’ (y similares). No obstante, 
si se admite que definir los conceptos político es una de las tareas más 
controvertidas, entonces las definiciones amplias y abiertas que se encuentran 
en esta tesis están en sintonía con un enfoque de teoría política. Por otra parte, 
uno de los objetivos de esta tesis ha sido la de mostrar las articuladas formas 
en el que la dimensión emocional juega un papel en la elaboración de la 
realidad política. En este sentido entonces, aunque pueda parecer un 
argumento circular, el acto discursivo de la definición de la realidad adquiere 
un significado especial para el problema general de esta tesis. 
 
Del mismo modo, la fusión de las distintas perspectivas teóricas y 
metodológicas ha presentado diferentes dificultades. Sin embargo, el 
propósito ha sido el de reducir la diferencia entre teoría y evidencia empírica, 
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así como entre los debates sobre la democracia y enfoques sobre los 
movimientos sociales, contribuyendo a que las teorías normativas y análisis 
del discurso dialoguen. Vincular las teorías políticas contemporáneas al 
análisis discursivo de los fenómenos de movilización, en nuestra opinión, es 
una buena manera de responder a las preguntas de esta investigación y, con 
ello, poder hacer una contribución científica. 
 
La misma estructura de la tesis refleja el objetivo de nuestra investigación que 
mezcla reflexiones sobre los acontecimientos de protesta con los debates 
teóricos. La primera parte de esta tesis (capítulo dos) se centra de hecho en la 
revisión de la literatura acerca del lugar y función de las pasiones en el ámbito 
social y político. A pesar de que no parezca haber ninguna razón para subrayar 
el omnipresente rol de las emociones en la vida individual y social – es 
suficiente pensar en la reciente ira causado por el rescate de las instituciones 
financieras por parte de los gobiernos, la ‘ira del pueblo’ –, la dimensión 
afectiva ha tenido durante mucho tiempo una compleja y difícil relación con el 
ámbito político, y también con el pensamiento político más en general. De 
hecho, hemos profundizado brevemente en las amplias implicaciones 
históricas y teóricas asociadas con un enfoque en las emociones: el 
pensamiento político acerca de la dimensión afectiva, a la vez, ahonda sus 
raíces en las disputas filosóficas 'clásicas' (la preocupación por las emociones 
en la vida social es tan antigua como la filosofía misma), y abre relativamente 
nuevas y estimulantes líneas de investigación. Teniendo en cuenta todo ello, se 
han subrayado en los varios capítulos los intentos por revitalizar el estudio de 
las emociones, y sobre todo su importancia para la comprensión de los 
fenómenos políticos contemporáneos.  
 
El siguiente capítulo (capítulo tres) ha abordado las consecuencias 
epistemológicas que la literatura sobre emociones y política ha puesto en 
evidencia, y con ello se ha delineado el eje metodológico de la investigación. 
Como ya se ha sugerido, el argumento central es que análisis del discurso e 
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investigación teórica sobre la relación entre populismo y democracia tienen 
varios puntos de convergencia, y por lo tanto constituyen el centro de la 
investigación. Esta conjunción de perspectivas teóricas y discursivas permite 
una mejor articulación del problema que esta tesis aborda. En este sentido, se 
ha esbozado el enfoque sobre populismo desarrollado desarrollados por la 
Escuela de Essex, y también hemos explorado el lugar y la función de la 
dimensión afectiva tal y como esta perspectiva los ha ido enfocando. Se ha 
argumentado, de hecho, que es a través de la lógica populista que las 
emociones operan lo que hemos llamado su función ‘geométrica’. El populismo, 
es decir, activa una politización de las pasiones. 
 
En los siguientes dos capítulos (capítulo cuatro y el capítulo cinco) se ha 
desarrollado un análisis de las recientes movilizaciones anti-austeridad, 
combinando análisis de discurso con la reflexión teórica sobre la acción 
colectiva. Después de haber perfilado las múltiples explicaciones científicas de 
la movilización política, se han puesto de relieve sobre todo los enfoques 
científicos orientados al análisis de los procesos simbólicos de la acción 
colectiva. La idea central es que temas como identidad y emociones encajan 
con el proceso de framing, que resulta ser la construcción social de la esfera 
política a través de las dinámicas cognitivas que la misma movilización 
produce. Con ello, se ha hecho hincapié en que la dimensión afectiva, así como 
otros factores culturales, estratégicos e ideológicos, es necesaria para la 
comprensión de la actual ola de movilizaciones. En este orden de ideas, sobre 
la base del ‘marco de injusticia’ propuesto por Gamson (1992), se han 
subrayado las formas en que las emociones están involucradas en la dinámica 
política: tienen – se ha argumentado – un papel constructivo en la percepción 
de la situación de injusticia, en la formación de la identidad colectiva, y en el 
activación de la acción política. Así que el caso de las recientes movilizaciones 
anti-austeridad resulta ser un ejemplo de las formas en que la dimensión 
afectiva se manifiesta en los procesos políticos y en la acción colectiva. 
Teniendo en cuenta todo ello, dos consecuencias se merecen una mención 
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adicional: la primera es que, los movimientos políticos son a la vez 
estratégicos y emocionales, es decir, que están orientados al cambio de las 
políticas públicas, así como son actore públicos que contribuyen a la 
redefinición de la realidad política. En segundo lugar, se ha argumentado que 
la movilización social y en particular modo los recientes movimientos anti-
austeridad desvelan profundas cuestiones teóricas sobre la naturaleza de la 
política y de la democracia. Cuestiones teóricas que están vinculadas 
esencialmente  con la dimensión afectiva y la dicotomía entre razón y 
emociones. 
 
Como consecuencia, el quinto capítulo se ha dedicado explícitamente a estas 
preguntas teóricas, puestas en primer plano por las recientes movilizaciones 
de protesta. Entre ellas, la crítica a la representación política, los procesos 
participativos de toma de decisiones, así como la idea de un lugar diferente 
para la democracia que pueda permitir el ejercicio político del ‘pueblo’ son las 
críticas teóricas que los movimientos sociales y de protesta dejan al 
descubierto. Estos puntos críticos, además, están vinculados con la disputa 
discursivo-emocional para el significado de la conceptualidad política. En este 
sentido, destacando los elementos discursivos empleados en de los 
acontecimiento de protesta, se han querido evidenciar las dinámicas 
emocionales que entran en juego con la misma definición de las ideas políticas, 
tales como ‘el pueblo y ‘democracia’. Con todo ello, se ha demostrado que una 
perspectiva centrada en la dimensión afectiva también puede arrojar luz sobre 
la relación peculiar y, a menudo incómoda, entre populismo y democracia. 
 
De hecho, los dos últimos capítulos ahondan en este tema y el debate 
normativo sobre el lugar de la dimensión afectiva dentro de la política 
democrática. Concretamente, en el capítulo sexto aborda la difícil relación 
entre populismo y democracia teniendo en cuenta las recientes perspectivas 
que ponen de relieve la magnitud de tal cuestión. La idea ha sido considerar el 
problema planteado por Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser (2012a; 2012b) sobre el 
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carácter amenazante o bien correctivo del populismo para la democracia, y 
con ello presentar diferentes posiciones teóricas sobre el asunto. Por un lado, 
la tradición intelectual que ve el populismo como una amenaza para la 
democracia liberal, en la medida en que sería dañino para algunos de sus 
valores fundamentales. Aquí algunas lecturas recientes de esta relación – 
como, por ejemplo, la de Urbinati (2014) – resulta ser iluminante en la medida 
en que compagina las cuestiones históricas y teóricas que se unen en el mismo 
concepto de ‘pueblo’ y todo lo que conlleva. 
 
Por otra parte, se han puesto de manifiesto diferentes evaluaciones teóricas 
(Laclau, 2005a) que, no siendo menos rigurosos analíticamente, mantienen 
que el populismo sería, al fin y al cabo, un aspecto esencial para cualquier 
articulación político-democrática. Además, a partir de las ideas de esta 
literatura, nos hemos centrado en las ‘paradojas’ de la democracia, así como en 
la ubicación y la función del ‘pueblo’. Esto, se ha argumentado, tiene una 
conexión directa con el caso de estudio y el rol de las emociones en el ámbito 
político. Con todo, el argumento ha sido que, a pesar de coincidir con la 
posición liberal en las críticas a ciertas falacias en la teoría populista, estas 
crítica no desacreditan esta última perspectiva teórica en su capacidad para 
dar cuenta del rol de las emociones en la política, y la forma en la que operan a 
nivel discursivo. 
 
Aunque los diferentes análisis que hemos esbozado, como los de Canovan, 
Urbinati, y Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser, contribuyen a la tarea de aclarar las 
raíces históricas y teóricas del populismo, fallan en parte en no trazar una 
conexión entre este tema y la dimensión afectivo-emocional. Como se ha 
demostrado a través del análisis discursivo de las recientes movilizaciones 
anti-austeridad – aquí entendidos como una forma de populismo – las 
emociones tienen una función específica en la política democrática – un papel 
que hemos llamado ‘geométrica’ y ‘sugerente’ – y están directamente 
relacionadas las disputas por la soberanía popular. Con todo, se ha apuntado 
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también que esta función no encuentra (salvo las excepciones que se 
explicitan en el capítulo septimo) el justo reconocimiento en gran parte de la 
reciente literatura en la teoría democrática. 
 
En este contexto, en el último capítulo, se ha centrado la investigación en el 
enfoque agonístico desarrollado recientemente por Chantal Mouffe. De hecho, 
hemos esbozado su propuesta normativa con el fin de delinear un horizonte 
productivo en la conceptualización tanto del papel de las emociones, como de 
la relación entre populismo y democracia. Al vincular conceptos como el 
conflicto, las pasiones y el agonismo, Mouffe desarrolla una perspectiva 
fructífera que ofrece un horizonte crítico de análisis, que bien encaja en este 
estudio. Su contribución normativa se relaciona con nuestro enfoque 
discursivo de las emociones en las movilizaciones anti-austeridad y, en este 
sentido, permite entrever las dinámicas en las que la dimensión emocional 
opera en el proceso de elaboración de la realidad política – lo que en capítulos 
anteriores se ha descrito como un proceso que pretende colmar el vacío de la 
democracia. Ahora bien, a pesar de que el modelo agonístico de la democracia, 
desde un punto de vista analítico, no es inmune a la dicotomía entre razón y 
emoción, se ha no obstante argumentado que la perspectiva de Mouffe 
permite dar cuenta – aún de manera no definitiva – de muchas de las 
cuestiones que se han planteado en esta tesis. 
 
Con todo lo que se puede concluir es que, si – al menos en el plan teórico – se 
tiene que aceptar la imposibilidad de ir más allá de la dicotomía entre razón y 
emoción (en la medida en que seguimos utilizando estas dos nociones, 
continuaremos a operar a través de ellas), sin embargo – desde un punto de 
vista normativo – se puede actuar políticamente más allá de esta oposición. 
 
